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REPORT

# Improving Soldier and Unit Effectiveness with the Stryker Brigade Combat Team Warfighters' Forum

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*Bryan W. Hallmark • S. Jamie Gayton*

Prepared for the United States Army  
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## Preface

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This report describes a study of leader-, soldier-, and unit-level outcomes associated with the Army's first warfighters' forum, the Stryker Brigade Combat Team Warfighters' Forum (SWfF). In 1999 the Army began the creation of a "medium" force, eventually to become Stryker Brigade Combat Teams (SBCTs), to bridge a gap between "light" initial-entry units and heavy armored forces (West-Point.org, 2002). By 2003 SBCTs were preparing for deployment to Iraq. Thus, the time from creation to deployment was quite short. To support the rapid and successful development of SBCTs, a more networked and collaborative means of sharing information—SWfF—was established. The research discussed in this report explored how SWfF supports units preparing for operations.

Specifically, the study analyzed leaders' and soldiers' use of SWfF products and services, their satisfaction with these products and services, the efficacy of a SWfF training tool in promoting individual tactical knowledge, and whether the availability of a handbook derived from recent returnees' combat experiences improved unit-level tactical performance. The purposes of this analysis were (1) to determine whether and how SWfF products are associated with knowledge acquisition and tactical proficiency and (2) to explore ways in which SWfF, and by extension other warfighters' forums, could better support tactical units in the future.

The work will be of interest to those involved with setting direction and priorities for Army training and professional development programs, as well as to those involved in establishing and maintaining knowledge management networks.

This research was sponsored by the Commanding General, I Corps and Fort Lewis, and was conducted in RAND Arroyo Center's Manpower and Training Program. RAND Arroyo Center, part of the RAND Corporation, is a federally funded research and development center sponsored by the United States Army. Questions and comments regarding this research are welcome and should be directed to the research team leader, Bryan W. Hallmark, [hallmark@rand.org](mailto:hallmark@rand.org).

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## Summary

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Following Operation Desert Storm, the U.S. Army initiated a major force modernization effort designed to improve its ability to respond to a rapidly changing global strategic landscape. One of the most significant components of this effort was the development of Stryker Brigade Combat Teams (SBCTs) supported by an armored weapons platform that was lighter and more deployable than any the Army had at the time. A brigade coordination cell was established to assist with SBCT development. This cell later became the Stryker Brigade Combat Team Warfighters' Forum (SWfF).

SWfF was designed to facilitate a more collaborative, network-based training system. Specifically, it was designed to support the SBCT community of practice<sup>1</sup> by assisting in the development and dissemination of new lessons learned, leader development tools, and tactics, techniques, and procedures. The Army is currently developing and fielding additional warfighters' forums (WfFs). To support further decisions regarding the WfF concept, senior Army leaders asked RAND Arroyo Center to assess how and how well SWfF works. This report documents the results of that research.

## Approach

Our primary purpose was to assess the association between (1) SWfF products and services and (2) soldier and leader proficiency. We designed an assessment that approached this objective from the following three vantage points.

**Customer Use of and Satisfaction with SWfF Products and Services.** To obtain a robust understanding of customers' views about SWfF, we conducted three usage/satisfaction substudies. In the first one, we surveyed SBCT leaders and staffs about how well a SWfF-maintained website met their needs. In the second substudy, we surveyed a broader pool of SBCT personnel to determine how many used SWfF support; specifically, we sampled the personnel from two SBCTs, analyzing data provided by more than 3,000 leaders and soldiers. In the third usage/satisfaction substudy, we analyzed the logs that SWfF leaders and staff kept on support they offered by telephone and email to determine how often and in what ways they directly supported organizations within and outside of the SBCT community of practice.

**Measuring Gains in Individual Tactical Knowledge.** To determine whether SWfF tools were associated with improvements in the tactical knowledge of soldiers and junior leaders, we

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<sup>1</sup> For this report we define "community of practice" as all individuals either assigned to SBCTs or supporting them in some fashion. This community includes Stryker leaders, staffs and soldiers, Army personnel outside the SBCTs that support the SBCTs, and contractors that directly or indirectly support SBCTs.

designed a substudy in which personnel from two SBCT battalions completed a pre-training assessment and then participated in a tactical training event, called the “Hundredth House,” a computer game reenactment of an actual ambush involving U.S. Army forces in Iraq. We contrasted post- and pre-assessment values to determine whether the training event improved tactical knowledge about similar possible ambush scenarios.

**Measuring Gains in Unit-Level Tactical Knowledge.** To assess whether SWfF tools were positively associated with unit performance, we worked with SWfF to develop a checklist-style handbook, the Iraq Common Events Approaches (ICEA) handbook, and then conducted a test of performance differences between units that used the handbook and those that did not. To create this handbook, we devised a method for rapidly (1) collecting and synthesizing the combat experiences of many soldiers who recently returned from an operational deployment and (2) converting these experiences into timely information that leaders could use during their preparations for upcoming deployments.

## Overview of Findings

### SWfF Was Used Widely and Viewed Favorably

Considered as a whole, the three usage/satisfaction substudies strongly demonstrate that SWfF was supporting the Army's training and preparation for war through the incorporation of lessons learned. The vast majority of SBCT leaders sampled were satisfied with SWfF's StrykerNet website and would recommend it to others. However, some of the digital resources in StrykerNet were viewed less often than others, indicating that they might benefit from a reassessment of their purpose, content, and/or format. In addition, a small number of respondents indicated that StrykerNet improvement was necessary; the most commonly suggested improvement was to include more prepackaged training material.

The usage survey results confirmed that SWfF was used by the SBCT community of practice. Approximately one-third of senior leaders and staff reported that they visited StrykerNet, and one-half of those visiting the site reported using it for training or individual development purposes. Less than 10 percent of those sampled attended a Stryker symposium or sought SWfF staff support. However, these lower rates probably do not reflect the full value of the symposiums or the SWfF staff. By design and for practical reasons, not all members of a unit attend a symposium or receive SWfF staff support. Instead, units have representatives attend or ask questions and then disseminate the lessons learned to the rest of the unit members.

The analysis of staff communication logs strongly suggests that customers were satisfied with the support they received directly from SWfF leaders and staff. SWfF personnel handled a large number of requests for assistance: approximately 80 customer communications per week (about 3,600 customer communications yearly). Repeat customers were commonplace, accounting for nearly 80 percent of the communications analyzed. The most common type of communication involved members of an SBCT seeking training-related information. The log analysis also suggests that SWfF staff reduced the burden on SBCT tactical units by addressing requests that would otherwise have been directed to them. Specifically, 36 percent of SWfF's communications involved requests from organizations outside of the SBCT community. It is very likely that if SWfF were not present, someone in I Corps or an SBCT would have needed to handle the request, losing valuable time from their deployment preparation or training.


### SWfF Tools Were Associated with Gains in Individual Tactical Knowledge

The Hundredth House training tool<sup>2</sup> improved the tactical knowledge of most participants in this substudy. We saw meaningful gains among three of the four groups analyzed: officers, noncommissioned officers with recent Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) experience, and other enlisted soldiers all scored significantly higher on measures of tactical training after completing the Hundredth House training. NCOs with Afghanistan or pre-2006 OIF experience showed little gain. We used results to create feedback reports for battalion commanders; lower scores mean that unit members were less likely to react to situations as commanders expected, information that commanders and their staffs can use to focus subsequent training. Most Army training tools lack accompanying assessments and reports such as this.<sup>3</sup>

### The ICEA Handbook Produced for SWfF Led to Improved Unit Proficiency

Platoons in an SBCT that received the ICEA did significantly better on tactical tasks during combat training center rotations than platoons that did not receive the handbook. The findings were very robust: We found this effect at both the Joint Readiness Training Center and the National Training Center, regardless of how many training rotations the observer had previously seen, and across ten different tactical scenarios. In addition, as shown in Figure S.1, these

**Figure S.1**  
Differences Attributable to the ICEA Handbook During a Training Rotation



RAND TR919-S.1

<sup>2</sup> The Hundredth House tool was developed by Joint Base Lewis-McChord, Battle Command Training Center, Leader Development Section, and is available through the Stryker Warfighters' Forum. The name derives from soldiers' description of the ambush site as looking like a hundred other houses they had been to.

<sup>3</sup> It is possible that some may exist, but we did not uncover any, and none were being used by SWfF during our research.



differences were observed during the entire training rotation.<sup>4</sup> On average all platoons—those that did and did not receive the ICEA—improved during the course of the rotation.<sup>5</sup> However, the platoons from SBCTs that had the ICEA did better than the other platoons throughout the entire rotation.

## Conclusions and Recommendations

The Army's training system must be able to respond more rapidly to changes in the strategic and tactical landscape. Our findings indicate that SWfF is a successful step in this direction, harnessing available computer-based technologies to rapidly collect, analyze, and synthesize lessons learned from theater and then disseminating them as training resources. These findings appear to be generalizable to other warfighters' forums, and thus we recommend that the Army continue to develop and refine the WfF concept. To this end, we offer several recommendations that could help other WfFs and Army knowledge management organizations:

1. **Ensure That WfFs Continue to Provide Dynamic Information to Their Communities.** We think a primary reason for SWfF's success was its focus on collecting and disseminating the most up-to-date information to the community of practice. Commanders, staffs, and subordinates want to obtain the most recent TTPs and/or information that pertain to where they will deploy next. WfFs need to continue to make this an important element of what they do.
2. **Monitor Views Within the Community of Practice About What WfFs Offer.** We found that leaders generally were satisfied with StrykerNet offerings, but some did indicate that improvements could be made. We believe WfFs will continue to be valuable, particularly if they track and address their customers' preferences. For example, tracking could reveal that some elements of a WfF are so rarely used that they should be discontinued or that there is more demand for some types of information than the website currently provides. Such tracking is not difficult or costly. We recommend it become a standard component of warfighters' forums.
3. **Incorporate Feedback Reports into Prepackaged Training Aids and Tools.** We are not recommending that assessments be used for assigning grades or for comparing or evaluating units. Rather, training tools should give commanders feedback to help them decide how to alter professional development courses or individual and/or collective training programs. The tool then supports units in two ways: it helps teach soldiers, and it is a diagnostic for command groups. Incorporating embedded assessments into training aids is a consideration not just for WfFs, but for other Army organizations as well. The Army would benefit from a continuous review of which Army training tools/aids could best be modified to include embedded assessments.
4. **Consider Broader Adoption of the Method Used to Produce the ICEA Handbook.** The ICEA was positively correlated with success at the combat training centers. The

<sup>4</sup> A 0–5 scale was used by observers. The unit received a 0 when it should have done the skill/task but did not, and a 5 when the performance was “superior.”

<sup>5</sup> The means for training days 10–15 were statistically greater than those for training days 1–4 and 5–9 at  $p < .05$ . There was no statistical difference between the means for training days 1–4 and 5–9.

method used to create it offers several promising advantages for rapidly converting soldier knowledge into training and mission execution materials that can be employed by units preparing for deployments. The method's advantages include

- Leveraging current and relevant information: The information is derived from those who just returned from a deployment.
- Disseminating information rapidly: The time between information collection and publication of a document is three months or less.
- Placing a low burden on leaders and soldiers: It takes less than one hour of a combat returnee's time to provide the necessary information.
- Using empirical data: The technique moves away from anecdotal stories of a few and instead synthesizes the combat knowledge of hundreds of soldiers.
- Applying to other areas of interest: The technique could be readily adapted to collect and disseminate information about the performance of systems, equipment, or other areas of interest.

Given the positive outcomes demonstrated for this method, as well as its potential advantages, we believe it merits further consideration and broader application.



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We are indebted to the many anonymous Stryker soldiers and leaders who supported our research by completing surveys, using training tools, and being willing to have their performance assessed at CTCs. If this research helps future soldiers, it is because of them. We are particularly grateful for the participation and feedback from the two battalion commanders who volunteered to use the Hundredth House as part of this research.

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## Glossary

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1LT	First Lieutenant
2LT	Second Lieutenant
AAR	After-Action Review
AC	Active Component
AO	Area of operation
ARFORGEN	Army Force Generation
ARNG	Army National Guard
BCT	Brigade Combat Team
BCTC	Battle command training center
CALL	Center for Army Lessons Learned
CM	Consequence management
COIN	Counterinsurgency
COP	Combat outpost
CPT	Captain
CS	Cordon and search
CTC	Combat training center
DA	Department of the Army
DAC	District Advisory Council (Iraq)
DoD	Department of Defense
DOTMLPF	Doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leader development, personnel and facilities
DP	Dismounted patrol
FM	Field manual
FOB	Forward operating base
FORSCOM	U.S. Army Forces Command
HBCT	Heavy brigade combat team
HD	Hasty/deliberate [checkpoint]
HMMWV	High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle
Hundredth House	Leader decisionmaking tool available on the StrykerNet website
HWfF	Heavy Warfighters' Forum

IBCT	Interim Brigade Combat Team
ICEA	Iraq Common Event Approaches [handbook]
IED	Improvised explosive device
IF	Indirect fire
IWfF	Infantry Warfighters' Forum
JMSOC	Jacobsen Mission Support Operations Center
JRTC	Joint Readiness Training Center
JSS	Joint security station
LDZ	Leader development zone
LTC	Lieutenant Colonel
MAJ	Major
MCO	Major combat operations
MS	Meeting site
MSR	Main supply route
NCO	Noncommissioned officer
NTC	National Training Center
OC	Observer/controller
ODS	Operation Desert Storm
OEF	Operation Enduring Freedom
OIF	Operation Iraqi Freedom
PIED	Possible/suspected improvised explosive device
QRF	Quick reaction force
RD	Raid
ROE	Rules of engagement
SBCT	Stryker Brigade Combat Team
SGT	Sergeant
SOP	Standing operating procedure
SPC	Specialist (Army rank)
SSG	Staff Sergeant (Army rank)
Stryker	Wheeled armored combat vehicle
StrykerNet	Website established and maintained by SWfF as the home for SWfF's knowledge repository
STX	Situational training exercise
SWfF	Stryker Warfighters' Forum: a network-centric knowledge repository designed to collect and provide lessons learned and deliver tools to increase Stryker soldier knowledge and increase Stryker unit performance
TACSOP	Tactical standing operating procedures

TM	Trainer/mentor
TRADOC	U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command
TTPs	Tactics, techniques, and procedures
VBIED	Vehicle-borne improvised explosive device
WfF	Warfighters' Forum





## Introduction

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Following Operation Desert Storm (ODS), the U.S. Army implemented a series of significant force modernization initiatives to improve its ability to respond to a rapidly changing global strategic landscape. One of the most significant initiatives was the development of a new Brigade Combat Team (BCT) centered on an armored weapon platform that was lighter and more deployable than any the Army had at the time. In the wake of ODS, the Army had recognized a need to have a BCT that was capable of bridging the gap between rapidly deployable “light” initial entry divisions (e.g., the 82nd Airborne and 10th Mountain Divisions) and heavy armored units (e.g., the 3rd Infantry Division) that required more time to deploy but were more lethal (West-Point.org, 2002). The new brigade was, then, intended to provide the Army with a unit that offered to some extent the advantages of both light and heavy units.

In the late 1990s and early 2000s, the Army rapidly moved to create BCTs with these capabilities. In 1999 General Shinseki, then Chief of Staff, announced in a speech that the Army would begin developing a new force with such characteristics. Soon after his speech the Army created the position of Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) Deputy Commanding General for Transformation and formed a staff for this office. Within a year, vehicle trials for the interim vehicle were under way and 3rd Brigade, 2nd Infantry Division began to reorganize into a new brigade (later to become SBCT 1). A six-wheeled armored vehicle—the Stryker combat vehicle—was selected as the major weapons platform of the interim brigade, and Stryker vehicles began to arrive at Fort Lewis by mid-2002. In that year the vehicle was a highlight of Millennium Challenge 2002 at the National Training Center (NTC). Subsequently, the Army published Field Manual 3-21.21, defining the mission, intent, and training expectations for the Stryker Brigade Combat Team or SBCT (Army, 2003). By 2003 approximately 50 field manuals specific to Stryker were in place and SBCT 1 was preparing for a deployment to Iraq.<sup>1</sup>

In conjunction with these developments, a brigade coordination cell was established to assist the development of SBCTs. Ultimately this cell evolved into the Stryker Brigade Combat Team Warfighters’ Forum (SWfF). The rapid and successful development of the SBCTs was in part supported by the development of this cell, which provided the capability to rapidly collect, synthesize, and disseminate best practices and tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) to the SBCTs.

Almost as soon as they were formed, the SBCTs were directed to shift their preparation and training focus from major combat operations (MCO) to stability operations and fighting

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<sup>1</sup> Mark J. Reardon and Jeffrey A. Charlston, *From Transformation to Combat: The First Stryker Brigade at War*, Washington, D.C.: Center of Military History, 2007.

counterinsurgencies. This change in focus required SBCTs to develop new TTPs. Previous TTPs, designed to exploit the speed and situational awareness afforded by the Stryker vehicle and the SBCT's advanced communication and computer systems in MCO, were not as practical for SBCTs required to operate in urban environments for counterinsurgency operations (COIN). In addition, TTPs were constantly changing in response to an adaptive insurgent enemy and the ever-evolving, dynamic requirements of current COIN fights.

All of these conditions contributed to the Army shifting "towards a more networked and collaborative training system facilitated by modern communication technology."<sup>2</sup> Such a system could rapidly convert the lessons learned in theater into information that could be shared with units preparing to deploy to theater. SWfF is a key feature of this shift in training. It was designed to support knowledge sharing and peer-to-peer learning through networked communities of practice. Specifically, SWfF was designed to support the SBCT personnel by assisting in the development and dissemination of new TTPs, lessons learned, and leader development tools.

To achieve its design goals, SWfF conducts several outreach activities. The major activities include a SWfF-created and -maintained website that serves as an SBCT information repository. To facilitate the sharing of lessons learned among SBCT leaders, SWfF coordinates and moderates an Internet-based interactive leader and staff symposium. Finally, SWfF staff directly support the SBCT community as requested.

## SWfF's History, Mission, and Supporting Tasks

In 1999 a brigade coordination cell was established to support the development of the interim brigade. This original cell was composed of over 90 personnel and was responsible for all facets of establishing a new organization (a much broader mission than SWfF's mission today). During the last decade, the cell changed in size and focus. Such changes included the formation of The Stryker Center for Lessons Learned, the commanding general's initiatives group, and the Stryker University concept. According to SWfF's operations officer, Colonel (ret.) Rich Kaiura (2008), "SWfF originated from the commanding general's initiatives group and the Stryker University Initiative." SWfF is a smaller organization than the original coordination cell. During this study, SWfF was directed by a lieutenant colonel or colonel with a staff of approximately seven retired Army personnel.

SWfF's mission according to the organization's charter is

To enhance BCT leader, leader team, and unit training throughout the Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) process, to include the incorporation of lessons being learned by all BCTs, in order for BCTs to perform at higher levels of mission proficiency in each subsequent deployment; and to serve as conduits of BCT operational experience for training, doctrine, and force design and as models for other Army training and leader initiatives.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>2</sup> I Corps' Stryker Brigade Combat Team Warfighters' Forum (SWfF), *Fort Lewis Stryker Brigade Combat Team Warfighters' Forum Concept Plan*, 2007, p. 18.

<sup>3</sup> Benjamin S. Griffin, William S. Wallace, and Charles C. Campbell, *General's Charter: SWfF, IWfF, HWfF*, 2007, p. 18.

Central to SWfF's organizational charter is that it is focused on "collecting and sharing observations, insights, lessons and innovations from SBCTs" to establish a knowledge repository of experience and expertise that could integrate lessons learned and TTPs from the institutional Army, combat training centers, and operational units.<sup>4</sup> SWfF's eight supporting tasks were designed to allow it to achieve the goals of the charter:<sup>5</sup>

1. Develop and sustain a repository of experience and expertise in the SBCT community.
2. Create a community of practice among SBCTs, home stations, and the institutional Army.
3. Use a collaborative, distributive,<sup>6</sup> continuous learning methodology that is operationally based.
4. Recommend applicability for other brigades.
5. Adjust concept and evolve as new opportunities and technologies arise.
6. Enhance the planning, coordination, integration, and facilitation of unit training and leader development, and leverage the community of practice to marshal resources from across DoD, academia, and state and local agencies to support home station unit needs.
7. Incorporate lessons learned from all SBCTs.
8. Act as an advocate for the seven SBCTs and monitor integration of DOTMLPF<sup>7</sup> in SBCT formations.

## Purpose of This Research

Our primary purpose was to assess the association of SWfF products and services with soldier and leader proficiency. Because the SWfF's role is quite broad—as demonstrated by its supporting tasks—we designed an assessment that studied several elements that could contribute to possible improvements in soldier and leader proficiency. We group the elements studied into three broad categories:

- customer use of and satisfaction with SWfF products and services;
- gains in individual tactical knowledge; and
- the degree to which providing units with systematically created, theater-based feedback improved their proficiency during a combat training center event.

We determined customer use and levels of satisfaction by conducting three distinct sub-studies. First, we surveyed SBCT leaders and staff on their views of SWfF's website, StrykerNet. StrykerNet includes a repository of lessons learned, instructional/training materials, and

<sup>4</sup> I Corps' SWfF, 2007, p. 1.

<sup>5</sup> Supporting tasks were found in I Corps' SWfF, 2007.

<sup>6</sup> This includes use of distributed learning methods. We use Badrul Khan's definition of distributed learning as "an instructional model that allows instructor, students, and content to be located in different, non-centralized locations so that instruction and learning occur independent of time and place . . . . The distributed learning model can be used in combination with traditional classroom-based courses, with traditional distance learning courses, or it can be used to create wholly virtual classrooms." James L. Morrison and Badrul H. Khan, *The Global e-Learning Framework: An Interview with Badrul Khan*, The Technology Source Archives at the University of North Carolina, 2003.

<sup>7</sup> DOTMLPF is doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leader development, personnel and facilities.

links to other information websites. We asked survey respondents to use various StrykerNet elements and answer a series of use and satisfaction items about the element they used. Second, we surveyed all individuals in two SBCTs to estimate the percentage of individuals in the SBCT community of practice that used various SWfF products (e.g., StrykerNet) or services (e.g., direct SWfF staff support). For the third substudy, we had SWfF leadership and staff complete a communications log. They completed the log for a three-week period during which they recorded categorical elements of email, face-to-face, and phone conversations. Some elements included the content of the call (e.g., doctrine or training related), who they communicated with (e.g., SBCT unit members or Department of the Army personnel), and whether SWfF personnel believed they addressed customers' needs. The substudies are documented in Chapter Two of this report.

While documenting use of and satisfaction with SWfF products and services was one facet of our research, another was empirically determining whether SWfF training packages/tools led to gains in the tactical knowledge of individual SBCT leaders and soldiers. For two SBCT battalions, we assessed whether using a virtual tactical training tool was related to soldiers' and leaders' gains in tactical knowledge.<sup>8</sup> During this substudy, battalion personnel completed a pre-treatment assessment, participated in a tactical training event facilitated by the battalion commanders, and then completed a post-treatment assessment. This part of our research is detailed in Chapter Three.

As defined in the sixth supporting task of its charter, SWfF also was designed to enhance the planning, coordination, integration, and facilitation of unit training. We assessed whether products that SWfF (or any Army knowledge management organization) could create, maintain, and disseminate could improve unit-level outcomes at an Army combat training center.<sup>9</sup> This research involved two distinct phases: the creation of a handbook that we employed as a treatment, and an empirical test of performance differences between units that did versus did not receive the handbook. To build the handbook, we developed a low-cost, rapid method to scientifically gather and analyze the experiences of more than 300 soldiers and leaders who were in operations in Iraq three months prior. We assessed and aggregated their experiences into a single, checklist-style handbook that was distributed to some units and withheld from others.<sup>10</sup> Observers<sup>11</sup> at the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) and NTC observed units in our substudy and then completed questionnaires made up of items assessing the skills/actions from the handbook. We detail this research in Chapter Four of this report.

As outlined above, Chapters Two, Three, and Four of this report document the methods, present the results, and discuss the implications of the individual substudies comprising our research. In Chapter Five we integrate and summarize our findings, and we discuss their overall implications for SWfF, for other warfighters' forums, and for Army knowledge management organizations more broadly.

<sup>8</sup> We were able to assess only one of the SWfF tools that focused on individual tasks and skills. However, as we discuss later in Chapter Three, we believe these results indicate that the other tools could be effective as well.

<sup>9</sup> At the inception of this study we recognized that all units had relatively equivalent access to SWfF resources. We designed a treatment that no units could have accessed previously, thus increasing our confidence that the treatment delivered was the most likely reason for any measured differences between control and treatment battalions.

<sup>10</sup> Generally these groups were similar in composition.

<sup>11</sup> Throughout this document we refer to both National Training Center observer/controllers and Joint Readiness Training Center trainer/mentors as "observers."

## SWfF Successfully Reached and Supported SBCT Community

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Some could argue that the true measure of success for an organization like SWfF is how well it *directly* and positively affects unit performance in theater—such as a platoon leader successfully using a technique that he learned from SWfF. In this example, the leader *directly* learned the technique from SWfF. We also contend that SWfF products and services could have a valuable but *indirect* effect on unit performance in theater that is practically impossible to measure empirically.<sup>1</sup> As an example, one SBCT battalion commander told us that as a result of his participation in a Stryker symposium,<sup>2</sup> he revised his unit's tactical standing operating procedures (TACSOP). We are reasonably confident that a battalion commander changing his TACSOP would affect how his unit operates in theater. However, it would have been impossible to *systematically* measure the indirect (or distal) relationship between a SWfF product or service that led to a commander changing his or her TACSOP and the changes in units' performance that might have resulted. In addition, the information requests SWfF receives from units, leaders, and soldiers reflect specific needs and may be applied in different ways by recipients. Consequently, most measurement methodologies cannot be used accurately because the relationships between the information SWfF provides and the impact of that information are so unique that the samples would be inherently too small.<sup>3</sup>

To address this challenge, we developed three substudies that by proxy measured some of the relationships between SWfF and possible outcomes for SBCTs. Specifically, the three substudies measured customer use and satisfaction with SWfF products and services. The first substudy assessed SBCT leaders' and staff's views about a SWfF-maintained website; the second substudy determined the percentage of SBCT personnel who used SWfF; and the third assessed the role of SWfF staff within and outside the SBCT community of practice. In the remainder of this chapter, we describe the methods and report the results of each substudy.

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<sup>1</sup> In Chapters Three and Four we tested for direct or proximal effects between the use of SWfF tools and individual- and unit-level outcomes.

<sup>2</sup> Stryker symposiums are computer-based, audio-visual teleconferences coordinated and moderated by SWfF. During these conferences the leadership of I Corps, SBCTs, and other Army agency representatives discuss focused topics of interest to the SBCT community.

<sup>3</sup> The vast majority of measurement methods that allow researchers to conduct tests of statistical significance rely on estimating differences in central tendency. Without sufficiently large treatment and control samples, such methods are impractical.

## Vast Majority of SBCT Leaders and Staff Satisfied with Website

SWfF created a website (<https://strykernet.army.mil>)<sup>4</sup> specializing in “all things Stryker” to serve as a repository of experience and expertise for SBCTs. As such, StrykerNet accomplishes the first supporting task of SWfF’s charter—to “Develop and sustain a repository of experience and expertise in the SBCT community.” If SBCT leaders and staff found the information on StrykerNet useful and would have used it again, then SWfF’s activities would be associated with potentially positive SBCT unit outcomes.

To measure use and satisfaction with StrykerNet, we designed, administered, and analyzed the data from a web-based survey of SBCT leader and staff perspectives. Descriptions of the components of the StrykerNet website that leaders and staff responded to in our survey are described below, followed by a discussion of our methods and results.

### StrykerNet Components

The StrykerNet website contains a wealth of material and links to several other websites. However, based on our review of the site and discussions with SWfF staff, we determined that the following nine components form the vast majority of the website that warranted assessment.

**Home Page.** The StrykerNet home page includes information about virtual teams and workshops, SWfF weekly updates, and previous and upcoming Stryker symposiums.

**SLA Marshall Video Recordings.** The SLA Marshall recordings are a collection of interviews with recently deployed leaders from company-, battalion-, and brigade-level units. The recordings include semi-structured discussions pertaining to combat preparations, deployment operations, and redeployment and reset actions.

**SLA Marshall Transcripts.** The SLA Marshall transcripts are a complete written transcription of the recordings. Users are able to search the transcripts by topic. Embedded in the transcripts are hyperlinks to sections of the recording.

**Leader Development Zone: Self-Improvement.** The leader development zone self-improvement section comprises four self-paced development tools that contain lesson plans and audio/visual recordings. The lesson plans subsection includes learning objectives, a list of suggested readings, and a discussion agenda to guide military history and theory courses. In addition there are links to an instructor support site and a contractor website that hosts a tactical language and culture training system.

**Leader Development Zone: Training Modules.**<sup>5</sup> These modules consist of five complete and nine in-progress tutorial style audio/visual classes on Army topics. The five complete modules cover the topics of convoy drills, Field Manual (FM) 3-0, FM 3-24, goal setting, and a stand-alone reading list. The in-progress modules include topics such as negotiations, critical thinking, and ethical reasoning.

**Leader Development Zone: Decision Exercises.** This section provides three multimedia decisionmaking tools leaders can use to support junior leader development. They are the Hundredth House (junior tactical leaders are the primary audience), Frontline Express (junior leaders are the primary audience), and Outfitter Express (designed for logistics convoy leaders). Each is a facilitator-led, discussion-based exercise intended to foster learning through both the media’s content and interactive discussions.

<sup>4</sup> StrykerNet can be accessed only by individuals with an Army Knowledge Online account.

<sup>5</sup> During survey administration this site was labeled “leader development zone—professional development modules.”



**Leader Development Zone: Area of Operation Immersion Program.** This section gives commanders tools to help them train soldiers and units on wartime tasks while at home station. The tools (1) cover staff estimates/situational awareness, situational understanding development and predeployment military decisionmaking process, (2) provide virtual right-seat rides,<sup>6</sup> and (3) support military intelligence company and cultural understanding/environmental awareness training. These tools rely on reach capabilities and products from a theater of operation, as well as expertise from the Jacobsen Mission Support Operations Center (JMSOC).

**Knowledge Repository.** The StrykerNet knowledge repository stores documents relevant to SBCT soldier and leader development, training, and deployment preparation. Examples of these documents include military manuals, theater-developed smart cards, and individual submissions of best practices. Topics are organized into 22 groups beginning with a group for each of the elements of DOTMLPF and concluding with additional timely topics such as improvised explosive devices (IEDs), counterinsurgency, and convoy operations.

**Stryker Lessons and Insights.**<sup>7</sup> This component is a collaborative effort between the Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) and SWfF. Its primary elements include (1) a CALL section that includes CALL handbooks, reports, newsletters, smartbooks, and combat training center (CTC) trends; (2) an SBCT lessons-learned tables section that comprises a set of operations, reset, and transformation tables organized by observations, discussions, and insights; (3) a Stryker vehicle-performance-in-combat video section that consists of video recordings of former commanders and soldiers highlighting the Stryker and its performance in combat; and (4) a section with unit and conference after-action reviews (AARs).

### **StrykerNet Survey Substudy Methods**

Using the above nine components as the substantive basis for a survey, we developed a draft survey to assess leaders' views about each component and StrykerNet overall, and provided it to SWfF for review and comments. The final survey included four primary questions about each of the nine components:

- How many respondents viewed a component, and how much time was spent viewing it?
- How well did each component meet the respondents' intended purpose?
- If their purpose was met, how did it help?
- How could the component be improved?

In addition, the final survey included four questions about StrykerNet overall:

- What was your primary purpose for using StrykerNet?
- Where else could you find similar information?
- How likely are you to use the site again?
- Would you recommend the site to others?

<sup>6</sup> The term derives from the practice of orienting new persons (typically new CTC trainers) by having them travel around during training (thus, riding in the right seat of a HMMWV) with an experienced person. This particular virtual "right-seat ride" shows the activities and responsibilities encountered and required for different positions in an SBCT.

<sup>7</sup> When we administered the survey the component was titled "Stryker lessons and insights." At the time of writing this report the link was titled "lessons learned."




An explanation of and a link to the survey were embedded on the StrykerNet home page. The initial response rate was very low.<sup>8</sup> Consequently, the I Corps commanding general distributed an email message to SBCT command groups requesting that they go to StrykerNet and then complete the survey. Immediately following this email message approximately 30 usable responses were received. The survey link remained active for several more months, but few additional surveys were completed.<sup>9</sup> Data from 33 respondents were analyzed for this substudy.<sup>10</sup> Respondents were predominantly SBCT commanders or staff who were asked to complete the survey, so the sample did not represent all possible users of StrykerNet.

### StrykerNet Survey Results

**Purpose for Visiting StrykerNet.** Respondents provided categorical responses about their primary reason for visiting StrykerNet: these results are in Figure 2.1. Most respondents indicated that their purpose was either “to evaluate potential as a training tool” (33 percent), “to learn TTPs/SOPs” (27 percent), or “self-development” (18 percent). Because our respondents were directed to StrykerNet and the survey so they could provide us their feedback, we were

**Figure 2.1**  
Distribution of Respondents' Reasons for Visiting StrykerNet



RAND TR919-2.1

<sup>8</sup> Respondents were anonymous.

<sup>9</sup> While the survey was originally intended for any SBCT member, we believe our sample was made up largely of commanders and/or staff because the email was addressed to brigade commanders and staff and because so many of the survey completions immediately followed the email. All but one of the respondents included in the analyses were from SBCT units.

<sup>10</sup> Forty-two surveys were submitted, and of these nine were not included in the analyses. Two respondents indicated that they were contractors, and seven indicated that they spent less than one minute on all nine site components.

not too surprised that more respondents selected “evaluate potential as a training tool” than any other single category. The other two common selections, TTPs and self-development, were consistent with SWfF’s task of being a “repository of experience and expertise” for SBCTs.

**Time Spent on Each Website Component.** To increase our confidence that their subsequent perceptions of a component were valid, we first determined whether respondents spent enough time viewing a website component. Respondents were asked to provide a categorical estimate, using a six-point scale, of the number of minutes they spent viewing each component. The six categories provided were: 0—did not look at site, less than 1 minute, 1–15 minutes, 16–30 minutes, 31–60 minutes, more than 60 minutes. If respondents indicated they did not look at or looked at a component for less than a minute, we did not include their data for that component in the analyses of the component. The counts of respondents included in our analyses of the nine components are in Table 2.1.<sup>11</sup>

Table 2.1 also displays the percentage of our sample that spent time viewing each of the nine components. A greater number of respondents viewed the “Stryker lessons and insights” (73 percent), “home page” (70 percent), and “knowledge repository” (70 percent) components than all others. The least-viewed components were the two SLA Marshall components and the “leader development zone: area of operation immersion.” Our analyses did not suggest why these last three were visited less than the other sites, but it could benefit those who build similar websites to review these components with a view toward increasing their viewing rates.<sup>12</sup>

**Web Site Component Met Respondents’ Intended Purpose.** We asked respondents to use a four-point scale to rate how well the component met the respondents’ needs.<sup>13</sup> The results of this analysis are displayed in Figure 2.2. The vast majority of respondents indicated that all of the components were either helpful or extremely helpful (80–90 percent). Overall, if the SBCT leaders or staff spent sufficient time viewing the component they were very likely to view it as meeting their intended purpose.

**Table 2.1**  
**Number of Respondents for Analysis by Web Site Component**


<b>StrykerNet Component</b>	<b>Number of Respondents</b>	<b>Sample Percentage</b>
Home page	23	70%
SLA Marshall recordings	15	45%
SLA Marshall transcripts	12	36%
Leader development zone (LDZ): self improvement	21	64%
LDZ: professional development modules	20	61%
LDZ: decision exercises	17	52%
LDZ: area of operation immersion	16	48%
Knowledge repository	23	70%
Stryker lessons and insights	24	73%

<sup>11</sup> Web usage times were not available, so we asked respondents to indicate the length of time they used StrykerNet.

<sup>12</sup> Later in this section we review respondents’ suggestions for how to improve each component. The suggestions from respondents for how to improve these less-often-viewed components did not look too much different from the suggestions for the other sites.

<sup>13</sup> The scale options were as follows: “0—did not meet my purpose,” “1—slightly helpful,” “2—helped me meet my purpose,” and “3—extremely helpful; could not easily complete without it.”

**Figure 2.2**  
**Distribution of Respondents Indicating Whether StrykerNet Web Site Components Met Their Intended Purpose**



RAND TR919-2.2


For each of the components that respondents stated was helpful or extremely helpful, they were asked to select the best description of how it was helpful on an eight-point scale.<sup>14</sup> Figure 2.3 displays the results. As it shows, there was significant variation in the selections of how the component helped across the nine components. However, when we looked at the median percentages across the nine components, a pattern did emerge. Overall, the top three reasons selected were self-development (the most common reason provided, median percentage 47), increase effectiveness (median percentage 14) and acquire new TTPs (median percentage 11). Since our sample was comprised of leaders, these results suggest that SWfF was successfully executing its supporting tasks of “enhancing leader development” and “providing a repository of experience and expertise.”

**Ways to Improve Each Web Site Component.** Respondents provided suggestions on how to improve each of the nine components.<sup>15</sup> The analysis results are displayed in Figure 2.4. More than two-thirds of the respondents across all nine components indicated that no improvements

<sup>14</sup> The response options were “increased efficiency—reduced training time,” “increased effectiveness—(modified, enhanced, expanded techniques or strategies),” “general self development and understanding,” “learn new TTPs/SOPs,” “provided prepackaged training materials,” “learn new equipment uses, maintenance, and sustainment techniques,” “find/develop peer-to-peer contact (find peer contact and position information),” and “other.”

<sup>15</sup> Respondents were asked to indicate one of these improvement options for each component: “improve layout (e.g., web links),” “improve content (e.g., did not have information you wanted or enough information),” “content organization (e.g., information was available, but difficult to find),” “increase quantity of prepackaged training or TTP materials available,” “other,” or “no improvement required.”

**Figure 2.3**  
**How Each Web Site Component Met Respondents' Purposes**




were necessary (median percentage 71). Of the possible improvements, the two selected most often were “increase prepackaged material” and “better organize content” (median percentages across the nine components were 13 and 11, respectively). These results indicate that providing better organized content and more prepackaged material would benefit SBCT leaders.

**Sources Other than StrykerNet for Similar Information.** Respondents recorded other sources where they could find information similar to that found in StrykerNet. Fourteen percent stated they thought the information could not be found in other places. So most respondents (86 percent) believed that similar information could be obtained from other sources. The most commonly selected other sources were peers (57 percent), then other websites (43 percent), and finally other units (36 percent). Since StrykerNet was designed to be a repository of experiences, it was not surprising that leaders and staff believed peers and other units were sources of the same information. In fact, SWfF selected StrykerNet content by searching out experiences of leaders and soldiers in the SBCT community. In addition, SWfF reviewed other websites to identify other Internet-based sources of information that the SBCT community could use and integrated them into StrykerNet, so it is certain that some of the information in StrykerNet could be found in other Internet sources. It is important to note that SWfF serves as a centralized repository of Stryker information—not as a source of unique information. In this capacity, it appears that SWfF successfully centralized a vast amount of information that Stryker leaders found helpful.

**Overall Satisfaction with StrykerNet.** We gathered two self-reported behavioral metrics of satisfaction with StrykerNet: would you use it again, and would you recommend it to your

**Figure 2.4**  
**Recommended Web Site Improvements**




peers or subordinates? Figure 2.5 displays the percentage of respondents who were unlikely, neutral, and likely to use and recommend the site in the future. Eighty-two percent of survey takers were likely to both use and recommend the site in the future. Clearly, the vast majority of our respondents were satisfied with StrykerNet.

**Summary of StrykerNet Survey Results.** Overall the leaders and staff who completed our survey were satisfied with StrykerNet offerings. These findings are consistent with previous recognitions SWfF has received, including the Department of the Army's 2005 Knowledge Management Award for the Best Community of Practice. Some of the nine components were viewed more often than others, but we are unsure of the reasons why this was the case. It may have been that the less-viewed sites had been previously seen by respondents or that some components did not appeal to some respondents. Some review of these less-viewed sites would most likely prove valuable. Also, while most respondents did not indicate that any improvement was necessary, some did. The most commonly suggested improvement was to include more pre-packaged training material. Such an improvement seems reasonable, and further development of such materials could be warranted.

### One-Third of SBCT Key Personnel Sampled Used SWfF's Products and Services

In our second substudy, we turn from satisfaction with one aspect of SWfF (StrykerNet) to the extent to which all of SWfF products and services are used by the SBCT community. To answer

**Figure 2.5**  
**Future Intentions to Use and Recommend Site to Others**



this question we designed and administered a one-page survey. The survey asked respondents to record their position type (e.g., staff officer, company commander) and to answer six questions about their use of SWfF products or services.<sup>16</sup> The six questions were as follows:<sup>17</sup>

- 1a. Have you ever visited the StrykerNet website?
- 1b. Have you ever used the StrykerNet website for training or individual development?
2. Have you participated in a Stryker Symposium either in person or remotely?
3. Have you ever received support from SWfF staff either by email, phone, or face-to-face for any Stryker support?
- 4a. Have you seen or heard of the RAND/SWfF “Iraq Common Events Approaches” handbook?
- 4b. Have you used/incorporated the “Iraq Common Events Approaches” handbook into your unit’s training?

We sent surveys to two SBCTs and requested that the surveys be distributed to as many SBCT members as possible. In total 3,326 completed surveys were returned.<sup>18</sup> Of these, 153

<sup>16</sup> RAND Arroyo Center provided the surveys to brigade staffs, who subsequently distributed them to subordinates. Respondents were anonymous.

<sup>17</sup> These were all of the questions on the usage survey; however, in this chapter we do not discuss the results for questions 4a and 4b. Instead, for clarity reasons, we discuss these results in Chapter Four when we discuss the creation and development of the Iraq Common Events Approaches handbook.

<sup>18</sup> Because we do not know the number of soldiers who received the survey, we were not able to calculate the response rate percentage.

were not fully complete and were not included in our analysis, so a total sample of 3,173 surveys were used for the analyses.

Table 2.2 shows the sample counts by position. As can be seen in the table, the sample was a good representation of SBCTs.

**Table 2.2**  
**Survey Sample Distributions by Position Type**

Senior Command and Staff		Junior Leaders		Enlisted Soldiers (E1-E4)	
Positions	Count	Positions	Count	Positions	Count
Brigade commander	1	Company commander	34	Squad member	675
Brigade operations officer (S3)	1	Company executive officer	24	Staff soldier	375
Battalion commander	9	Platoon leader	95		
Battalion executive officer	3	Platoon sergeant	77		
Battalion operations officer (S3)	7	Squad leader	217		
Battalion command sergeant major	3	Team leader	412		
Other staff officers	64				
Senior staff NCO (E8 and E9)	37				
Staff NCO (E5-E7)	375				

Because some of the counts for position type in our sample were small,<sup>19</sup> we collapsed the sample into three groups: (1) senior command and staff, (2) junior leaders, and (3) enlisted soldiers. These groupings and the position types within them are displayed in Table 2.3. There were 500 senior command and staff, 859 junior leader, and 1,050 enlisted respondents in our sample. Each row in Table 2.3 shows the percentage of respondents in each group that used one of SWfF's products or services.

One-quarter to one-third of leaders and staff reported visiting StrykerNet. At first glance these percentages seemed low; however, it was important to consider that not *all* members of a unit had to see or use SWfF for the entire unit to benefit. For example, if a battalion commander or staff used SWfF and consequently improved their TACSOP, all members of that battalion benefited. In addition, of those leaders or staff who visited the website, one-half of them (i.e., approximately 15 percent of the total sample) reported using StrykerNet to improve

**Table 2.3**  
**Percentage of Respondents That Used SWfF**

	Senior Command and Staff	Junior Leaders	Enlisted (E1-E4)
Visited StrykerNet	30%	24%	9%
Used StrykerNet	15%	14%	3%
Attended symposium	10%	5%	3%
Requested direct SWfF support	9%	7%	3%
Sample size	500	859	1,813

<sup>19</sup> These small counts were of course expected for some positions. For example, the largest count for brigade commanders would have been two.

their training or individual development. Similar logic applies to the percentages of respondents who participated in a symposium or requested direct support. The Stryker symposiums included key leaders and staff—that is, not all staff or junior leaders participated. Consequently, we expected the overall percentages to be small. But in these cases as well, the entire unit can benefit: once one member of a unit finds an answer or other useful information, it is easy to transmit to the remainder of the organization.

We believe these results tell us that SWfF was used by the SBCT community—it provided information via its web portal to one-third of the key leaders and staff members in the SBCTs we sampled. In addition, StrykerNet offerings were incorporated into individual and training development by one-half of the leaders or staff who viewed the site.

## **SBCT and External Customers Highly Satisfied with Direct SWfF Support**

While StrykerNet and Stryker symposiums are SWfF's most obvious activities, it directly supports numerous SBCT leaders and staff via phone, email, and face-to-face communication. The substance of the support provided was highly variable and was specific to the requestor. For example, communications ranged from someone asking for another person's contact information to complicated requests for information that required SWfF to perform additional research and multiple follow-ups with requestors. Because of the variety and diversity of the communications, empirically documenting their impact directly was very difficult; consequently, we chose to have SWfF record and categorize their external communications. We document our approach and the results of this substudy below.

### **Communication Log Substudy Approach**

When we started this research, some SWfF staff maintained communication logs. We modified the format of these logs by including additional elements that had not been collected to date and redesigning response options to help us streamline data processing and analysis. To pilot the new log book, SWfF staff recorded their communications for several weeks. As a result of this pilot, we made significant changes to the log book; the data reported in this substudy were collected using this revised log book. This data collection occurred for a three-week period during late 2008. During this time, we requested that SWfF staff record as many communications with external audiences as possible. For each communication recorded, we requested that staff answer the following questions:

- Was the communication with a repeat customer?
- What type of organization was supported (e.g., Stryker units)?
- What category of DOTMLPF best described the content of the communication?
- What category best described the type of benefit possible (e.g., provide information or connect people)?
- How did the audience benefit from the communication?

### **Staff Address About 36,000 Requests Yearly, with High Customer Return Rate**


We received a total of 275 documented communications from seven different SWfF personnel during the three-week period. On a daily basis this equates to approximately six commu-



nications per staff member per day.<sup>20</sup> On average, per business day, 16 communications were logged, with a maximum of 25 communications on any single day. This average support rate of 16 per day, or 80 per week, extrapolated over a year would mean that SWfF directly supported about 300 customers monthly or 3,600 yearly. We found that 79 percent of the communications were with repeat customers. This finding suggests that those personnel who previously received support from SWfF were sufficiently satisfied with the quality of previous support to return.<sup>21</sup>

**SWfF Supported SBCTs and External Organizations.** For each communication documented, SWfF staff recorded who they supported by category. The categories included: Stryker units, non-Stryker tactical units, I Corps, U.S. Forces Command (FORSCOM), U.S. Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), Fort Lewis Battle Command Training Center (BCTC), Department of the Army (DA), or non-DA units (e.g., U.S. Department of Defense). Figure 2.6 displays the distribution of support recipients for each of these categories. A fundamental role for SWfF was to support the SBCT community of practice; one-half of all communications directly supported SBCTs. One of SWfF's supporting tasks is to be an advocate for the seven SBCTs; these results suggested they were fulfilling this task as well by providing Stryker-related information to organizations outside the SBCT community of practice. Specifically, 36 percent of SWfF's communications were with such outside organizations.<sup>22</sup> Much of these communications were requests for Stryker-related information. We believe that with-

**Figure 2.6**  
**Distribution of Organizations SWfF Supported**



<sup>20</sup> The number of communication days reported during the three-week period varied by staff member. The average number of days was 13, with a range of 10–16.

<sup>21</sup> This return rate also could imply that the requests were complex enough to require multiple follow-ups. However, this would still mean that the customer was sufficiently satisfied with the process to continue the communication.

<sup>22</sup> Because one could categorize I Corps and the Fort Lewis BCTC as members of the Stryker community, we excluded them from the discussion of agencies outside the Stryker community of practice. However, one could reason that if SWfF did not exist, the 14 percent of communications between SWfF and I Corps/BCTC would have to have been supported by SBCTs.

out SWfF, the staffs of the SBCTs or I Corps would have answered these requests. Because SWfF was able to field them, SBCTs and I Corps were able to stay focused on preparing for and executing operational deployments, and at the same time the outside agencies received answers to their requests.


**Most SBCT Customers Seek Training-Related Information.** SWfF staff recorded which element of DOTMLPF best described the support provided in each communication.<sup>23</sup> Figure 2.7 shows the distribution of communications by the type of support provided. Training support was the most common support provided (23 percent) and personnel (7 percent) and facilities (6 percent) were the least common. These results were consistent with the basic role of SWfF supporting SBCT training and deployment preparation. The remainder of support was evenly distributed across the other categories of DOTMLPF.

**Providing Information Is the Most Common Type of SWfF Service.** SWfF staff also recorded how their customers were helped. Specifically, did SWfF:

- support doctrine development,
- connect people,
- promote an understanding of SWfF,
- provide information,
- assist learning,
- provide technical assistance, or
- provide another type of direct support?


Figure 2.8 displays the number of communications in each of the categories listed above for the four most common organizations SWfF supported. The most frequent category was providing information (47 percent for Stryker units, 72 percent for TRADOC, 42 percent for

**Figure 2.7**  
**Distribution of DOTMLPF Support**



<sup>23</sup> Staff could select multiple DOTMLPF categories as appropriate. When multiple categories were selected, all categories were included in the analysis.

**Figure 2.8**  
**Frequency Distribution of Benefits Provided**



RAND TR919-2.8

FORSCOM, and 36 percent for non-DA organizations). In addition, it was common for SWfF to benefit SBCTs by providing other forms of direct support (27 percent) and assisting with learning (12 percent). For the other three organization types in Figure 2.8 it was common for SWfF to promote the organizations' understanding of WfFs. Given that WfFs were formed so recently, it was not surprising that some of SWfF's communication were oriented on improving outside organizations' understanding of the WfF concept.

**How Were the Customers Benefited?** Directly assessing the satisfaction of all the organizations that SWfF supported during all communications was not feasible. Instead we asked SWfF to indicate the specific benefit provided by the communication.<sup>24</sup>

Table 2.4 displays the four most common categories of support SWfF provided to customers,<sup>25</sup> the percentage of communications attributable to each category, how the customer benefited, and the percentage of communications when that benefit type was recorded. Table 2.4 shows that one-half of all communications provided information, and a total of 68 percent of these were either helpful or provided critical information. Approximately two-thirds of the other direct support was intended to improve training planning and preparation, while the other one-third went to improving deployment preparations. Only 10 percent of communications provided technical support, and generally this support helped others to access technologies.

<sup>24</sup> Because this metric could have asked a staff member to report on his own performance, we were concerned about self-report bias—the possibility that someone would consciously or unconsciously over- or underestimate his success. Consequently, we crafted the response options as a determination of how the customer would have benefited, and not an evaluation of the communication or the communicator.

<sup>25</sup> These four totaled to 87 percent of all communications recorded.

**Table 2.4**  
**Types and Benefit of SWfF Support Provided**

Category of SWfF Staff Support Provided	Percentage of All Communications	How the Customer Benefited	Percentage Within Support Categories
<i>Provided information</i>	51%	Directed to information	32%
		Provided helpful information	40%
		Provided critical information	28%
<i>Provided other direct support</i>	13%	Improved training planning and preparation	63%
		Improved routine training execution	4%
		Improved preparation for deployment	33%
<i>Promoted understanding of WfFs</i>	13%	Addressed a few questions satisfactorily	27%
		Addressed most questions satisfactorily	54%
		Addressed all questions satisfactorily	19%
<i>Provided technical assistance</i>	10%	Unsuccessful	5%
		Assisted with accessing technologies	67%
		Assisted incorporating technologies	5%
		Assisted developing technologies	24%

### Summary of Communication Log Substudy Results

This substudy empirically demonstrated the ways in which SWfF staff provided direct, tailored support both to the SBCT community of practice and to the Army more broadly. Unlike StrykerNet or the training tools that SWfF created and/or maintained, the communications documented in this substudy represented individually based support—a specific request from a soldier, leader, staff member, or agency representative. While computer-based knowledge repositories are valuable tools, the communications documented here gave customers timely and flexible information across a broad range of subjects. This type of information often involved more than a simple answer to a simple question. The kind of detailed and interactive information that SWfF often provides can be difficult to provide in web-based systems.<sup>26</sup>

### Summary of Leader and Soldier Use of and Satisfaction with SWfF

Considered as a whole, the three substudies presented in this chapter strongly supported the idea that SWfF was meeting many of the supporting tasks in its charter and, in so doing, enhancing the proficiency of SBCTs in theater. We found that the vast majority of SBCT leaders sampled were satisfied with how SWfF was enhancing training through StrykerNet. Some review and improvement of StrykerNet could be warranted. In particular, development and inclusion of more prepackaged training material would likely improve the website. These survey results also confirmed that SWfF was used by the SBCT community of practice: approximately one-third of senior leaders and staff reported that they visited StrykerNet and one-half of them reported using the site for training or individual development purposes. Our staff communication log substudy suggested that it was common for SWfF staff to handle approximately 16 external requests daily during this substudy: this rate would yield about

<sup>26</sup> In-person communication with Richard Kaiura, SWfF Operations Manager, Fort Lewis, WA, July 11, 2008.

3,600 customer cases yearly. The most common customer case was a member of an SBCT seeking training-related information; however, SWfF supported customers within and outside the SBCT community of practice across all DOTMLPF domains. The return customer rate (nearly 80 percent of communications were return customers) indicated that customers were satisfied with the support they received previously. SWfF also supported the community of practice by responding to requests for information; having SBCTs handle these requests would have taken valuable and limited time from someone's deployment preparation or training.<sup>27</sup>

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<sup>27</sup> We would assume that most requests would go to units at home station, not those deployed.

## SWfF Training Tools Improved Tactical Knowledge of Most Study Participants

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In this chapter we describe the approach and present the results of a substudy that assessed the extent to which SWfF training tools led to gains in the tactical knowledge of individual leaders and soldiers. The tool studied was a leadership decisionmaking training tool called the “Hundredth House.” The Hundredth House tool was developed by Joint Base Lewis-McChord, Battle Command Training Center, Leader Development Section and available through the Stryker Warfighters’ Forum. The name derives from soldiers’ description of the ambush site as looking like a hundred other houses they had been to. This one-time training event tool combined

- a reenactment of an insurgent ambush of U.S. forces in Iraq via computer simulation using a computer-game engine,
- recorded interviews with the unit members who took part in the ambush event, and
- a facilitator-led discussion among the trainees that occurred after they viewed the reenactment and interviews.<sup>1</sup>

The tool was based on the actual events prior to, during, and after the ambush. The training totaled two hours, during which trainees viewed the reenactment, watched the interviews, and participated in discussions led by unit leaders.

### Substudy Approach

The sample included 130 soldiers and junior leaders who would typically participate in this type of training as part of their usual deployment preparation.<sup>2</sup> SWfF solicited volunteers to participate in the substudy from six battalions preparing for Iraq deployments; two battalions participated.

To determine whether the Hundredth House tool was associated with changes in tactical knowledge, we developed and administered a paper-and-pencil assessment to all participants

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<sup>1</sup> In these interviews, the leaders described what they knew at each stage of the unfolding ambush, what actions they took, and how they decided on their actions.

<sup>2</sup> One participant’s data were deleted from the analyses because the respondent listed seven years of deployments to Iraq and Afghanistan from 2001 to 2008; such a deployment tempo was not plausible, so the participant’s answers were considered to be unreliable. Also, nine cases were missing 20 or more pre- or post-treatment scores, so their data were not included in the analysis.

prior to and after the Hundredth House training.<sup>3</sup> A RAND Arroyo Center research team with operational and/or training assessment experience reviewed the Hundredth House tool to develop an evaluation framework that would address broad areas of tactical knowledge that could be affected by someone's participation in the training. These areas were (1) the environment and circumstances the soldiers and unit found themselves in, (2) enemies' actions and signals (or indicators) that should be received, understood, and interpreted, and (3) friendly elements' interpretations of enemy signals, responses, and actions, and friendly counteractions. The final assessment instrument contained 55 questions in these areas.<sup>4</sup> A copy of the original assessment instrument is in Appendix A.

At the beginning of the substudy, SWfF or RAND Arroyo Center personnel provided participants with an informed consent statement followed by detailed test instructions. Participants were then given approximately one hour to complete the assessment instrument, and then the training commenced.<sup>5</sup> SWfF or RAND Arroyo Center staff conducted the post-treatment assessment within 72 hours after the training was completed.

In scoring responses, we did not identify which answers to questions on the assessment instrument were "best"—many answers would be judgment calls based on a combination of the conditions presented in the question, a unit's TACSOP, and commander expectations and intent. Instead, the response options provided by the battalion commander were used to determine if a trainee in his unit provided a valid answer.<sup>6</sup> In other words, if a participant's and his commander's answer were the same, the participant received one point for the agreement.<sup>7</sup> We constructed a trainee's total score by summing the number of questions with trainee-commander response agreement.<sup>8</sup>

Because assessment development prior to the substudy was not possible, we conducted a series of analytic tests of the original 55 items to create a reliable final assessment score. First, if the proportion of commander-trainee agreement for an item on the pre- or post-treatment was very low—less than 10 percent—we reckoned that the item was not measuring the content we intended it to, deemed it unreliable, and removed it from the final scale.<sup>9</sup> In total, eight items

<sup>3</sup> Because of practical constraints, pre-study test development was not feasible, so it was not prudent to use separate test forms for pre- and post-training. Consequently, we assessed the same questions in the same order in both pre- and post-training.

<sup>4</sup> Three general question formats were employed. Specifically, the instrument had (1) ten rank-order questions where participants were asked to order items from most likely/important/desired to least likely/important/desired, (2) eight questions that asked participants to select all appropriate response options, and (3) thirty-seven questions that asked participants to select the best answer(s) from among two to six possible response options.

<sup>5</sup> Approximately 50 personnel attended per training session. The training session lasted approximately four hours.

<sup>6</sup> In addition, the commanders were the training facilitators, so they had opportunities to shape the discussions and reinforce their learning objectives during the training.

<sup>7</sup> No points were subtracted for lack of agreement.

<sup>8</sup> Each of the three question formats, described in a previous footnote, required a slightly different set of rules to determine commander-trainee agreement. When a respondent was asked to select the one or two best response option(s), an exact match between the respondent's and the commander's response determined agreement. For those questions that required a rank-ordered or "select all that apply" response, we determined that an exact match criterion was too stringent, so in those cases we applied different scoring techniques. Appendix B is a detailed description of how these question formats were scored.

<sup>9</sup> There were two exceptions to this determination. Two questions had pre-treatment commander-trainee agreement rates less than 10 percent but post-treatment agreement over 10 percent (11 percent and 24 percent). Because it may be that these were particularly hard items but some subjects were able to master them after training, we kept them in the final scale.

were deleted for this reason.<sup>10</sup> Next we used Cronbach's alpha to guide our development of a reliable final total assessment scale score.<sup>11</sup> This process led us to delete an additional 19 items. Our final scale comprised 28 items with a Cronbach's alpha of .68.

## SBCT Personnel Had Statistically Higher Scores After Training

The Hundredth House training tool appeared to improve participants' shared understanding of tactical knowledge, although gains varied by participant's rank and deployment. Table 3.1 summarizes, by rank and deployment, pre- and post-training averages, the standard deviation of these central tendencies, and the number of cases for each category of participants.

There are several interesting values displayed in the table. First, all categories of participants tended to have greater post- than pre-training scores. Generally, it appeared that officers had greater scores than the other groupings. Finally, soldiers with deployment experience in Afghanistan apparently did not do as well on the post-training assessment as the other groups. To test whether any of these differences were statistically significant, we conducted the regression analysis that we describe next.

### Officers and NCOs with Recent OIF Experience Show Greatest Gains

We constructed several regression models to estimate the effect of the Hundredth House training event while statistically controlling for rank and deployment experience. To account for rank we collapsed the respondents' reported rank into one of three groups: junior enlisted, noncommissioned officer (NCO), and officer.<sup>12</sup> This grouping not only provided natural break points for analysis purposes, but also yielded results that improved the organization of feedback for commanders.<sup>13</sup> We asked respondents to indicate their prior Iraq (Operation Iraqi

**Table 3.1**  
**Individual Tactical Knowledge Substudy Summary Statistics**

Variables	Pre-training Score Average	Standard Deviation	Post-training Score Average	Standard Deviation	Number of Cases
Junior enlisted (private–corporal)	7.81	4.12	11.12	4.37	47
Noncommissioned officers (sergeant–staff sergeant)	7.64	3.40	10.03	3.47	64
Officers (second–first lieutenant)	11.47	3.44	16.26	2.90	19
Previously deployed to Iraq	7.69	3.86	10.71	3.94	96
Previously deployed to Afghanistan	7.73	3.44	9.77	4.27	30

<sup>10</sup> A more detailed treatment of the reliability analyses is in Appendix C.

<sup>11</sup> Cronbach's alpha is a well-established statistical index that provides a quantitative assessment of the item-total reliability. The index ranges from 0 to 1.0, with 1.0 indicating that each item perfectly correlates with the total test score. Using this index allowed us to create a measurement with high internal reliability.

<sup>12</sup> Other rank groupings were considered and estimated, but overall these groupings provided the best estimates and most parsimonious explanation of the effect of rank on the post-training measure. Only these groupings are reported for the remainder of this document.

<sup>13</sup> After the completion of this study, the two battalion commanders were given aggregate-level feedback about their unit's performance on the post-treatment assessment. We presented each commander with a tabulation of the percentages of responses that did and did not match the commander's response on each assessment item. A feedback format example is in Chapter Three, Figure 3.1, of this report.



Freedom, OIF) and/or Afghanistan (Operation Enduring Freedom, OEF) operational deployments. We modeled deployment effects in several ways, but many of the deployment terms were not statistically significant. A notable exception was an interaction between our NCO variable and being deployed to either OEF or OIF prior to 2006.<sup>14</sup> The final regression model produced is displayed in Table 3.2. In this table we present each of the variables included in the model, along with the associated coefficient estimates, the t-statistics associated with each estimate, their level of statistical significance, and—in the bottom row—the adjusted R<sup>2</sup> for the entire model.

We used the estimates from the model in Table 3.2 to compute the average predicted post-treatment scores for (1) officers, (2) junior enlisted personnel, (3) NCOs with OEF or pre-2006 experience, and (4) NCOs with post-2006 OIF experience,.

Pre-training score averages, post-training averages, and the differences between the pre- and post-values are shown in Table 3.3. As can be seen in the last row of Table 3.3, all cohorts who participated in the Hundredth House training improved their scores on average, although not all cohorts improved equally. Officers improved their scores by 4.8 points, junior enlisted improved by 3.5, NCOs with no Afghanistan or pre-2006 Iraq experience improved by 3.9, and NCOs with Afghanistan or pre-2006 Iraq experience demonstrated the smallest improvement, 1.1.

While these statistical gains at first glance seem small, they are significant. Consider that the highest possible score on the assessment was 28 and that officers, on average, increased their scores by about 5 points. These officers were second and first lieutenants who had not

**Table 3.2**  
**Final Regression Model Estimates and Statistics**

Variables	Regression Coefficient	t-statistic	Significance
NCO	0.32	0.39	No
Officer	3.56	3.70	.01
OEF or pre-2006 OIF	0.93	0.77	No
Interaction NCO x (OEF/pre-2006 OIF)	-3.15	-2.13	.05
Pre-treatment score	0.45	5.60	.05
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup> = .39			

**Table 3.3**  
**Pre- and Post-Training Scores**

	Officer	Junior Enlisted	NCO Afghanistan or Pre-2006 Iraq	NCO 2006 or Later Iraq
Pre-training score averages	11.5	7.5	8.2	7.0
Post-training averages	16.3	11.0	9.2	10.9
Average change from pre- to post-training	4.8	3.5	1.1	3.9

<sup>14</sup> A significant surge in U.S. forces in Iraq occurred after 2006. Our purpose in modeling this variable in this manner was to capture the effect of being deployed to a theater unlike Iraq—that is, OEF—or being deployed to Iraq prior to the surge.

experienced a year-long deployment to either Iraq or Afghanistan.<sup>15</sup> Having participated in a two-hour training event, 18 percent more of their answers aligned with their commander's. Put another way, officers, junior enlisted, and NCOs with recent OIF experience had a 43–55 percent improvement in their scores.

NCOs with OEF or older OIF experience showed little gains. We are unsure why this one group did not benefit as much as the others. Two possible explanations are that NCOs who had deployed to Afghanistan or pre-2006 Iraq felt confident in their abilities and therefore failed to pay attention and absorb the knowledge/training, or that the NCOs consciously decided that their experience was a better model to follow/adopt than the techniques conveyed during the Hundredth House training.

Any explanation regarding the smaller gains is purely speculative without further research, but we believe information such as this finding is important to a commander. We present a way to disseminate this type of information below.

### **Assessment Results Could Serve as Feedback Reports to Battalion Commanders**

Recall that we scored answers as “correct” when the participant's and commander's answers matched. Thus, lower scores mean an increased likelihood of unit members reacting to situations in a manner not expected by their commander. We believe that such feedback—knowing if subordinates would react the way a commander would want them to—could be important. Consequently, we developed a feedback report and provided it to the battalion commanders.

An example of the feedback provided is displayed in Figure 3.1. The far left column contains two questions and their possible response options from the assessment instrument.<sup>16</sup> “Option 1” is the option the battalion commander selected prior to the training event.<sup>17</sup> The four right columns contain the percentage of unit members for each of the four groups that selected each option.

As an example, for “Question A” 68 percent of the lieutenants selected the same answer as the battalion commander; 50 percent of the NCOs with recent OIF experience, 40 percent of the NCOs with OEF or pre-surge OIF experience, and 31 percent of the enlisted soldiers did so as well. For the same question, the same number of junior enlisted soldiers selected “Option 2” or “Option 1.” These patterns suggest that the majority of lieutenants understood the commander's expectations, but only a minority of enlisted personnel did; thus, follow-up training may be better oriented to junior enlisted as opposed to officers.

The results for “Question B” display a slightly different trend. In this case, most of the groups selected the same option as the battalion commander and so little additional training is suggested. This type of feedback could enable a commander and staff to focus subsequent training or professional development meetings on those specific tactics or procedures for which unit members had not demonstrated mastery.<sup>18</sup>

<sup>15</sup> Three of the 19 junior officers in the sample did have some deployment experience, as they had deployed to Iraq for a short period to meet their units toward the end of the unit's deployment.

<sup>16</sup> Commanders were provided with this type of feedback for all the questions on the assessment instrument.

<sup>17</sup> On the actual instrument the commander's option was not always the first option presented. For the feedback, the response option order was sorted so that the commander's choice appeared first under each question.

<sup>18</sup> After receiving the feedback, both battalion commanders told us that the feedback was helpful and that it showed them and their subordinate commanders which areas needed additional attention or training.

**Figure 3.1**  
**Example of Feedback Provided to Battalion Commanders**

	Percentage of unit members (within cohort groups) with responses that matched the Battalion Commander's			
	Lieutenants	NCOs recent OIF experience	NCOs with OEF or pre-surge OIF experience	Junior Enlisted
<i>Question A: A Stryker patrol receives a report from partner Iraqi Police (IP) that an escaped detainee is in a house/building and that the IP received un-aimed gunfire from the building. By the time coalition forces arrived, no fire had been taken in over an hour. (Please circle your unit's most likely response.)</i>				
<b>Option 1:</b> Collect face-to-face information from IPs that initially reported the incident. Assess the situation and if story makes sense, offer to provide overwatch and QRF support to IP unit. Resist taking over the mission.	68%	50%	40%	31%
Option 2: Do not enter right now. Call for back-up/QRF and possibly UAS/CAS. Engage local IPs for information. Call local Iraqi leaders for information.	11%	17%	24%	31%
Option 3: Collect face-to-face information from IPs that initially reported the incident. Assess the situation and if story makes sense, and they request, assume the mission.	11%	17%	16%	25%
Option 4: Enter immediately to extract the escaped detainee. Back off/regroup only if insurgents elevate level of fight to include machine gun fire, explosives, or comparable.	11%	13%	12%	13%
Option 5: Enter immediately to extract the escaped detainee. It is critical to get the detainee to save face with insurgents and IPs—do not withdraw without capturing the escaped detainee.	0%	4%	8%	0%
<i>Question B: Your Commander orders you to conduct the search and apprehend mission. You brief your squads and have them get into position. The squad in the stack formation by the entrance gate behind the building's perimeter fence gets hit by an explosive device thrown from the building. Two soldiers are injured. Should you... (Mark an X in the <input type="checkbox"/> for your one best answer.)</i>				
<b>Option 1:</b> Abort the mission and call for backup?	83%	70%	64%	80%
Option 2: Continue the mission and order the squad to enter the house?	17%	30%	36%	20%

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## Summary

The Hundredth House training tool appeared to improve participants' shared understanding of tactical knowledge. Officers had a large absolute improvement, 5 points on a 28-point scale, and NCOs with recent OIF experience had about a 55 percent improvement from the pre- to post-training assessments. NCOs with OEF or older OIF experience showed smaller gains. We are unsure why this group gained less. Two possible explanations are that NCOs who deployed to Afghanistan or pre-2006 Iraq felt confident in their abilities and therefore failed to pay attention and absorb the knowledge/training, or they consciously decided that their previous experiences provided a better model to follow than the techniques in the Hundredth House training.

We also developed a feedback system that commanders could use. The feedback report provided information that could help a commander to know if subordinates would react the way he wanted them to. We believe the Army could benefit from a broader application of similar assessments and feedback reports.

## Training Handbook Improved Unit-Level Tactical Performance

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In the previous chapter we investigated whether a positive empirical relationship existed between a SWfF training tool and the tactical performance of individuals. In this chapter, we investigate whether such a relationship exists at the unit level. However, to accomplish this objective we needed to create a training tool to overcome certain complications.<sup>1</sup> Working together with SWfF, we developed a checklist-style training handbook—the Iraq Common Events Approaches (ICEA) handbook—that is consistent with SWfF’s techniques and approaches.

To develop the handbook, we devised a method that allowed us to rapidly and systematically capture the combat experiences of soldiers recently returning from an operational deployment and convert them into timely information that leaders can use during preparations for future deployments. This technique could easily be adopted by any WfF or Army knowledge management system to rapidly turn knowledge from deployed operations into training/mission support materials. As such, it responds to the customer feedback discussed in Chapter Two, suggesting that SWfF include more prepackaged training material.

In the remainder of this chapter, we describe this method and the ICEA handbook it yielded in greater detail and then discuss our approach for assessing the handbook’s impact on unit outcomes, the assessment results, and the implications of this substudy for WfFs.

### A Structured Approach for Rapidly Aggregating Combat Experiences

To develop a training tool that could be used to assess SWfF’s impact on unit performance, Arroyo designed a survey that could rapidly capture the experiences of SBCT soldiers who had recently returned from a 15-month deployment to Iraq. The survey required approximately one hour of a combat returnee’s time; synthesizing and organizing their responses into handbook form required approximately 700–1,000 man-hours. The approach, described below, was designed so that it could be adopted readily by SWfF or any Army knowledge management organization responsible for informing, educating, and/or training soldiers, leaders, or units.

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<sup>1</sup> First, all SBCT units had equal access to SWfF products and services, so we could not group units into control and treatment groups for substudy purposes. In addition, we ruled out using correlational techniques, like correlating reported use of SWfF and unit outcomes, because of several very real and potential threats to statistical validity. For example, units that used SWfF prior to our substudy could have been more open to innovation and so may have outperformed non-SWfF users, not because of SWfF products but because they employed innovative training and operational techniques.

### Survey of Combat Veterans

Working with SWfF we selected a pool of events that these SBCT platoons, squads, and teams encountered during operations in Iraq and that future units were likely to encounter in similar operations. From this initial pool we reduced the list to the ten events in Table 4.1. For each of the ten events, we developed a one-paragraph scenario describing the tactical situation and conditions of the event (e.g., number of vehicles, activities of friendly and enemy personnel, location of enemy, terrain features).<sup>2</sup>

For each scenario, respondents were asked to record their experiences/observations/lessons learned during events similar to those described. The response format was open-ended, but it was systematically structured to elicit experiences in each of these five categories:

1. Actions (or key decisions) required, undertaken, or made by you or your unit.
2. Coordination, communications, and reports within your unit, to higher or adjacent units, or to host nation civilian, military, or government personnel.
3. Prior preparations/battle drills/SOPs that your unit employed/should have employed.
4. Use of provided or developed tools (e.g., “stay back 50 meters” signs for vehicles, improved litters for vehicle mounting).
5. Other items that you feel were critical to resolving the event but did not “fit” into the other four categories.

No respondents were asked to complete the answers to all ten scenarios. We estimated that completion time was approximately 15 minutes per scenario and we did not want the total completion time to exceed 60 minutes; consequently, each respondent was asked to answer four of the ten scenarios.<sup>3</sup>

**Table 4.1**  
**Ten Events That Formed the Foundation for the ICEA**

Common Events	Event Abbreviation
Patrol comes upon a PIED (possible/suspected IED)	IED
Respond as a QRF to a “hot” area	QRF
Dismounted patrol takes small arms fire (SAF)	DP
ROE engagement—escalation of force—patrol fires on privately owned vehicle that gets too close to convoy	ROE
Conduct hasty/deliberate checkpoint operations	HD
Indirect fire on forward operating base, combat outpost, or joint security station	IF
Conduct cordon and search	CS
Conduct raid with Iraqi Security Forces	RD
Secure a habitual meeting site (e.g., for a District or Neighborhood Advisory Council)	MS
Conduct consequence management operations (immediate response following an IED or vehicle based IED or damage/injuries from combat operations)	CM

<sup>2</sup> A copy of the entire survey is in Appendix D.

<sup>3</sup> All subjects received the IED and QRF scenarios. One-half of the surveys had the IED scenario first and the other half the QRF first. Of the remaining eight scenarios, four scenarios were randomly selected and presented to respondents. Respondents were asked to select and answer two of these four.

The leadership of the SBCT that participated in the substudy asked each of its seven battalions to have no less than 30 leaders from their battalions complete the survey.<sup>4</sup> In response to this request, 340 surveys were returned to Arroyo; ten were too incomplete to be included in the analyses.<sup>5</sup>

We conducted a frequency analysis to determine how often survey respondents provided similar experiences/observations/lessons learned. To conduct this analysis we created codes to group survey responses.<sup>6</sup> The codes were a means for organizing similar phrases into a unitary concept. For example, one respondent may have written “stop vehicle,” another “pull off route,” and yet another “stop and pull off MSR.” We coded each of these phrases as the single code “stop/pull off route/MSR.”<sup>7</sup> In total we created 695 codes, such as

- stop/pull off route/MSR,
- create standoff (from suspected IED),
- conduct PIED drills (5 and 25s),
- secure area,
- cordon area, and
- alert/clear locals.

We coded and analyzed a total of 14,500 subject responses across all ten event scenarios. For each of the ten events and within three categories for each event we determined how many times survey respondents’ phrases shared a code.<sup>8</sup> For example, we computed how many respondents provided a phrase that was coded “stop/pull off route/MSR” in the “common actions” response section for the IED event scenario. If more than 10 percent of the survey respondents provided a phrase that simultaneously had the same code, was in the same response category, and also in the same scenario event, we selected that code for inclusion in the handbook.<sup>9</sup> In constructing the ICEA handbook, we also included a few additional items. These items were included because TTPs or doctrine indicated they were linked with items that made the 10 percent cutoff. The content of the entire ICEA handbook is in Appendix F.

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<sup>4</sup> We produced two versions of the survey, one Web-based and one paper-and-pencil, so leaders with limited access to a computer could be included in the study. In total, 150 paper copies were provided to the brigade.

<sup>5</sup> 239 were web responses and 101 paper-and-pencil.

<sup>6</sup> Appendix E offers a detailed description of how we created and coded the surveys.

<sup>7</sup> MSR is an acronym for main supply route.

<sup>8</sup> We collapsed the original five response categories into three because the responses within the “actions” and “preparations” categories overlapped in many cases and items within the “other” category were more useful when rolled into other categories as appropriate. The new categories were (1) common actions/reminders, (2) equipment/kits/tools to support operations, and (3) event execution checklists.

<sup>9</sup> We wanted to develop a handbook that captured the combat returnees’ experiences/observations/lessons learned in a concise one-page format for each event scenario. Ten percent appeared to afford the right balance between capturing the essence of the combat returnees’ knowledge while guarding against inclusion of every unique phrase that was employed in theater. The latter approach could have turned the document into a collection of data rather than a synthesis of information.

## Unit-Level CTC Performance Enhanced by ICEA Handbook

To determine the effect of the handbook on unit performance, we compared how well units that did and did not receive the ICEA handbook performed during their CTC training. The remainder of this chapter reports our approach, findings, and implications.

### Assessment Approach

**Data Sample.** Platoons from three active component (AC) SBCTs, one Army National Guard (ARNG) SBCT, and two AC Heavy BCTs (HBCTs) participated in this substudy. Units were included in the substudy because each conducted a CTC rotation during our 12-month data collection window. To account for any differences attributable to units being in an AC or ARNG brigade, the research design differed slightly for the AC and ARNG units. For the AC units, all platoons in two SBCTs received the ICEA handbook within four months prior to their CTC rotation—they were part of the treatment group. Platoons in one of the AC SBCTs and all of the AC HBCTs did not receive the handbook—these platoons made up the control group.<sup>10</sup> Because there was only one ARNG SBCT in the U.S. Army, we conducted a different research design for these units. For them, we distributed the ICEA handbook to platoons within a single battalion, and no other battalions in this SBCT received the ICEA. In total, 202 platoons comprised the dataset.

**Implementation.** We briefed the commanders of the units that received the handbooks. During this briefing we (1) requested the handbook be distributed to all soldiers, team leader and above, (2) described that the purpose of the handbook was to test a knowledge transfer delivery method, and (3) requested that, if possible, they incorporate the handbook into their training plans as they saw fit. Arroyo gave the commanders some examples of how the handbook could be incorporated, including (1) leaders reading/reviewing, (2) modifying drills/SOPs, and (3) using as a pre-execution checklist.

For the AC units, the handbooks were distributed at the time of the briefing. One thousand copies were provided to each brigade. All commanders from the treatment brigades agreed to incorporate the handbook into their unit training plans. For the ARNG SBCT, the training handbooks were delivered to the commander of the infantry battalion that served as the treatment group prior to their two weeks of annual training, which focused primarily on individual tasks and skills. This battalion received 200 handbooks, enough to provide a copy to every leader in the battalion, from team leader to battalion commander.<sup>11</sup>

We included two questions in the usage rate survey<sup>12</sup> that were used to determine whether more junior leaders in the treatment or control units received the ICEA.<sup>13</sup> These two items and the percentage of junior leaders who reported seeing and/or using the ICEA are contained in

<sup>10</sup> It was not possible for us to randomly assign units to a treatment group. We only had access to include SBCTs in the treatment group. In addition, the SBCTs that did not receive the handbook had completed their CTC rotation prior to our completion of the ICEA. So this SBCT's platoons comprised part of the control group. All SBCTs that could receive the handbook prior to their rotation served as the treatment group.

<sup>11</sup> Immediately following the SBCT's CTC rotation, we provided another 1,000 handbooks for the remainder of the brigade.

<sup>12</sup> The usage survey was described in Chapter Two.

<sup>13</sup> Our junior leader group included company commanders and executive officers, platoon leaders and sergeants, and squad and team leaders.



**Table 4.2**  
**ICEA Handbook Usage Questions and Percentage of Junior Leaders Who Saw and Used the ICEA**

Usage Survey Question	Percentage of Treatment Units	Percentage of Control Units
Have you seen or heard of the RAND Arroyo Center/SWfF “Iraq Common Events Approaches” handbook?	35%	2%
Have you used/incorporated the “Iraq Common Events Approaches” handbook into your unit’s training?	21%	1%

Table 4.2.<sup>14</sup> A statistically larger proportion of junior leaders in the treatment group reported seeing (35 percent) and using (21 percent) the ICEA than those in the control groups, 2 percent and 1 percent, respectively.<sup>15</sup>

**Data Collection Instruments.** We designed ten CTC observer questionnaires, one for each of the elements in Table 4.1, with content that paralleled the information in the ICEA.<sup>16</sup> Each questionnaire was divided into three distinct sections: (1) common actions/reminders, (2) event execution checklist, and (3) key equipment, kits, and tools. For all ten questionnaires, the first section generally included about six items, the second section included approximately 20–30 items, and the equipment/tool section had approximately 20 items. A sample of one of the questionnaires is in Figures 4.1 and 4.2, and all ten are in Appendix G. For the common actions/reminder and event execution checklist items, observers recorded how well the item was done using the six-point scale displayed in Figure 4.1. For the tool section, observers recorded several dimensions of tool use, including whether or not the tool was part of the unit’s standing operating procedures (SOP), available, and how well it was used. The exact metrics used are in Figure 4.2.

**Data Collection.** Observers at the JRTC and NTC recorded observations using the questionnaires. We provided oral and/or written questionnaire completion instructions to representative members of observer groups.<sup>17</sup> These representatives confirmed that these instructions were provided to all observers. Additionally, the written instructions were included each time we distributed questionnaires. Observers recorded observations, using the appropriate questionnaire for each training event, during the first instance when a unit encountered the event. For example, if a unit encountered an IED on training day 1, the observers completed an IED questionnaire recording that unit’s performance on training day 1.<sup>18</sup> Observers were asked to

<sup>14</sup> We did not determine how the ICEA was incorporated, e.g., if a unit used it during a classroom review, for updating SOPs, or as a pre-mission checklist. The focus of this study was “would it affect performance?”

<sup>15</sup> The t-statistics equaled 3.09 ( $p < .01$ ) for “seen” and 6.82 ( $p < .01$ ) for “used.”


<sup>16</sup> The expert trainers or observers at the Joint Readiness Training Center are “trainer/mentors” or TMs and at the National Training Center they are “observer/controllers” or OCs. For brevity reasons we refer to both classes of individuals as “observers” in this document.

<sup>17</sup> A copy of the written instructions is in Appendix H.

<sup>18</sup> Most questionnaires were completed during a semi-controlled, initial stage of training when units were assessed on specific events during situational training exercises (STXs).



**Figure 4.1**  
**Front Page of IED Event Observer Questionnaire**



**RAND** ARROYO CENTER

***Iraq Common Event Approaches – Possible IED (PIED) Identified by Patrol Questionnaire***

☐ Check if STX/Lanes

O/C call sign \_\_\_\_\_ # of rotations with this call sign \_\_\_\_\_ Training day \_\_\_\_\_

Unit \_\_\_\_\_ Rotation \_\_\_\_\_ Battalion Mission \_\_\_\_\_

Score each activity below by how sufficiently it was done. 0 = NOT DONE – BUT should have been 1 = NOT SUFFICIENT 2 = SOMEWHAT SUFFICIENT 3 = MODERATELY SUFFICIENT 4 = <b>COMPLETELY SUFFICIENT</b> - the action or activity was complete, AND timely enough so that assigned tasks and/or mission <u>could be accomplished</u> 5 = SUPERIOR NA = NOT APPLICABLE (not required, no reason to execute) UO = UNOBSERVED BY OC	N O T  N O T  D O N E	S U F F I C I E N T	S O M E W H A T	M O D E R A T E L Y	C O M P L E T E	S U P E R I O R	A P P L I C A B L E	U N O B S E R V E D
<b>Common actions/reminders</b>								
1. During preparation for execution and reporting, how well did the unit ...								
a. Report the following to higher and adjacent ...								
1) sitrep, status, and/or contact?	0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
2) 9-line IED?	0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
3) 9-line medevac as needed?	0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
b. Track frequencies and call signs for enabling units (e.g., EOD)?	0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
c. Conduct/verify PCC/PCI?	0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
d. Conduct rock drills (internally & with Iraqi forces)?	0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
e. Conduct movement/convoy withdrawal brief?	0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
f. Brief Rules of Engagement (ROE)?	0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
g. Disseminate photos/description of BOLO* /high value targets?	0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
h. Request air support (AWT*/UAV)?	0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
i. Call and update squads/platoons/convoy?	0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
j. Update/mark friendly/enemy and incident locations on FBCB2?	0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
k. Prepare PAO/IO release?	0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
<b>Event execution checklist</b>								
2. During event execution, how well did the unit ...								
a. Stop/pull off route/MSR?	0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
b. Create standoff (from suspected IED)?	0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
c. Conduct IED drills?	0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
d. Secure area?	0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
e. Cordon area?	0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
f. Alert/clear locals?	0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
g. Put vehicles in overwatch and roadblock (foot and vehicular traffic)?	0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
h. Use Binocs, RWS, vehicle optics to identify IED?	0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
i. Mark IED or cordon as soon as possible?	0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
j. Update higher by sending full IED/UXO report?	0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
k. Mark on FBCB2?	0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
l. Call/coordinate with explosive ordnance disposal (EOD)?	0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
m. Call/coordinate UAV support?	0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
n. Engage locals for intelligence about IED?	0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
o. Check surroundings/look for initiation wires and other IEDs?	0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
p. Await further orders (await EOD or mark/bypass)?	0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
q. Lead EOD to IED (secure and protect EOD)?	0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
r. Execute contingency plan/unit battle drill for IED disposal if EOD was unavailable?	0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
s. Use EOD to reduce the IED?	0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
t. Coordinate with higher for Law Enforcement Program (LEP) team to conduct SSE* (forensics/evidence gathering)?	0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
u. Continue mission?	0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
v. Provide detailed/complete IED/event report to S2 staff upon return to FOB?	0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
w. Execute information operations (IO) actions to support/exploit?	0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO

**Figure 4.2**  
**Back Page of IED Event Observer Questionnaire**

<b>Key Equipment, Kits, and Tools (EKT) to Facilitate Operations.</b> Place an X in each appropriate box to show whether EKT items were (1) on the SOP, (2) available for use, (3) necessary for use based upon tactical situation, (4) used. (5) Then identify, according to the scale above, how well the unit used this item to influence the tactical situation.	(1) Equipment, Kit, Tools were listed on SOP or equipment lists	(2) Equipment, Kit, Tools were available for use	(3) Item should have been used to support tactical situation	(4) Item <u>was</u> used to support tactical situation	(5) How well did the unit use this item to influence the tactical situation?							
					0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
Signs – deadly force, warning, EOF (for vehicles & cordon)					0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
Bullhorns					0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
Blinking lights					0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
Chem lights					0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
Visible lasers (for C2 at night)					0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
Cones					0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
Concertina wire (pickets, pounder, wire gloves)					0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
First aid kits/extra supplies/medball					0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
Litter/skidcos					0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
Non-lethal intervention weapons					0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
Detainee kits*					0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
Hand cuff straps/zip ties					0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
Sensitive site exploitation kits (SSE)*					0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
Interpreter					0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO

\* AWT – Air Weapons Team

\* BOLO – be on the lookout for (photo/description of individual or vehicle to watch for)

\* Detainee kits – Kits with unit designated items (e.g., blindfolds, detainee forms, Xsray, digital cameras, zip ties) used in capturing, questioning, processing, transporting, and incarcerating individuals

\* SSE kits – Kits with various unit designated items (e.g., rubber gloves, evidence bags, finger print capabilities, video cameras/recording devices) used to facilitate evidence collection and forensic analysis.

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complete the corresponding event questionnaire immediately following the execution of each event. All data were collected while units conducted regularly planned training.<sup>19</sup> In total we gathered 1,088 platoon event observations from 422 treatment and 666 control unit events.<sup>20</sup>

<sup>19</sup> Many observers confirmed that they were able to complete the questionnaires without altering their normal assignment responsibilities.

<sup>20</sup> Several observers told us that the ICEA appeared to be an effective way to remember and organize actions necessary during operations.

### Findings Strongly Suggest That the Handbook Improved Unit Performance

**Summary Statistics.** To test for a relationship between the ICEA and CTC outcomes, we derived an average assessment score across all skills on a single questionnaire.<sup>21</sup> This metric was the one used for all analyses. Platoons' average scores, the standard deviations, and the number of cases are provided in Table 4.3. As can be seen in the table, the average score for platoons that received the handbook was greater, 2.86, than the average control group score of 2.45. In addition, the average score for both treatment and control units was slightly greater near the end of the training rotation, training days 10–15, than earlier in the rotation, training days 1–4 and 5–9. Also, average scores for some of the events, notably QRF, appeared to be greater than those for some of the other events. To ascertain whether any of the apparent differences in Table 4.3 were statistically different, we conducted a series of multiple regression analyses including some of the variables and deleting others in Table 4.3 until the best fit of the data was achieved.<sup>22</sup>

**Regression Analyses.** We first estimated a full model. Because platoon assessments on multiple events resulted in observations within companies not being wholly independent, we used a regression clustering technique to ensure unbiased coefficients.<sup>23</sup> This initial full model

**Table 4.3**  
**Platoon Summary Statistics for Various Groups**

Variable	Average Platoon Score	Standard Deviation	Number of Cases
Treatment (received ICEA handbook)	2.86	0.77	422
Control (did not receive ICEA)	2.45	0.80	662
Possible IED scenario event	2.62	0.84	139
Quick Reaction Force scenario event	2.80	0.87	104
Dismounted Patrol scenario event	2.50	0.81	111
Rules of Engagement scenario event	2.60	0.86	152
Conduct Checkpoint scenario event	2.62	0.74	97
React to Indirect Fire scenario event	2.42	0.77	102
Cordon and Search scenario event	2.60	0.72	112
Raid with Iraqi Army scenario event	2.77	0.81	89
Secure Meeting Site scenario event	2.55	0.84	109
Consequence Management scenario event	2.66	0.79	69
CTC site one	2.55	0.74	150
CTC site two	2.62	0.83	934
Training days 1–4	2.52	0.84	425
Training days 5–9	2.55	0.80	380
Training days 10–15	2.62	0.72	134
Observer for more than three rotations	2.59	0.80	569

<sup>21</sup> A total score that was computed by summing across all items was not prudent because platoons did not necessarily have the same total number of completed items. For example, not all platoons necessarily needed to perform every item on a questionnaire to be successful; so the observer would score the item as not applicable.

<sup>22</sup> Appendix I contains a description of the variables we created and the models we estimated.

<sup>23</sup> Cluster specifies that the observations are independent across groups (companies), but not necessarily within groups. In this model, a unique hierarchical identifier for each platoon and its associated company, battalion, and brigade is specified. The cluster technique ensures that the lack of independence between subordinate platoons does not bias the estimated coefficients. The cluster command we used affected the estimated standard errors and variance-covariance matrix of the estimators, but not the estimated coefficients.

yielded few variables that were statistically significant.<sup>24</sup> We subsequently removed variables that were not our primary variable of interest, the treatment effect, to determine whether the model fit and estimates would change.

Table 4.4 contains the coefficients and statistical test results for the final regression model. The treatment variable had a 0.42 coefficient that was statistically significant ( $p < .01$ ). This demonstrated treatment effect of .42 points is moderately large. Although the assessment scale ranged from 0 to 5, scores of 0 and 5 were relatively uncommon occurrences; this resulted in an “effective” assessment scale of 1 to 4. In perspective, this equates to a nearly half-point treatment effect on what was in practical terms at most a four-point scale. Of the ten event scenario coefficients, only those for “indirect fire” (–0.27) and “conduct raid with Iraqi security forces” (0.16) were statistically significant. We left the other scenarios in the model for completeness, even though their coefficients were not statistically significant. As we mentioned above, units appeared to perform better near the end of the rotation, training days 10–15. The estimates for training days 1–4 and 5–9 were both negative and statistically significant, meaning that scores from the beginning and middle of the training rotation were significantly lower than scores toward the end of the rotation.

Figure 4.3 is a graphical representation of the differences between the treatment and control platoons for the full rotation.<sup>25</sup> As the regression models predicted, platoons with the handbook had better performance outcomes. In addition, this greater level of performance remained throughout the rotation.<sup>26</sup> Also, all units improved as a result of their CTC training.<sup>27</sup> Despite the overall improvement in both groups, units with the handbook were perform-

**Table 4.4**  
Final Regression Model Coefficients, Test Statistics, and Statistical Significance Results

Variable	Coefficient	t-statistic	p-value Less Than .05
Treatment (received handbook)	0.42	3.83	yes
Quick reaction force	0.09	1.09	no
Dismounted patrol	–0.13	–1.78	no
Rules of engagement	–0.01	–0.17	no
Conduct checkpoint	–0.01	–0.2	no
React to indirect fire	–0.27	–2.73	yes
Cordon and search	–0.02	–0.26	no
Raid with Iraqi army	0.16	2.05	yes
Secure meeting site	–0.14	–1.76	no
Consequence management	0.03	0.38	no
Training days 1–4	–0.34	–3.08	yes
Training days 5–9	–0.28	–2.51	yes
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup> = 0.11			


<sup>24</sup> The estimates and other statistics for this initial model are in Appendix I.

<sup>25</sup> Because there were few differences attributable to event scenario and there were no statistically significant treatment and scenario events interactions, our remaining discussion is based on the average values across all ten event scenarios.

<sup>26</sup> When we modeled treatment by training day interaction terms, none of them were statistically significant.

<sup>27</sup> The CTC improvement effect applies to both CTCs: there were no detectable differences between the JRTC and NTC in our outcome measures.

**Figure 4.3**  
**Graphical Representation of Differences Attributable to the Handbook During a Training Rotation**



RAND TR919-4.3

ing better throughout the rotation. Finally, during previous studies when we used 0–5 scales similar to those in this substudy, observers at JRTC and NTC have repeatedly told us that a 3 means the unit could do the skill that was scored. An averaged value greater than 2.5 indicated that units tended not to get scores lower than 2 and did receive many scores of 3 or greater.<sup>28</sup> Consequently, we would consider an average score that exceeded 2.5 to indicate that a unit was doing the majority of skills well. From this perspective, platoons that had the handbook really shone on these outcome measures. That is, the average platoon that received the ICEA was above the 2.5 cutoff at the beginning of the rotation; platoons without the handbook were not. In addition, the average platoon with the ICEA received mostly 3s or better for all skills near the end of the rotation.

## Summary and Implications of This Substudy

Working together with SWfF we developed a technique for capturing the experiences of combat veterans and synthesizing those experiences into an easy-to-use checklist that other units could use when they prepare for a deployment. This technique was not used by SWfF at the beginning of the substudy, but it was designed so that it could be adopted readily by them or any Army knowledge management organization responsible for informing, educating,

<sup>28</sup> Clearly, many different combinations of scores could have resulted in an average of 2.5. However, 0–5 were the only numerical values possible on this scale, and zeros and fives were rarely recorded. Also, when we have conducted case-by-case examinations of units with an average of 2.5, we have seen that a common pattern was about half the values were 2 and the other half were 3.

and/or training soldiers, leaders, or units. The technique required approximately one hour of a combat returnee's time—an activity that could be completed at the returnee's convenience. Synthesizing and organizing the experiences into a checklist form took the majority of time; including the returnee and analysts' time, approximately 1,000-1,300 man-hours were used.

We do not know how this level of effort compares to other feedback systems, but we believe the time was well spent for several reasons. First, it seemed to work. The CTC outcome findings strongly suggested that the handbook was associated with improved performance on handbook-related skills. Second, it is a way of cost-effectively disseminating lessons learned to a wide and distributed audience. To date approximately 10,000 handbooks have been distributed to units. In addition, electronic copies were shared with CTC observers who saw the handbook and wished to incorporate it into their job. This handbook was specifically tailored for platoon and subordinate leaders; however, the technique could be adapted for other audiences such as battalion command groups or nontactical entities that want to rapidly and reliably consolidate lessons learned.

We did not determine how leaders used the handbook, but considering the large sample size, the research design, and the statistically significant results, we are very confident it helped units prepare and perform. We suspect that how the handbook was used varied from leader to leader. For example, one battalion commander, after his training CTC rotation, told us that his command group did not “integrate” it into their training, but instead compared their TACSOP to the content of the handbook. He estimated their TACSOP contained 90 percent of the ICEA's content. So his unit used the handbook to confirm that what it had already developed was consistent with the experience from theater.



## Summary, Conclusions, and Recommendations

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In reviewing the charter, supporting tasks, and the FORSCOM Commanding General's statement regarding WfFs,

This initiative [Warfighters' Forums] shows the potential for exponential growth. The Warfighters' Forums will revolutionize the way we train, prepare for war, and adapt our practices to cope with dynamic change...<sup>1</sup>

we determined that for SWfF to be viewed as a success, it had to be a dynamic and adaptive organization that successfully and rapidly collected, synthesized, organized, and disseminated information to the community of practice.

We conducted a series of substudies documenting the ways in which SWfF supported the SBCT community of practice; how SBCT leaders used SWfF support and how satisfied they were with it; and whether SWfF tools were associated with measurable increases in individual and collective proficiency. Overall, across all of these substudies, the results showed that SWfF was supporting the Army's training and preparation for war and that its methods were capable of helping the Army adapt to changing tactical landscapes. Some of the primary findings were:

- **Leaders and staff were satisfied with SWfF's information portal.** The vast majority of SBCT leaders and/or staff was satisfied with SWfF's website and would recommend it to others.
- **Use of the website among SBCT personnel was significant.** One-third of all SBCT personnel that we surveyed viewed the website and one-half of those who viewed the site used it to improve their training and/or individual development.
- **SWfF was viewed mainly as supporting training.** Leaders primarily used SWfF's website to improve their self-development and unit training effectiveness and also as a source for new TTPs. In addition, the most common DOTMLPF element that SWfF staff directly supported was training.
- **SWfF staff directly supported a large number of requests for assistance.**
  - SWfF staff had approximately 80 external communications weekly.
  - The most commonly seen support involved an SBCT member seeking training information.
  - A large percentage of contact (80 percent) was with repeat customers—indicating that customers were satisfied with the support received.

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<sup>1</sup> Charles C. Campbell, Army Command Warfighters' Forum Web Page.



- **SWfF staff reduced the burden on SBCT tactical units of answering requests for information.** Thirty-six percent of SWfF communications were in response to requests from outside the Stryker community of practice; thereby, SWfF functionally reduced the burden of this responsibility on SBCT personnel while still addressing the requests.
- **SWfF tools were associated with improvements in individual tactical knowledge.** Statistically significant gains in junior officers', NCOs', and enlisted soldiers' tactical knowledge were associated with their use of a SWfF tactical training tool.
- **The ICEA handbook produced for SWfF led to improved collective proficiency.** Platoons in brigades that received a tactical handbook did significantly better at a CTC than platoons that did not receive the handbook.

Next, we detail these major findings. We then provide conclusions based on the findings and offer recommendations for the future.

## Use of and Satisfaction with SWfF Findings

We presented the findings of three substudies in Chapter Two; each showed ways in which SWfF was meeting its supporting tasks as outlined in the charter statement of the general officer Executive Council.<sup>2</sup> The substudies included (1) a survey of SBCT leaders' use of and satisfaction with a SWfF website; (2) a survey of all personnel in two SBCTs; and (3) an analysis of SWfF leader and staff communication logs.

We surveyed a sample of SBCT leaders about how and how well a SWfF-designed and -maintained website, StrykerNet, met their needs. Most reported that their main purposes in using StrykerNet were:

- self-development,
- improving training effectiveness, and
- finding new prepackaged TTPs.

We found that the vast majority of surveyed leaders were satisfied with how well SWfF enhanced training through incorporation of lessons learned in the StrykerNet website and, further, that they would recommend the site to their subordinates and colleagues. We also learned that some review of StrykerNet could be warranted. Some StrykerNet components were viewed more often than others; review of the less-viewed sites could be beneficial. Also, while most respondents did not indicate that any improvement was necessary, some did. The most common potential improvement noted was to include more prepackaged training material on the website.

We also surveyed a broader pool of SBCT personnel to determine how many members of the community of practice used SWfF. We sampled the personnel from two SBCTs and analyzed the resulting data provided by more than 3,000 leaders and soldiers. The results indicated

<sup>2</sup> The supporting tasks covered in the charter statement are as follows: "To enhance BCT leader, leader team, and unit training throughout the Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) process, to include the incorporation of lessons being learned by all BCTs, in order for BCTs to perform at higher levels of mission proficiency in each subsequent deployment; and to serve as conduits of BCT operational experience for training, doctrine, and force design and as models for other Army training and leader initiatives." (Griffin, Wallace, and Campbell, 2007, p. 1).

that SWfF was widely used by the SBCT community of practice. Approximately one out of three senior leaders and staff visited StrykerNet, and one-half of those who visited the site used it for training or individual development purposes. When we consider that members of SBCTs regularly communicate and share ideas, one out of three is a high rate. It is very likely that the ideas and lessons learned from StrykerNet by the “one out of three” are disseminated to the other “two out of three” within SBCTs.

As we expected, the percentages of SBCT members who participated in Stryker symposiums or obtained direct SWfF staff support were low, about 10 percent. Not all members of an SBCT are invited to or need to attend a symposium. Units were able to send representatives to a symposium; subsequently the representative could disseminate the lessons learned to the rest of the unit as needed. A similar situation most likely occurred with SWfF staff support, that is, a member of a unit or organization directly contacted SWfF and that person shared the lessons learned with his leaders, colleagues, and/or subordinates. For example, if a battalion commander learns a valuable TTP either in a symposium or from the staff, he would then transmit that TTP to all of his battalion. In such a case, SWfF positively impacts the entire battalion by communicating directly with only one person. Therefore, 10 percent was reasonable.

We also analyzed the direct communications between SWfF and its customers. These results provided additional insights into how well and in what ways SWfF supported the community of practice. SWfF staff handled about 16 external requests daily during this substudy. By extrapolation, during a one-year period SWfF would handle about 3,600 customer communications. Repeat customers were commonplace, accounting for nearly 80 percent of the communications observed. This return-customer rate strongly suggests satisfaction with support received previously. The most common communication involved an SBCT member seeking training-related information. However, SWfF provided support across all DOTMLPF domains to customers within and outside the SBCT community of practice.

SWfF also reduced the burden on SBCTs by answering requests for information and providing other forms of support, thereby freeing the SBCTs to concentrate on their own training and preparation for deployment. Thirty-six percent of SWfF's communications were in response to requests from organizations outside the SBCT community (about 100 in an 18-day period). If SWfF had not existed, it is very likely that someone in I Corps or in an SBCT would have had to handle such requests. This would have consumed valuable, limited training/preparation time. We believe this SWfF role benefits both the SBCTs, in that their training/deployment preparation time is protected, and organizations within the Army or Department of Defense, in that their questions about SBCTs are answered effectively.

## **Individual- and Collective-Level Tactical Education and Training Findings**

We conducted two substudies to determine whether SWfF tools would contribute to improvements in individual tactical knowledge and/or collective tactical performance at the CTCs. Although it is difficult to establish a definitive causal link in this type of research, in both substudies we found statistically significant relationships between the tools provided and our outcome measures. The most likely explanation for the observed relationships was the presence of the tools; consequently, we believe the tools directly contributed to gains in individual tactical knowledge and collective tactical proficiency.

### **Individual Tactical Knowledge Improved**

The Hundredth House training tool that SWfF offers improved the demonstrated tactical knowledge of most participants in this substudy. In fact, we saw meaningful gains among three of the four groups analyzed: junior officers, NCOs with recent OIF experience, and enlisted soldiers. We also used the results to provide feedback to battalion commanders. Because recipients' scores depended in part on their commander's expectations, lower scores mean that unit members were less likely to react to situations as expected. We believe that such feedback could be important in the future because it helps a commander and staff to focus subsequent training or professional development meetings on those specific tactics or procedures needing improvement.

### **Platoon Proficiency at the CTCs Improved If the ICEA Handbook Was Provided to SBCTs**

Working together with SWfF, we developed a technique for capturing the experiences of combat veterans and synthesizing them into a checklist that other units could easily use when they prepare for deployment. Units that received the handbook prior to their rotation did better on average at the handbook-related skills than units that did not; the differences were statistically significant, large, and seen at both the JRTC and NTC.<sup>3</sup> This technique could be adopted readily by any Army knowledge management organization responsible for informing, educating, and/or training soldiers, leaders, or units. We discuss why wider adoption of the technique could be beneficial in providing units with up-to-date TTPs in the next section.

## **Conclusions and Recommendations**

### **Conclusions**

SWfF is a primary example of how the Army is addressing the demands of today's strategic and tactical landscape by leveraging available computer-based technologies. These technologies allow the Army to more rapidly collect and disseminate lessons learned. They also enable commanders and staffs at multiple locations to participate in Internet-based symposiums where participants share and discuss observations. In a way, WfFs are a vehicle to harness these technologies to support specific types of Army formations such as SBCTs, IBCTs, or HBCTs. Many in the Army believe that warfighters' forums represent a fundamental shift in the Army's training system. As we show in this report, SWfF provides support using numerous methods, such as organizing networked symposiums; supporting anyone in the SBCT community of practice through communication; collecting, organizing, and disseminating lessons learned on its StrykerNet website; and providing individual and collective training tools.

We conducted multiple substudies to provide a holistic perspective concerning how and how well SWfF—and by extension other WfFs—supports its community of practice. The results indicate that SWfF does a good job supporting not only the Stryker community of practice but the Army as well. Our results consistently showed that SWfF and its techniques were widely used, well received, and associated with improvements in individual and collective capabilities.

If anything, we may have underestimated SWfF's effects. Studies of entities like the Stryker community of practice are a challenge. As we indicated earlier in this report, because

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<sup>3</sup> Our outcome metrics measured only the items that were in the handbook.

the community is so well networked, a single person learning something from SWfF could transmit the lesson to a large number of people in the community. Thus, while we may have observed only one out of three people using a SWfF resource, it is highly likely that the one-third transmitted the information to many or all of the other two-thirds.

Considering the networked nature of the community of practice, it is easy to wonder why a WfF is necessary—rhetorically, “If everyone communicates with everyone else, why have a facilitator in the network?” Our research and observations tell us that WfFs play a critical role in the networked community of practice. First, SWfF is a single, one-stop repository of just about anything that pertains to Stryker organization, doctrine, or TTPs. While individuals within the community of practice may communicate with each other, they alone cannot collect, synthesize, and disseminate information as effectively and efficiently as SWfF can. Second, SWfF can respond to requests for information, both internal and external to the community, and craft tailored responses without distracting unit members preparing for deployment. Third, WfFs can efficiently and effectively disseminate emerging lessons and refine, update, or eliminate TTPs that become obsolete. As insurgents change their tactics in response to U.S. techniques, our techniques have to evolve to achieve tactical and, ultimately, strategic success. An organization like SWfF is well suited to dynamically tracking successful revisions and quickly disseminating the changes to all SBCTs (and far more so than a few commanders could). Finally, SWfF is a resource for all members of the community of practice. If someone has a question, he can go to SWfF without worrying about interrupting other activities because SWfF’s purpose is to serve the community.

Based on our observations of SWfF operations, we also believe that some of SWfF’s success is due to its personnel. Most staff members were civilian contractors who had been battalion commanders in the Army. They repeatedly demonstrated high levels of knowledge and dedication. During this study there were multiple SWfF directors. Each of them was a lieutenant colonel or colonel who had just served as an SBCT battalion commander or was going into SBCT battalion command immediately following the director’s position. Each had been in the Stryker community for much of his recent career and thus had many contacts in the SBCTs. All of the directors and staff impressed us with their knowledge and professionalism. We suspect that SWfF would not have been as successful without personnel of this high quality.

## Recommendations

Based on our empirical research and our observations during this study, we make the following recommendations:

1. Continue to develop warfighters’ forums as key resources for collecting, synthesizing, and disseminating BCT-specific best practices and TTPs.
2. Ensure that WfFs continue to provide dynamic information to their communities.
3. Have WfFs continue to monitor the views of their communities of practice about what they offer.
4. Incorporate feedback reports into prepackaged training aids and tools.
5. Consider broader adoption of the method used to produce the ICEA handbook.

We conclude this report by detailing each of these five recommendations below.

**Continue to develop warfighters’ forums.** Our findings consistently showed that SWfF was well used, leaders were satisfied with it, and most importantly, SWfF tools were strongly

associated with improvements in performance. One advantage of a WfF over many other systems is that it is focused on a specific community of practice that shares similar requirements, needs, and responsibilities. For example, SWfF can provide personnel with equipment information, doctrine references or links, or techniques that are particularly germane to an SBCT. It maintains interaction with SBCTs so that it can extract valuable information about SBCT operations that is then shared with all of the SBCT community. In addition, SWfF searches for information that applies to more than just SBCTs, distills it, and provides it to its community of practice.

**Ensure that WfFs continue to provide dynamic information to their communities.** One of the reasons for SWfF's success was that it focused on collecting and disseminating the most up-to-date information possible to the community of practice. Examples included interviewing leaders within one month after they returned from a deployment and surveying returning junior leaders for the creation of the ICEA handbook. Commanders, staffs, and subordinates want to obtain the most recent TTPs and/or information that pertains to where they will deploy next—WfFs need to continue to make this an important element of their service.

**Monitor the views of the communities of practice about what WfFs offer.** We found that many leaders were satisfied with StrykerNet offerings. However, some did indicate that improvements could be made. We believe WfFs will be more valuable if they track and address the preferences of their communities of practice. Such tracking could reveal that some aspect of a WfF is so rarely used that it should be discontinued, or, in contrast, that there is greater demand for some types of information than the levels currently offered. Such tracking would not be too difficult or costly; we recommend it become a standard component of warfighters' forums.

**If possible, incorporate feedback reports into prepackaged training aids and tools.** The Hundredth House did not have an assessment device that could be used to give feedback to commanders or training developers. In fact, most Army training tools do not have an embedded assessment for feedback purposes.<sup>4</sup> We are not recommending that assessments be used for assigning grades or for comparing or evaluating units. Rather, training tools should provide commanders with feedback about how they could alter professional development courses and/or individual and collective training programs. These assessment reports also can provide valuable information to tool/aid developers. For example, a developer may have assumed that the conditions presented in a series of tactical vignettes would teach soldiers to execute certain preferred reactions to contact. However, the assessment could uncover that many soldiers instead chose different reactions. Thus, the assessment, combined with further review of the training content by the developer, could uncover elements of the training vignettes that led to less preferable reactions than those intended.

Incorporating embedded assessments into training aids could be considered for other Army organizations as well. The Army should review which training tools/aids could include embedded assessments. A word of caution is in order, however. Assessment development requires both art and science. The developer needs to fully understand the substance of the training content, be able to create clear and measurable assessment items, and be able to conduct item and reliability analysis or arrange for such analysis to be done. For example, in our substudy we crafted 55 items that had face validity; that is, they appeared to measure the con-

<sup>4</sup> It is possible that some do exist, but we did not uncover any and none were being used by SWfF during our research.



cepts we expected. However, after conducting rigorous statistical analyses, we determined that nearly one-half of the original items were not statistically “reliable,” and we deleted them.

**Consider broader adoption of the method used to produce the ICEA handbook.** Given experimental necessity, we worked with SWfF to develop the ICEA. However, we suggest the Army apply the method more broadly, for a number of reasons. Such handbooks are:

- **Current and relevant:** The information is derived from those who just returned from a deployment.
- **Rapid:** The time between information collection and publication of the document is three months or less.
- **Flexible:** As conditions, TTPs, or other factors change in theater, this technique captures the changes.
- **Only a small burden on leaders and soldiers:** It would take respondents only one hour to provide the information. They could provide it by computer or by hard copy during any time of the day that best fit their schedule.
- **Empirically based:** The technique draws from the actions, techniques, and preparations of hundreds of combat returnees, consolidating their shared views.
- **Efficient:** WfFs or other similar organizations are responsible for collecting, collating, processing, analyzing, and producing publications. They will develop efficient approaches to these responsibilities after repeated administrations of this technique.
- **Relatively low cost:** Administration of the survey involves little time or cost. Our largest associated cost (mainly manpower time) involved coding responses. However, even this cost was modest, and we suspect it will be reduced with further development and application.
- **Widely applicable:** The method could be used to share knowledge and insights in many areas, not just TTPs of tactical units. It could be readily adapted to collect and disseminate information about the performance of systems, equipment, or other areas of interest.
- **Effective:** Units that received the ICEA handbook performed the covered skills better than units that did not receive it. In addition, we had multiple requests for the handbook from individuals who saw it but did not receive it originally.

While the advantages listed above clearly suggest the desirability of employing training support ideas like the ICEA handbook, the Army will need to proceed carefully in broadening usage. First, it should ascertain the different ways in which the handbook was or could have been used, and then structure future techniques with those uses in mind. Second, broadening usage may lead to some minor increases in manpower requirements—most likely in WfFs—unless these requirements can be offset by reductions in other workload. These caveats notwithstanding, we believe the method merits further consideration and broader application.



## **Hundredth House Assessment Instrument**

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This appendix presents a facsimile of the paper-and-pencil assessment developed by the research team and given to all participants prior to and after the Hundredth House training. The evaluation framework was designed to address broad areas of tactical knowledge that could be affected by someone's participation in the training. These areas were (1) the environment and circumstances the soldiers and unit found themselves in, (2) enemies' actions and signals (or indicators) that should be received, understood, and interpreted, and (3) friendly elements' interpretations of enemy signals, responses, and actions, and friendly counteractions. The final assessment instrument contained 55 questions in these areas. What follows has been formatted to fit this presentation.



Survey # \_\_\_\_\_

## Hundredth House Questionnaire

This survey is part of a study conducted by the Arroyo Center of the RAND Corporation, a non-profit research institute, in Santa Monica, California. The study is sponsored by I Corps, Fort Lewis, Washington. The goal of the study is to assist the Army to better understand how the Stryker Warfighters' Forum (SWfF) is helping to sustain and improve Stryker Soldier and leader skills capabilities and combat readiness. You have been asked to complete this survey because you are preparing for deployment with a Stryker unit.

Participation in this survey is completely voluntary. You may choose not to fill it out, or to skip any question you would prefer not to answer. You will not be asked to provide information that directly identifies you. We will, however, need to link responses from each respondent's questionnaire prior to receiving Hundredth House training, to responses after receiving the training. To accomplish this link, we will provide each of you a unique identification number located on the first questionnaire that we ask you to complete. We ask you to remember this number and place it on the second questionnaire you will take shortly after completing training. This will provide us the link we need to assess learning associated with the Hundredth House tool while ensuring your responses are anonymous. The estimated time to complete the survey is about 30 minutes.

Your answers will go to the research team at the RAND Corporation, and they will be anonymous: No one will be able to identify them as having come from you. In reporting results of the survey, RAND will combine your responses with those of others in a way that would prevent anyone from deducing what individuals responded.

We urge you to complete this survey. Your participation is very important to the study team's efforts to help units in preparing for the next deployment and to get as complete a picture as possible of SWfF's contribution to skills capabilities and combat readiness.

If you have any questions about the study or your participation, you may contact RAND's project leader, Bryan Hallmark at (310) 393-0411 ext. 6312, [hallmark@rand.org](mailto:hallmark@rand.org), or assistant leader Jamie Gayton at (310) 393-0411 ext. 7636, [jgayton@rand.org](mailto:jgayton@rand.org).

If you have any questions about your rights as a research participant, you may contact:

Jim Tebow, Co-Administrator  
RAND Human Subjects Protection Committee  
1776 Main Street M3W  
Santa Monica, CA 90407-2138  
(310) 393-0411 x7173  
[James\\_Tebow@rand.org](mailto:James_Tebow@rand.org)

What is your current rank?

- |                                       |                           |
|---------------------------------------|---------------------------|
| <input type="radio"/> PVT/PV2/PFC     | <input type="radio"/> 2LT |
| <input type="radio"/> SPC/Corporal    | <input type="radio"/> 1LT |
| <input type="radio"/> SGT             | <input type="radio"/> CPT |
| <input type="radio"/> SSG             | <input type="radio"/> MAJ |
| <input type="radio"/> SFC             | <input type="radio"/> LTC |
| <input type="radio"/> MSG/1SG/SGM/CSM |                           |

Please select all the operations for which you have deployed. Select the box that shows the date you started the deployment. For instance, if you were deployed from January 2005 to January 2006, you would mark OIF 2005 (not 2006). If you were deployed from June 2006 to September 2007, you would mark OIF 2006 (not 2007). There should be one mark for each deployment.

- |                                |                                |
|--------------------------------|--------------------------------|
| <input type="radio"/> OEF 2001 | <input type="radio"/> OIF 2003 |
| <input type="radio"/> OEF 2002 | <input type="radio"/> OIF 2004 |
| <input type="radio"/> OEF 2003 | <input type="radio"/> OIF 2005 |
| <input type="radio"/> OEF 2004 | <input type="radio"/> OIF 2006 |
| <input type="radio"/> OEF 2005 | <input type="radio"/> OIF 2007 |
| <input type="radio"/> OEF 2006 | <input type="radio"/> OIF 2008 |
| <input type="radio"/> OEF 2007 |                                |
| <input type="radio"/> OEF 2008 |                                |

Note that all following questions will ask you to either:

- 1) Rank order your responses—you will see a \_\_\_\_\_ for each ranking
- 2) Mark an X in the ☐ for your **one** best answer—you will see a ☐
- 3) Mark a ✓ in the ☐ for **all** responses that apply—you will see a ☐
- 4) Circle your unit's most likely response—You will see A B C D E

1. Rank order the list of five possible reactions by how likely they are to occur when *high-level* insurgents such as Al Qaeda have no avenue for their escape/withdrawal? (1 is most likely and 5 is least likely.)
  - \_\_\_ surrender
  - \_\_\_ fight to kill some coalition forces and then surrender
  - \_\_\_ fight to the finish
  - \_\_\_ commit suicide before being taken prisoner
  - \_\_\_ use weapons/explosives to kill as many as possible including self (become a martyr)
2. Rank order the list of five possible reactions by how likely they are to occur when *low-level* terrorists/insurgents such as local Sunni or Shia groups have no avenue for their escape/withdrawal? (1 is most likely and 5 is least likely.)
  - \_\_\_ surrender
  - \_\_\_ fight to kill some coalition forces and then surrender
  - \_\_\_ fight to the finish
  - \_\_\_ commit suicide before being taken prisoner
  - \_\_\_ use weapons/explosives to kill as many as possible including self (become a martyr)
3. How important is it to be familiar with insurgent/terrorist tactics, techniques, and procedures in specific neighborhoods before conducting operations there? (Mark an X in the ○ for your *one* best answer.)
  - extremely
  - somewhat
  - neither important or unimportant
  - somewhat unimportant
  - unimportant
4. How important is it to be aware of the specific ethnic/religious breakdown in a neighborhood before conducting operations there? (Mark an X in the ○ for your *one* best answer.)
  - extremely
  - somewhat
  - neither important or unimportant
  - somewhat unimportant
  - unimportant

5. What should we assume that the enemies (insurgents/terrorists) know about our actions? (Mark an X in the ○ for your **one** best answer.)
- they know very little about our routes, TTPs and missions because we are good at changing up our operations
  - they might know typical routes and stopping points in neighborhoods but not our TTPs for conducting operations
  - they are constantly trying to learn our TTPs from watching our actions on objectives BUT have no inside knowledge of and therefore cannot anticipate our missions
  - they know our TTPs and get some information about upcoming missions
  - they know our TTPs and have “insiders” who routinely provide information about upcoming missions

*Questions 6–9 are examples where you need to decide to what extent enemy actions and Iraqi Army (IA)/Iraqi Police (IP) requests would determine your unit’s level of response in a given situation? Use one of the following five possible US unit actions for your answers to questions 6–9.*

- A. Do not enter right now. Call for back-up/QRF and possibly UAS/CAS. Engage local IPs for information. Call local Iraqi leaders for information.
  - B. Collect face-to-face information from IPs that initially reported the incident. Assess the situation and if story makes sense, offer to provide overwatch and QRF support to IP unit. Resist taking over the mission.
  - C. Collect face-to face information from IPs that initially reported the incident. Assess the situation and if story makes sense, and they request, assume the mission.
  - D. Enter immediately to extract the escaped detainee. Back off/regroup only if insurgents elevate level of fight to include machine gun fire, explosives, or comparable.
  - E. Enter immediately to extract the escaped detainee. It is critical to get the detainee to save face with insurgents and IPs—do not withdraw without capturing the escaped detainee.
6. A Stryker patrol receives a report from partner IPs that an escaped detainee is in a house/building and that the IPs receive **un-aimed** small arms fire (SAF) from the building when trying to enter. (Please circle your unit’s most likely response.)  
A B C D E
7. A Stryker patrol receives a report from partner IPs that an escaped detainee is in a house/building and that the IPs receive **aimed** SAF from the building when trying to enter. (Please circle your unit’s most likely response.)  
A B C D E
8. A Stryker patrol receives a report from partner IPs that an escaped detainee is in a house/building and that the IPs received **machine gun fire** from the building and sustained two casualties from a grenade that was tossed by the entrance gate when trying to enter. (Please circle your unit’s most likely response.)  
A B C D E

9. A Stryker patrol receives a report from partner IPs that an escaped detainee is in a house/building and that the IPs received un-aimed gunfire from the building. By the time coalition forces arrived, no fire had been taken in over an hour. (Please circle your unit's most likely response.)  
A B C D E
10. Place a check mark next to ALL of the weapons that if used by an insurgent/terrorist organization would necessitate a platoon requesting back-up/overwatch before completing an ongoing (approved) mission? (Mark a ✓ in the ☐ for all responses that apply.)
- ☐ Rocks, bricks, or sticks are thrown from vehicles or buildings
  - ☐ Molotov cocktail-like weapons (hand propelled)
  - ☐ Un-aimed small arms fire
  - ☐ Aimed small arms fire
  - ☐ Grenades, fabricated IEDs, or RPG-type weapons
  - ☐ Machine gun fire
11. Please place a check mark next to ALL of the items that represent the "tell-tale" signs of Al Qaeda involvement in an insurgent/terrorist operation associated with a building, house, or structure? (Mark a ✓ in the ☐ for all responses that apply.)
- ☐ Rocks, bricks, or sticks are thrown from vehicles or buildings
  - ☐ Molotov cocktail-like weapons (hand propelled)
  - ☐ Un-aimed small arms fire
  - ☐ Aimed small arms fire
  - ☐ Grenades, fabricated IEDs, or RPG-type weapons
  - ☐ Machine gun fire
  - ☐ Extended engagements
  - ☐ Supporting fringe attacks
  - ☐ Dialogue/demands made to coalition leaders
  - ☐ When questioned, neighbors can provide names and occupations of house inhabitants
12. If your or one of your subordinate units has taken 20% or more casualties in attacks from a building/structure, check the **one** best answer below to describe under what conditions the unit being attacked is justified in engaging with direct fire from UAS, helicopter gunships, or CAS? (Mark an X in the ☐ for your **one** best answer.)
- ☐ Always, based upon typical standing ROE
  - ☐ If we cleared attack with higher HQ according to release authority in standing orders
  - ☐ If cleared by higher and only if no or virtually no collateral damage is likely to be realized
  - ☐ We might be justified but must consider the ROE and whether our decision could pass the test of the "court of professional and public scrutiny" following the action
  - ☐ We would never be justified in using this type of force against a building. Other means could always be used to minimize casualties and collateral damage

13. Consider an Iraq deployment where a unit experiences the same set of enemy actions during every raid or house search for multiple months. Select the one best choice below regarding if the unit should change its SOP. (Mark an X in the ☐ for your **one** best answer.)
- ☐ No, we should develop an SOP and stick to it.
  - ☐ Maybe, we must weigh the benefits of updated SOPs and TTPs against the costs of having soldiers confused about current/correct battledrills and SOPs.
  - ☐ Yes, a unit should conduct AARs following missions and immediately incorporate changes that could benefit mission success or safety of soldiers.
  - ☐ Yes, but units should adapt SOPs over time to ensure that the SOP will prevail for the “likely” insurgent course of action.
  - ☐ Yes, but units should adapt SOPs over time to ensure the SOP will prevail against the “most dangerous” insurgent course of action.
14. Select any of the following conditions that **would** influence you to take offensive action faster than you would if the condition was not present? (Mark a ☐ in the ☐ for all responses that apply.)
- ☐ You have taken casualties but are not taking fire currently.
  - ☐ You are exactly 1 hour from completing your patrol.
  - ☐ You currently have UAS support but may lose it at any time.
  - ☐ You currently have Helo gunship support for a short time.
  - ☐ Supporting fringe attacks.
  - ☐ You currently have CAS support for a short time.
  - ☐ You currently have IA support for a short time.
15. How many soldiers in your squad would you try to get combat lifesaver (CLS) qualified/trained prior to deployment? (Mark an X in the ☐ for your **one** best answer.)
- ☐ One per squad
  - ☐ One per team
  - ☐ 50% of squad
  - ☐ 75% of squad
  - ☐ 100% of squad
16. A Stryker platoon receives a request for support from IPs who are being engaged by suspected insurgents from inside a house. Upon arriving, the platoon leader gets fully briefed by the IPs, develops a course of action, and starts to execute his plan. As a squad from the platoon prepares to enter the house, a soldier from your support force and a soldier from your clearance force become casualties to SAF and grenades. The situation is **NOT** going well. When a higher commander arrives at the scene of this operation, he should (mark an X in the ☐ for your **one** best answer):
- ☐ Relieve the platoon leader for exhibiting poor judgment in deciding to enter the house.
  - ☐ Allow the platoon leader to continue being in command of the operation/situation.
  - ☐ Immediately assume command of the operation/situation.
  - ☐ Get briefed by key personnel/leaders and assume command of the operation as soon as he has sufficient situational awareness.

17. A Stryker platoon receives a request for support from IPs who are being engaged by suspected insurgents from inside a house. Upon arriving, the platoon leader gets fully briefed by the IPs, develops a course of action, and starts to execute his plan. As a squad from the platoon prepares to enter the house, insurgents begin firing again but the unit takes no casualties as the operation begins. The situation appears to be going well. When a higher commander arrives at the scene of this operation, he should (mark an X in the ☐ for your **one** best answer):
- ☐ Relieve the platoon leader for exhibiting poor judgment in deciding to enter the house.
  - ☐ Allow the platoon leader to continue being in command of the operation/situation.
  - ☐ Immediately assume command of the operation/situation.
  - ☐ Get briefed by key personnel/leaders and assume command of the operation as soon as he has sufficient situational awareness.
18. You are asked to partner with an IP unit. Rank order the list of items below concerning what you **should** know about the IP unit you will partner with. (1 is most important and 6 is least important.)
- IP unit's training levels for insurgent-type missions
  - IP unit's tactics for conducting insurgent-type missions
  - IP unit's previous experience conducting joint (IA/coalition) operations
  - Ethnic/religious breakdown within the IP unit's ranks
  - Weapons/equipment IP unit currently has
  - Background information about the IP unit, including OPSEC trustworthiness, from a coalition unit that has worked with the IP unit
19. You have a partnership with an IP unit and they call for help on a mission. (Mark an X in the ☐ for your **one** best answer.)
- ☐ Not conduct the operation/provide support.
  - ☐ Request information from them before conducting the operation/providing support.
  - ☐ Request information from them and corroborate with some additional (coalition) intelligence before conducting the operation/providing support.
  - ☐ Immediately conduct the operation/provide support—they are your partners.
20. You have a partnership with an IP unit and they call for help on a mission. If they requested, what level of support would you be willing to provide? (Mark a ☒ in the ☐ for all responses that apply.)
- ☐ UAS/CAS/Helo video or intelligence support.
  - ☐ UAS/CAS/Helo direct fire support.
  - ☐ QRF type support (back-up).
  - ☐ A unit to integrate and conduct a joint mission with the IPs.
  - ☐ Assume command of the situation and complete the mission for them.

21. Where should teams conduct final checks and establish their stack formation prior to building/house clearing operations. (Mark an X in the ☐ for your **one** best answer.)
- ☐ Against the building/house in best covered/concealed position available.
  - ☐ Against the fence surrounding the building/house.
  - ☐ Behind an overwatch Stryker vehicle that offers cover and concealment.
  - ☐ Far enough away to be out of range of hand propelled (thrown) explosives and “covered” from direct fire weapons.
  - ☐ Far enough away to eliminate all risk of enemy action.
22. At squad-level, rank order who is in the best position to provide status reports to platoon leadership during an operation. (1 is best position and 5 is least best position.)
- \_\_\_\_\_ Squad leader
  - \_\_\_\_\_ Team leader
  - \_\_\_\_\_ Member of squad
  - \_\_\_\_\_ Stryker turret gunner
  - \_\_\_\_\_ Stryker driver
23. Rank order who should be providing status reports to company leadership during an operation. (1 is best person and 8 is least best person.)
- \_\_\_\_\_ Platoon leader
  - \_\_\_\_\_ Platoon sergeant
  - \_\_\_\_\_ Squad leader
  - \_\_\_\_\_ Team leader
  - \_\_\_\_\_ Stryker turret gunner
  - \_\_\_\_\_ Stryker driver
  - \_\_\_\_\_ Member of squad
  - \_\_\_\_\_ Company HQ element dispatched to the site of the operation
24. Mark the **two** elements of a SALUTE report that could provide the best indicators of whether a platoon should enter and clear a house in a search and apprehend type operation for a high value target. (Mark an X in the ☐ for your **two** best answers.)
- ☐ Size
  - ☐ Activity
  - ☐ Location
  - ☐ Unit
  - ☐ Time
  - ☐ Equipment



25. Your unit enters a house and comes under heavy direct fire from covered/concealed positions and sustains casualties. Rank order the list of ways below for your unit to get heavier weapons fire (from organic assets) on the objective? (1 is your preferred technique and 5 is your least preferred technique.)
- \_\_\_\_\_ Send in a reinforcing team/squad with heavier weapons to engage.
  - \_\_\_\_\_ Use massed fires by pinned-down squad to replicate heavier weapons.
  - \_\_\_\_\_ Relocate supporting force to better positions to engage.
  - \_\_\_\_\_ Have supporting force use grenades/explosives to engage.
  - \_\_\_\_\_ Have Stryker vehicle reposition or knock down obstruction to engage.
26. To reduce the number of times subordinate units get sucked into operations they cannot resolve without help, should there be a SOP that establishes for example: un-aimed weapons fire requires platoon or higher involvement, aimed weapons fire requires company or higher involvement, and machine gun fire or use of explosives requires battalion level involvement. (Mark an X in the ○ for your **one** best answer.)
- Yes—SOPs are great tools to ensure mission accomplishment and safety of soldiers.
  - No—this unduly restricts junior leaders by imposing inflexible rules on operations.
27. A platoon planned a raid of a suspected insurgent house and the PL has decision authority to execute the operation. As the operation begins, the lead squad takes casualties while moving into final staging positions for entering the building (through direct fire or explosives from the building). Given these circumstances, check the box next to the ONE best option with respect to making changes in the decision authority for entering the building. (Mark an X in the ○ for your **one** best answer.)
- No, the PL should still make the decision.
  - Maybe, the PL should discuss with higher if available but still make the ultimate call.
  - Yes, the authority to launch a mission following a pre-emptive attack by insurgents is enough of a signal to elevate the decision to the next higher level.
  - Yes, this decision should have always been at a higher level regardless of the operation.
28. Assume your unit has been in theater for 5 months. If a **contact** report from a platoon at 0200 states that shots have been fired, what do you think your commander will do? (Mark an X in the ○ for your **one** best answer.)
- Nothing. The commander will probably not be awakened by the RTO or find out about this until the morning.
  - Nothing. If awakened by the RTO, this does not warrant any action at this point.
  - Alert QRF (awake and in vehicles) to be on high alert.
  - Alert Commander's personal security detachment (PSD) team for potential movement to the site.
  - Confirm level of contact with Platoon Leader.
  - Move with PSD team to that location to provide command and control and eyes on for higher command.

29. Assume your unit has been in theater for 5 months. If a ***casualty*** report from a platoon arrives at the TOC at 0200 (with no details about the casualty), what do you think your commander will do? (Mark a ✓ in the ☐ for all responses that apply.)
- ☐ Nothing. The commander will probably not be awakened by the RTO or find out about this until the morning.
  - ☐ Nothing. If awakened by the RTO, this does not warrant any action at this point.
  - ☐ Alert QRF (awake and in vehicles) to be on high alert.
  - ☐ Alert Commander's PSD team for potential movement to the site.
  - ☐ Confirm level of contact, method of injury, extent of injury, with Platoon Leader.
  - ☐ Deploy QRF and alert backup QRF to assume QRF status.
  - ☐ Move with PSD team to that location no matter how serious the injury is to provide command and control and eyes on for higher command.
  - ☐ Move with PSD team to that location only if risk to life, limb, or eyesight; provide command and control and eyes on for higher command.
30. Assume your unit has been in theater for 5 months. If a ***multiple casualty event report*** arrives at the TOC at 0200, what do you think your commander will do? (Mark a ✓ in the ☐ for all responses that apply.)
- ☐ Nothing. This is likely NOT CCIR—so the commander will probably not be awakened by the RTO or find out about this until the morning.
  - ☐ Nothing. If awakened by the RTO, this does not warrant any action at this point.
  - ☐ Alert QRF (awake and in vehicles) to be on high alert.
  - ☐ Alert Commander's PSD team for potential movement to the site.
  - ☐ Confirm level of contact, method of injury, extent of injury, with Platoon Leader.
  - ☐ Deploy QRF and alert backup QRF to assume QRF status.
  - ☐ Move with PSD team to that location no matter how serious the injury is to provide command and control and eyes on for higher command.
  - ☐ Move with PSD team to that location only if risk to life, limb, or eyesight; provide command and control and eyes on for higher command.
31. Your unit is conducting a routine patrol. During your patrol pre-brief, you were told that UAS/CAS/Helo gunships would be direct support to the brigade and might be available to your platoon during your patrol. (Mark a ✓ in the ☐ for all of the AUTHORITIES that a platoon leader should have in this situation if the assets are available.)
- ☐ Ordering additional “eyes on” for a specific location/target.
  - ☐ Ordering covering fire (defensive)—fires specifically to extract unit from a firefight or IED ambush, or similar event.
  - ☐ Ordering supporting fire (offensive)—fires specifically to support a unit during a counterattack or pursuit following a firefight, ambush, or similar event.
  - ☐ Ordering stand-alone response attack—fires in response to earlier attack on unit from house/building that is currently posing no imminent risk and is designed to “level” the house/building and kill all inhabitants.
  - ☐ Ordering stand-alone response attack—fires in response to earlier attack on unit from house/building that is currently posing imminent risk to soldiers and is designed to “level” the house/building and kill all inhabitants.

32. Your unit has taken direct fire from a known insurgent house and received one casualty. What do you believe will be your commander's most important consideration when deciding whether to engage the house with Helo gunships or CAS? (Mark an X in the ☐ for your **one** best answer.)
- ☐ Mission accomplishment—the likelihood that using assets will result in kill or capture of those in house/building.
  - ☐ Collateral damage—the likelihood that using assets will or will not have direct unintended consequences for equipment or personnel.
  - ☐ Information operations—the likely affect of the portrayal of the event on local nationals, coalition forces, Americans at home, and the world.
33. How effective do you think a Helo gunship would be at delivering fires that would severely injure or kill the inhabitants of a house/building and render the house “unlivable?” (Mark an X in the ☐ for your **one** best answer.)
- ☐ Very effective—the firepower on these systems assures that they will accomplish the mission every time.
  - ☐ Moderately effective—although the odds are very small, there is still a chance that insurgents could survive.
  - ☐ Effective—although all insurgents may not be dead, they will all be injured or incapacitated through concussion and shock.
  - ☐ Somewhat ineffective—in some cases, inhabitants may survive unharmed and able to continue the fight.
  - ☐ Completely ineffective—in many cases, the building will remain intact and inhabitants will survive to continue the fight.
34. Your unit cleared the first floor of a house/building, killing two insurgents and taking several casualties. You then called in a Helo gunship strike to kill all inhabitants on the second (top) floor and destroy the house/building. One hour after the Helo gunships reported mission accomplishment, you note that two of the walls had collapsed and no activity or sound had been heard from the building. (Mark an X in the ☐ for your **one** best answer.)
- ☐ Call in another strike to be sure.
  - ☐ Wait another two hours to be sure.
  - ☐ Send in available medics with a squad in support to determine if any inhabitants are alive and assess/evacuate casualties.
  - ☐ Have a squad enter and clear the building using SOP.
  - ☐ Request an IP or IA unit to enter the building and confirm clear for the information operations victory (they get credit for eliminating insurgents).
  - ☐ Have another unit take charge of the operation while you reconsolidate and evacuate earlier casualties.

35. Check the SINGLE most likely type/kind of vehicle that would be the primary medical evacuation vehicle following a casualty producing event in an urban or semi-urban environment. (Mark an X in the ☐ for your **one** best answer.)
- ☐ Stryker medical evacuation vehicle (MEV) or HMMWV variant ambulance
  - ☐ Standard Stryker or HMMWV
  - ☐ Helicopter medevac
36. Your unit was attacked with aimed fire and an explosive device from the front of a house/building. Please rank order the following entry point options for entering the house to clear the building and capture/kill the inhabitants. (1 is your most preferred option and 5 is your least preferred option.)
- The front door
  - A rear or side door
  - A window on the first or second floor
  - Multiple points including the front door
  - Multiple points but NOT the front door
37. Select the best option when involved in an operation for dealing with heavy bleeding from an extremity. (Mark an X in the ☐ for your **one** best answer.)
- ☐ Get to level I care for medical attention
  - ☐ Gauze and direct pressure
  - ☐ Bandage wrapped tightly
  - ☐ Tourniquet
  - ☐ Steri-strips

38. Your Stryker platoon receives a report from IPs while on patrol that a suspected insurgent ran into a neighborhood house. When IPs approached the house, inhabitants fired **un-aimed** SAF. By the time your platoon arrived, there had been no activity from the house in over an hour. As a squad from your platoon established its “stack formation” against the fence of the building for entrance, an explosive was tossed from the building that inflicted two casualties. (Mark an X in the ☐ for your **one** best answer.)
- ☐ Abort entrance mission. Retreat to cover of Strykers. Cordon street/house. Call for back-up/QRF and possibly UAS/CAS. Engage local IPs and/or IA for information. Call local leaders for information. Call higher to provide assessment, ask for guidance, and explain that your platoon can no longer handle this mission.
  - ☐ Abort entrance mission. Call higher and ask for additional platoon to serve as cordon force to complete mission. Confirm that you have a good plan and can take out these insurgents, capture the escaped detainee, and can get the guys that hurt your two soldiers if given the opportunity.
  - ☐ Regroup. Platoon leader establishes one squad as cordon force, one as back-up, and one to enter house/building. As soon as brief mission/intent is provided, squads take positions and commence operation.
  - ☐ Hold ground, ask for back-up team to replace casualties and then continue the mission. Enter the house as soon as possible to get out of the “kill zone.” It is critical to get the detainee and kill or capture all remaining in the house to save face with insurgents and IA/IPs—do not withdraw without capturing the escaped detainee.
  - ☐ Continue the mission. Enter the house immediately to get out of the “kill zone.” It is critical to get the detainee and kill or capture all remaining in the house to save face with insurgents and IA/IPs—do not withdraw without capturing the escaped detainee.
39. Select the best type of transition of control that should take place between a platoon-sized QRF and an “engaged” platoon when the QRF arrives on the scene? (Mark an X in the ☐ for your **one** best answer.)
- ☐ None—engaged unit should extract casualties and depart as fast as possible to save lives.
  - ☐ The engaged unit should remain in command and the QRF should be a supporting element.
  - ☐ The QRF should assume command and the engaged unit should become supporting element.
  - ☐ The engaged unit leader should brief the QRF leader upon arrival. Control should remain with the engaged unit unless its combat effectiveness or medevac requirement preclude.

40. You are the leader and your subordinate unit is in contact and is not providing an adequate quantity of or sufficient detail in status reports. Sequentially order what you should do first, second, etc. (1 is your first action and 5 is last action.)

☐ Nothing—there must be a reason the unit has not reported. Wait for the unit to send an update.  
☐ Continue to call on the command (higher element's) "push" to demand an update.  
☐ Drop down to the subordinate element's "push" to listen in on the chatter and request an update from someone on the net.  
☐ Send out a HQ element to see first hand what is happening and establish status updates with the TOC.  
☐ Take PSD and go to the site personally to gain situational understanding. Use this to report status higher.

41. You are the commander of an engaged unit. You are unable to conduct an ideal battle hand-over of the situation with the QRF/backup that arrives on the scene. (Rank order the elements to conduct the battle handover. 1 is most important and 11 is least important.)

☐ Type of weapons engaged with  
☐ Mission  
☐ Number of insurgents  
☐ Duration of engagements (how long each episode of firing lasts)  
☐ Time since last weapons engagement  
☐ Explosives used (e.g., IEDs, grenades)  
☐ Outer cordon positions  
☐ Inner cordon positions  
☐ Involvement of IA/IP in support  
☐ Additional assets available UAS/CAS/Helo, EOD, etc.  
☐ Information operations concerns

42. A company commander prepares his unit for deployment and then commands his company in Iraq for six months. If this company commander could magically make his platoon increase their proficiency in one area, what **ONE** area would he pick? (Mark an X in the ☐ for your **one** best answer.)

☐ Battle drills  
☐ Casualty evacuation/medevac procedures  
☐ Weapons qualification statistics  
☐ Reporting accuracy and timeliness  
☐ Consequence management operations  
☐ ROE enforcement

43. Select **ALL** the conditions in the list below when a cordon should be established around a house/building? When you ... (Mark a  $\checkmark$  in the  $\square$  for all responses that apply.)
- ☐ suspect a person of interest is inside.
  - ☐ knock on the door of the house.
  - ☐ receive weapons fire from the house.
  - ☐ take casualties from actions by house members.
  - ☐ decide to enter and clear the house by force.
  - ☐ call in air assets (UAS/CAS/Helos) in support.
44. You are partnering with an IP unit. The IP unit receives direct fire from a house that they attempted to enter because an insurgent was believed to be there. They request and you provide support. You and the IPs establish a cordon and are NOT in any imminent danger. Is there any risk to mission success associated with collecting more intelligence from neighbors or the local IA unit before conducting the operation? (Mark an X in the  $\bigcirc$  for your **one** best answer.)
- ☐ Yes
  - ☐ No
45. Your company commander is tasked to plan and conduct a tactical mission within a neighborhood. To what extent should information operations impact mission planning? (Mark an X in the  $\bigcirc$  for your **one** best answer.)
- ☐ No impact on mission planning—the mission is planned and then we develop the best information operations plan based upon the mission
  - ☐ Some impact on mission planning—The mission is planned and then minor changes to the plan may be incorporated after the fact to support information operations objectives
  - ☐ Moderate impact on mission planning—information operations objectives should be discussed while developing the mission plan
  - ☐ Full impact on mission planning—mission and information operations objectives should be considered equally during the mission development process
  - ☐ Total impact—information operations should drive the mission planning/development process
46. If a soldier mentions that executing battle drills at the soldier level in an operation are instinctive, should that be perceived as a good thing? (Mark an X in the  $\bigcirc$  for your **one** best answer.)
- ☐ Yes, it is good that soldiers know battle drills so well that they can execute them without thinking.
  - ☐ No, it is not good since this reduces a soldier's ability to adapt to changing circumstances.

47. If a unit leader (platoon leader or commander) mentions that making decisions at the leader level is instinctive, similar to a soldier's ability to execute battle drills, should that be taken as a good thing? (Mark an X in the ☐ for your **one** best answer.)
- ☐ Yes, it is good that leaders know battle drills so well that they can "order" appropriate ones to support mission accomplishment without thinking.
  - ☐ No, it is not good since this reduces a leader's ability to incorporate different signals, and conditions into his decision-making process.

*Leaders are expected to make snap decisions during the course of daily operations in Iraq, whether on a seemingly routine patrol or while conducting planned operations against insurgents. There is often little time for reflection or analysis; instead leaders must rely on their judgment to make decisions in a timely manner.*

*For Questions 48–54 You are the leader on the scene. Questions 48–54 present you with a chronological sequence of events that might unfold for a leader in Iraq. At several steps in the sequence, the questions force you to make these types of snap decisions. At each step, no matter what your decision in prior steps/question, you will be forced to make a new decision. The existence of follow-on questions does not in any way imply how previous questions should be answered.*

*Situation: You have just begun partnering with an IP unit in Iraq. The agreement states you will act as a QRF for the IPs if they get in over their heads. With about 1 hour left on a routine patrol, you receive a call from an IP commander that they have chased an escaped detainee into a building and have taken AK47 fire.*

48. In light of the above situation, do you think you should...
- (Mark an X in the ☐ for your **one** best answer.)
- ☐ not respond because this does not appear to be a QRF mission?
  - ☐ respond by traveling to the location?
49. Your Commander orders you to go to the building with the escaped detainee. Upon arrival at the building scene, the only IP present is the IP commander who says that there has been no enemy fire in the last 1 hour and that it is very important that they recapture the escaped detainee who is hiding in the building. Should you...
- (Mark an X in the ☐ for your **one** best answer.)
- ☐ not conduct this search and apprehend mission?
  - ☐ conduct this search and apprehend mission?



50. Your Commander orders you to conduct the search and apprehend mission. You brief your squads and have them get into position. The squad in the stack formation by the entrance gate behind the building's perimeter fence gets hit by an explosive device thrown from the building. Two soldiers are injured. Should you...

(Mark an X in the ☐ for your *one* best answer.)

- ☐ abort the mission and call for backup?
- ☐ continue the mission and order the squad to enter the house?

51. You are ordered to enter the building. Immediately upon entering the building, a squad takes intense direct fire from a position at the end of the hallway. The squad takes additional casualties and moves into a room off the hallway for protection. Should you...

(Mark an X in the ☐ for your one best answer.)

- ☐ abort the mission and extract your casualties and soldiers?
- ☐ continue the mission and order the squad to eliminate the position protecting the long hallway?

52. The squad was ordered to eliminate the position protecting the hallway. Afterwards, the squad was able to secure the first floor of the building but sustained additional casualties in the process. At this point should you...

(Mark an X in the ☐ for your one best answer.)

- ☐ extract casualties and soldiers from the building, wait for back-up/QRF, and continue medevac procedures?
- ☐ continue the mission to clear the second floor and capture the escaped detainee?

53. You were ordered to continue the mission to clear the building. Now you have helicopters on site and must decide how to proceed. Do you...

(Mark an X in the ☐ for your one best answer.)

- ☐ order another squad to enter the building and clear the second floor to capture the escaped detainee?
- ☐ order the helicopter gunships to attack the building to preclude additional casualties?

54. Your commander ordered the helicopter gunships to attack the building. They cause significant damage to the building. Two of the walls have collapsed. You have heard no gunfire or human voices come from the building since the helicopter attack. Do you ...

(Mark an X in the ☐ for your one best answer.)

- ☐ wait additional time to confirm there is no activity in the building?
- ☐ order another unit (back-up/QRF has arrived) into the cluttered building to make their way to the second floor?

55. Assume your unit is involved in an operation where you accomplish the mission but you take a significant number of WIAs that must be evacuated and KIAs. Your unit must be rebuilt with elements from the higher unit as well as inbound replacements. Rank order the below list of multiple ways to learn from and cope with a traumatic event like this. (1 would be your most preferred way and 7 your least preferred way.)

\_\_\_\_\_ AAR—conducted within the platoon/devastated unit  
\_\_\_\_\_ AAR—moderated by a higher unit  
\_\_\_\_\_ AAR—moderated by a mental health or crisis intervention expert  
\_\_\_\_\_ Counseling—by mental health providers or crisis intervention experts for individuals and small groups  
\_\_\_\_\_ 15-6 investigation—to validate/invalidate actions  
\_\_\_\_\_ IG investigation—to review leader decisions  
\_\_\_\_\_ Safety Center investigation—to review prudence of actions to inform future leaders



## Hundredth House Assessment Instrument Scoring Techniques

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The following sections describe how the rank-ordered and “select all that apply” question formats were scored.

### Rank-Ordered Question Format

Across all rank-ordered format questions, participants were asked to rank order from five to eleven response options. Because some of the options were not too different from each other and it was thus unlikely that subordinates’ rank answers would exactly match their commander’s, a strict adherence to exact matches would have resulted in few if any agreements. So each rank-order question was reviewed to assess whether identifying a subset of the commander’s selections should be interpreted as achieving a commander-trainee agreement on the question. On questions where differentiation between the middle responses was less relevant than identifying the upper and lower rank orders (most likely/important and least likely/important), responses were scored as agreeing if the subordinates’ upper and lower ranks matched the commander’s. On other questions where identifying the upper-ranked option, that is, the most likely/important, seemed to be most relevant, responses were scored as agreeing when the participant’s and commander’s upper-ranked option was the same. Finally, there was one question where the commanders’ three lowest rank options seemed most important, and so an agreement occurred when participants selected the same lowest-rank options as their commander had.

### “Select All That Apply” Question Format

Across the eight questions with this format, the number of possible responses ranged from a low of five to a high of nine. Four of the eight questions had possible responses that were sufficiently distinct options that exact matches were required for the responses to be assessed as agreeing. The other four questions had possible responses with smaller marginal differences among the response options. For these four questions, agreement occurred if the participant selected both of the commander’s choices and one or more additional boxes marked that were in a subset of responses that were close in nature to the commander’s.



## Hundredth House Scale Reliability Details

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Table C.1 contains the mean responses for pre- and post-training scores. Values in rows with the letter “a” in the variable column refer to pre-training scores and those with the letter “b” refer to post-training scores. The numbers in the variable column correspond to the numbers on the Hundredth House assessment instrument shown in Appendix A. For example, variable “a1” in Table C.1 refers to pre-training scores for the first item of the Hundredth House assessment instrument, i.e.:

Rank order the list of five possible reactions by how likely they are to occur when high-level insurgents such as Al Qaeda have no avenue for their escape/withdrawal? (1 is most likely and 5 is least likely.)

### Mean Response Analysis

Eight of the original 55 items had proportions of agreement below 10 percent. We believed that items with such a low agreement were not accurately assessing the content/knowledge intended, so we deleted the item from the final scale. All of the remaining items are displayed in Table C.1.<sup>1</sup>

### Cronbach’s Alpha—Question Reliability Assessment

To assess question reliability for the remaining 47 questions, we used Cronbach’s alpha, a coefficient of reliability designed to determine how individual test question responses are correlated with the overall test score. Cronbach’s alpha was obtained using the equation in Figure C.1.

**Figure C.1**  
**Cronbach’s Alpha Coefficient of Reliability Equation**

$$\alpha = \frac{N * \bar{C}}{V + (N - 1) * \bar{C}}$$

N = number of items (test questions)  
 $\bar{C}$  = Average inter-item covariance  
 $\bar{V}$  = Average variance

SOURCE: UCLA: Academic Technology Services, *What Does Cronbach’s Alpha Mean?*

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<sup>1</sup> Pre-treatment items start with “a” and post-treatment items start with a “b” in the variable column.

The generally desired minimum value for Cronbach's alpha is about .70. A negative sign for an item-test or item-rest correlation implied that the "wrong" people are getting a question right, and the "right" people are getting a question wrong.<sup>2</sup> Negative signs for item-test and item-rest correlations implied that scores on the questions were negatively correlated with the overall test score, including the score in question or the test without the score in question, and were therefore unreliable.<sup>3</sup> Our first Cronbach's alpha estimate using all 47 items<sup>4</sup> was .41, as shown in Table C.2.

We used an iterative process of deleting items that did not appear to be well correlated with the total score and were therefore reducing the reliability of our final assessment score. For the first iteration, item b26 had large negative values for item-test and item-rest correlations; deleting it increased the alpha to .45, as shown in Table C.3.

Next, item b6 had large negative values for item-test and item-rest correlations, so we deleted it. The resulting scale is displayed in Table C.4. This deletion increased the alpha to .53. We continued this iterative process until we obtained a model with the largest alpha possible. The items that form this scale are in Table C.4. The final model consisted of 28 of the original 55 questions with an alpha equal to .68.

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<sup>2</sup> This means that respondents who have done well on most questions missed a question that was gotten right by respondents who have generally done poorly on most questions. In other words, the success rate on questions like this is not correlated with the success rate of respondents on the overall test. This implies that the question is not a reliable measure of performance on the test and should not be included in the final model.

<sup>3</sup> This means the item-test correlation shows how highly correlated each item is with the overall scale. The item-rest correlation shows how the item is correlated with a scale computed from only the other items.

<sup>4</sup> The deleted questions were 11, 14, 21, 27, 32, 37, 41, and 51.

**Table C.1**  
**Mean Response Assessment for Pre- and Post-Training Scores**

Variable	Mean	Fail If Less Than 10%	Variable	Mean	Fail If Less Than 10%
a1	0.74		a29	0.05	Fail
b1	0.77		b29	0.11	
a2	0.44		a30	0.06	Fail
b2	0.32		b30	0.24	
a3	0.92		a31	0.25	
b3	0.95		b31	0.20	
a4	0.36		a33	0.44	
b4	0.42		b33	0.51	
a5	0.33		a34	0.20	
b5	0.38		b34	0.31	
a6	0.41		a35	0.37	
b6	0.38		b35	0.48	
a7	0.73		a36	0.21	
b7	0.88		b36	0.21	
a8	0.32		a38	0.26	
b8	0.31		b38	0.43	
a9	0.41		a39	0.39	
b9	0.47		b39	0.30	
a10	0.13		a40	0.12	
b10	0.16		b40	0.16	
a12	0.32		a42	0.28	
b12	0.38		b42	0.32	
a13	0.60		a43	0.12	
b13	0.56		b43	0.23	
a15	0.84		a44	0.40	
b15	0.91		b44	0.48	
a16	0.47		a45	0.34	
b16	0.52		b45	0.38	
a17	0.32		a46	0.76	
b17	0.38		b46	0.81	
a19	0.25		a47	0.42	
b19	0.23		b47	0.50	
a20	0.44		a48	0.56	
b20	0.47		b48	0.76	
a22	0.32		a49	0.29	
b22	0.34		b49	0.56	
a23	0.38		a50	0.30	
b23	0.35		b50	0.67	
a24	0.20		a52	0.52	
b24	0.31		b52	0.77	
a25	0.12		a53	0.55	
b25	0.13		b53	0.69	
a26	0.47		a54	0.45	
b26	0.54		b54	0.62	
a28	0.14		a55	0.31	
b28	0.11		b55	0.23	



**Table C.2**  
**Cronbach's Alpha: Initial Model**

Variable	Number of Observations	Sign	Item-Test Correlation	Item-Rest Correlation	Average Inter-Item Covariance	Alpha
b1	82	+	0.2572	0.1554	0.00282	0.3981
b2	82	+	0.0067	-0.1131	0.0032698	0.436
b3	82	+	0.0699	0.0151	0.0030495	0.4138
b4	82	+	0.0843	-0.0383	0.0031328	0.4256
b5	82	+	0.1083	-0.0175	0.0030952	0.4229
b6	82	+	-0.1056	-0.2208	0.0034691	0.4508
b7	82	+	0.1432	0.0683	0.0029847	0.4097
b8	82	+	0.2235	0.1016	0.0028753	0.4046
b9	82	+	0.3503	0.2319	0.0026329	0.3836
b10	82	+	0.0593	-0.0414	0.0031252	0.4229
b12	82	+	0.1710	0.0459	0.0029759	0.4132
b13	82	+	0.1535	0.0274	0.0030103	0.4161
b15	82	+	0.1920	0.1324	0.0029413	0.4053
b16	82	+	0.1854	0.0602	0.0029489	0.411
b17	82	+	0.1309	0.0105	0.0030431	0.4182
b18	82	+	0.0348	-0.0129	0.0030714	0.4153
b19	82	+	0.0342	-0.0748	0.003186	0.4284
b20	82	+	0.4247	0.3123	0.0024895	0.3703
b22	82	+	0.1607	0.0379	0.0029922	0.4143
b23	82	+	0.1462	0.0282	0.003012	0.4154
b24	82	+	0.2224	0.1039	0.0028761	0.4043
b25	82	+	0.2582	0.1717	0.0028331	0.3979
b26	82	+	-0.0895	-0.2122	0.0034769	0.4521
b28	82	+	0.1075	0.0323	0.0030254	0.413
b29	82	+	0.2856	0.2033	0.0028011	0.3949
b30	82	+	0.1668	0.0602	0.0029655	0.4105
b31	82	+	0.2371	0.1345	0.002852	0.4008
b33	82	+	0.0289	-0.0971	0.0032488	0.4351
b34	82	+	0.3025	0.1910	0.0027336	0.3916
b35	82	+	0.1829	0.0567	0.0029547	0.4116
b36	82	+	0.3590	0.2586	0.0026492	0.3833
b38	82	+	0.2944	0.1724	0.0027403	0.3932
b39	82	+	0.2395	0.1239	0.002845	0.4014
b40	82	+	0.1141	0.0134	0.0030417	0.4162
b42	82	+	0.3900	0.2842	0.0025785	0.3776
b43	82	+	0.2843	0.1816	0.0027746	0.3943
b44	82	+	0.4514	0.3419	0.0024392	0.3654
b45	82	+	0.1400	0.0149	0.0030341	0.4179
b46	82	+	-0.0353	-0.1372	0.0032779	0.435
b47	82	+	0.2124	0.0889	0.0028968	0.4065
b48	82	+	0.0904	-0.0169	0.0030894	0.4206
b49	82	+	0.3354	0.2168	0.0026626	0.3862
b50	82	+	0.2834	0.1709	0.0027673	0.3946
b52	82	+	0.3124	0.2092	0.0027263	0.3902
b53	82	+	0.3688	0.2627	0.002619	0.3812
b54	82	+	0.3124	0.1953	0.0027092	0.3901
b55	82	+	0.1153	0.0081	0.003049	0.4174
Test Scale					0.0029318	0.4134

**Table C.3**  
**Cronbach's Alpha: 2nd Iteration**

Variable	Number of Observations	Sign	Item-Test Correlation	Item-Rest Correlation	Average Inter-Item Covariance	Alpha
b1	82	+	0.2549	0.1549	0.0033776	0.4387
b2	82	+	0.0260	-0.0919	0.0038144	0.471
b3	82	+	0.0524	-0.0014	0.0036362	0.4537
b4	82	+	0.1149	-0.0053	0.0036453	0.4597
b5	82	+	0.1295	0.0062	0.0036225	0.4585
b6	82	+	-0.0746	-0.1889	0.0040045	0.4832
b7	82	+	0.1375	0.0640	0.0035577	0.4494
b8	82	+	0.2328	0.1136	0.0034126	0.4432
b9	82	+	0.3676	0.2528	0.0031374	0.4226
b10	82	+	0.0627	-0.0362	0.0036937	0.4609
b12	82	+	0.1726	0.0499	0.0035352	0.4523
b13	82	+	0.1454	0.0215	0.0035915	0.4564
b15	82	+	0.1797	0.1211	0.0035173	0.4457
b16	82	+	0.1616	0.0383	0.003558	0.454
b17	82	+	0.1158	-0.0025	0.0036398	0.4591
b18	82	+	0.0117	-0.0352	0.003662	0.4552
b19	82	+	0.0387	-0.0683	0.0037554	0.4659
b20	82	+	0.4106	0.2992	0.0030489	0.4155
b22	82	+	0.1616	0.0412	0.0035541	0.4534
b23	82	+	0.1628	0.0473	0.0035458	0.4523
b24	82	+	0.2505	0.1353	0.003378	0.4403
b25	82	+	0.2571	0.1722	0.0033901	0.4383
b28	82	+	0.0983	0.0244	0.0036055	0.4528
b29	82	+	0.2615	0.1799	0.0033883	0.438
b30	82	+	0.1794	0.0752	0.0035066	0.4483
b31	82	+	0.2081	0.1066	0.003457	0.4446
b33	82	+	0.0293	-0.0944	0.0038284	0.4726
b34	82	+	0.2995	0.1900	0.0032864	0.433
b35	82	+	0.1916	0.0680	0.0034978	0.4498
b36	82	+	0.3645	0.2664	0.0031818	0.4242
b38	82	+	0.2856	0.1656	0.0033053	0.4356
b39	82	+	0.2216	0.1076	0.0034336	0.4442
b40	82	+	0.1241	0.0255	0.0035939	0.4539
b42	82	+	0.4118	0.3099	0.0030744	0.4165
b43	82	+	0.2660	0.1644	0.003357	0.4374
b44	82	+	0.4771	0.3725	0.0029138	0.4043
b45	82	+	0.1388	0.0161	0.0036027	0.457
b46	82	+	-0.0131	-0.1135	0.0038248	0.4699
b47	82	+	0.2254	0.1047	0.0034278	0.4445
b48	82	+	0.0945	-0.0108	0.0036535	0.4587
b49	82	+	0.3332	0.2169	0.0032088	0.4281
b50	82	+	0.2687	0.1578	0.0033445	0.4374
b52	82	+	0.3084	0.2070	0.0032806	0.4318
b53	82	+	0.3626	0.2583	0.0031702	0.4239
b54	82	+	0.3151	0.2004	0.003249	0.4309
b55	82	+	0.0857	-0.0196	0.0036687	0.4598
Test Scale					0.0034769	0.4521

**Table C.4**  
**Cronbach's Alpha: 5th Iteration**

Variable	Number of Observations	Sign	Item-Test Correlation	Item-Rest Correlation	Average Inter-Item Covariance	Alpha
b5	93	+	0.2864	0.1691	.0144661	0.6758
b7	93	+	0.2734	0.2004	.0147005	0.6732
b8	93	+	0.3616	0.2524	.0140555	0.6684
b9	93	+	0.3341	0.2181	.0141861	0.6714
b15	93	+	0.2805	0.2231	.0147818	0.6730
b16	93	+	0.2797	0.1610	.0145031	0.6766
b20	93	+	0.4696	0.3648	.0133969	0.6578
b22	93	+	0.2115	0.0948	.0148917	0.6820
b24	93	+	0.3389	0.2290	.0141861	0.6704
b25	93	+	0.3348	0.2583	.0144272	0.6695
b29	93	+	0.1841	0.1023	.0150155	0.6789
b30	93	+	0.1838	0.0797	.0150212	0.6819
b31	93	+	0.2297	0.1323	.0148004	0.6777
b34	93	+	0.3278	0.2224	.0142713	0.6710
b35	93	+	0.2514	0.1309	.0146669	0.6793
b36	93	+	0.4091	0.3161	.0139064	0.6637
b38	93	+	0.4218	0.3123	.0136759	0.6627
b39	93	+	0.1989	0.0880	.0149526	0.6820
b40	93	+	0.2040	0.1079	.0149216	0.6793
b42	93	+	0.4694	0.3719	.0134851	0.6580
b43	93	+	0.2089	0.1038	.0148973	0.6802
b44	93	+	0.5326	0.4353	.0130353	0.6511
b47	93	+	0.2456	0.1257	.0147005	0.6797
b49	93	+	0.3479	0.2327	.0141062	0.6701
b50	93	+	0.3850	0.2811	.0139523	0.6660
b52	93	+	0.4386	0.3464	.0137435	0.6611
b53	93	+	0.3638	0.2606	.0140815	0.6678
b54	93	+	0.4002	0.2932	.0138344	0.6647
Test Scale					.0143094	0.6794

## Combat Returnees Survey

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### Strykernet Tactical Vignettes Survey

This survey is part of a study conducted by the Arroyo Center of the RAND Corporation in Santa Monica, California and sponsored by I Corps, Fort Lewis, Washington. The goal of the study is to assist the Army to better understand how the Stryker Warfighters' Forum (SWfF) is helping to sustain and improve individual and Stryker unit skills capabilities and combat readiness. You have been asked to complete this survey because you recently completed a deployment with a Stryker unit.

Participation in this survey is completely voluntary. You may choose not to fill it out or to skip any question or portion you would prefer not to answer. You will not be required to provide any information about your identity. The estimated time to complete the survey is about 1 hour.

Your answers will go to the research team at the RAND Corporation, and they will be anonymous: No one will be able to identify them as having come from you. RAND will not provide information to the Army about who participated in the survey, but may inform it of what percent of individuals responded from different units. In reporting results of the survey, RAND will combine your responses with those of others in a way that would prevent anyone from deducing what individuals responded.

If you choose to contact our team and provide your contact information, RAND will keep this information confidential and maintain it only as long as necessary to determine whether follow-up is needed. After successful follow-up or at the conclusion of the study (whichever comes first), all contact information will be destroyed.

We urge you to complete this survey. Your participation is very important to the study team's efforts to help units in preparing for the next deployment and to get as complete a picture as possible of the SWfF's contribution to skills capabilities and combat readiness.

If you have any questions about the study or your participation, you may contact RAND's project leader, Bryan Hallmark (310) 393-0411, ext. 6312 [hallmark@rand.org](mailto:hallmark@rand.org) or assistant leader Jamie Gayton (310) 393-0411 ext. 7636 [jgayton@rand.org](mailto:jgayton@rand.org).

If you have any questions about your rights as a research participant, you may contact:

Jim Tebow, Co-Administrator  
RAND Human Subjects Protection Committee  
1776 Main Street M3W  
Santa Monica, CA 90407-2138  
(310) 393-0411 x7173  
[James\\_Tebow@rand.org](mailto:James_Tebow@rand.org)

# Tactical Vignettes Survey

## Purpose and Administrative notes

Soldiers and leaders deploying to Iraq enter theater with a baseline of training and knowledge that can help them respond to events that commonly occur in theater. By the time a unit completes an extended deployment in theater, they often refine or improve “battle drills” or “plays” that are routinely executed. This survey is designed to have commanders, leaders, and staff members who have recently returned from operations in Iraq share what they learned and how they conducted operations so that future deploying units can also benefit from those lessons. **Answer these surveys for the position that you had the most experience in while serving in Iraq.**

We would like you to **answer a total of FOUR scenarios**. The **first two** scenarios (marked “**MUST COMPLETE**” on the sides of the page) should be completed. You may then **choose which TWO** of the other four scenarios you provide answers for (marked “**CHOOSE TWO OUT OF FOUR**” on the sides). For each of the four scenarios, please provide a complete list of the actions, coordination, preparations, tools, or “other” items that you felt were necessary to most effectively respond to the given situation (maximizing the likelihood of mission success while mitigating the risk to subordinates).

Your responses will be aggregated with those of other leaders within your grade/rank. Our research efforts will focus on tallying the frequency (# of times specific items are mentioned) and the quality of responses (# of items mentioned that are deemed critical for success). As such, we request that you be as thorough as possible (**include all necessary items**), while maintaining clarity and conciseness (**bulletized lists are desired**). You may include items in some or all of the categories (i.e., the “boxed” items); there is NO requirement to enter items into every category.

One final note: We realize that there are many possible branches and sequels associated with each of the events/scenarios. Please provide responses in a straight forward manner that address the baseline scenario as you have routinely seen it played out. By listing these “battle-sharpened” responses, you will allow the survey team to better understand the extent of learning that took place while in theater.

1) Please mark the box(es) indicating the positions you held during your most recent deployment to Iraq (please mark all that apply). Please also indicate the number of months you served in each of these positions.

	# months served
<input type="checkbox"/> Member of squad	_____
<input type="checkbox"/> Team leader	_____
<input type="checkbox"/> Squad leader	_____
<input type="checkbox"/> Platoon Sergeant	_____
<input type="checkbox"/> Company staff NCO	_____
<input type="checkbox"/> Battalion/Brigade Battle staff NCO	_____
<input type="checkbox"/> Platoon Leader	_____
<input type="checkbox"/> Company Executive Officer	_____
<input type="checkbox"/> Company Commander	_____
<input type="checkbox"/> Battalion/Squadron Commander	_____
<input type="checkbox"/> Battalion S3/XO	_____
<input type="checkbox"/> Primary Staff Officer (company grade) (S1, S2, S4, S5, S6)	_____
<input type="checkbox"/> Assistant Staff Officer (company grade) (asst S3, Asst S1, etc.)	_____
<input type="checkbox"/> Gunner (turret in vehicle)	_____
<input type="checkbox"/> Driver	_____
<input type="checkbox"/> Vehicle commander	_____
<input type="checkbox"/> Other _____	_____

2) What is your branch/MOS

☐ Infantry/11  
☐ Field Artillery/13  
☐ Air Defense/14  
☐ Armor/19  
☐ Engineer/21  
☐ Signal Corps/25  
☐ Military Police/31  
☐ Military Intelligence/35/9697/98  
☐ Adjutant General/42  
☐ Ordnance/maintenance/44/45/52/63/91  
☐ Chemical/74  
☐ Transportation/88  
☐ Quartermaster/92  
☐ Other (Please List) \_\_\_\_\_

## Tactical Vignettes Survey #1

**IED (suspected) identified by patrol**

Your unit/personal security detachment is on a three vehicle patrol within your area of operations. You are located in a semi-urban area with a Mosque and market in close proximity with many local Iraqis walking around. Your lead vehicle identifies and reports a suspicious looking broken off section of a roadside curb that appears to be out of place - slightly discolored and almost propped at an angle facing the road. If you run out of room completing your answer, please use the back of this sheet.

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E**Actions (or key decisions) required by you or your unit**

- 1.
- 2.
- 3.
- 4.
- 5.
- 6.
- 7.
- 8.

**Coordination, communications, & reports:** within your unit, to higher or adjacent units, or to host nation civilian, military, or government personnel

- 1.
- 2.
- 3.
- 4.
- 5.
- 6.
- 7.
- 8.

**Prior preparations/battle drills/SOPs:** that your unit would need to employ

- 1.
- 2.
- 3.
- 4.
- 5.
- 6.
- 7.
- 8.

**Use of provided or developed tools:** (e.g. "stay back 50 meters" signs for vehicles, improved litters for HMMWV mounting)

- 1.
- 2.
- 3.
- 4.
- 5.
- 6.
- 7.
- 8.

**Other critical items:** other items that you feel are critical to resolving the event but do not "fit" into any of the previous categories

- 1.
- 2.
- 3.
- 4.
- 5.
- 6.
- 7.
- 8.

Respond as QRF to a "hot" area

Tactical Vignettes Survey #2

You are the leader of a four Stryker combat vehicle QRF supporting your JSS/COP/FOB. Your team receives an order to respond to a report of an explosion and gun fire about a half mile from your compound. In the three sentence situation brief, you are also told that there was a United States Army Corps of Engineers team with a civilian contracted security force that had coordinated to pass through the unit's area that day; however, there had been no contact with the element up to this point. As you arrive on the scene, you see a smoking/damaged black SUV and two small overturned Iraqi sedans that all appear to have casualties. You also note that there are no Iraqi police on site. You hear the crackle of continued AK47 fire that is coming from the direction of a 3 story building or adjacent alleyway. There is sporadic unidentified gunfire coming from beyond the damaged SUV. Please describe your list of items from the time you are notified until you have stabilized the scene.

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<b>Actions (or key decisions) required by you or your unit</b> 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8.
<b>Coordination, communications, &amp; reports:</b> within your unit, to higher or adjacent units, or to host nation civilian, military, or government personnel 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8.
<b>Prior preparations/battle drills/SOPs:</b> that your unit would need to employ 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8.
<b>Use of provided or developed tools:</b> (e.g. "stay back 50 meters" signs for vehicles, improved litters for HMMWV mounting) 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8.
<b>Other critical items:</b> other items that you feel are critical to resolving the event but do not "fit" into any of the previous categories 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8.



## Tactical Vignettes Survey #3

**Dismounted Patrol takes sniper/small arms fire**

Your unit/personal security detachment is on a dismounted patrol within your area of operations. Your three Strykers are following a short distance behind. You are patrolling in a semi-urban area with a Mosque and an elementary school in close proximity. You notice a long winding line of Iraqis across the street that appear to be waiting in line for kerosene to be distributed. You hear the crack of two shots being fired and see one of your Soldiers go down. You are not sure if he is shot, or if he is reacting to the fire. You are the leader of the patrol. If you run out of room completing your answer, please use the back of this sheet.

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**Actions (or key decisions) required by you or your unit**

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**Coordination, communications, & reports:** within your unit, to higher or adjacent units, or to host nation civilian, military, or government personnel

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**Prior preparations/battle drills/SOPs:** that your unit would need to employ

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**Use of provided or developed tools:** (e.g. "stay back 50 meters" signs for vehicles, improved litters for HMMWV mounting)

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**Other critical items:** other items that you feel are critical to resolving the event but do not "fit" into any of the previous categories

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ROE engagement (escalation of force) of POV with SAF

Tactical Vignettes Survey #4

Your unit/personal security detachment (PSD) is on a three vehicle patrol within your area of operations. You are located in a semi-urban area with paved neighborhood streets opening onto an MSR with 2 lanes of traffic flowing in each direction with a median in the center. Your PSD is moving in the center of the two lanes. You are the leader and located in the second vehicle. You hear the sound of two shots being fired followed by a short pause and then an additional two shots that all sounded distinctly like rounds from an M4. On the radio you hear the trail vehicle commander state that they just engaged a vehicle when it tried to enter the highway at high speed from an entrance ramp along your right hand side – failing to adhere to distance requirements. Please start your list of items from before your trail gunner engaged and end it after the event is fully resolved.

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<b>Actions (or key decisions) required by you or your unit</b> 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8.
<b>Coordination, communications, &amp; reports:</b> within your unit, to higher or adjacent units, or to host nation civilian, military, or government personnel 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8.
<b>Prior preparations/battle drills/SOPs:</b> that your unit would need to employ 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8.
<b>Use of provided or developed tools:</b> (e.g. “stay back 50 meters” signs for vehicles, improved litters for HMMWV mounting) 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8.
<b>Other critical items:</b> other items that you feel are critical to resolving the event but do not “fit” into any of the previous categories 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8.

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## Tactical Vignettes Survey #5

**Conduct Hasty/Deliberate Check Point**

Your unit/personal security detachment is on a four vehicle patrol within your area of operations. You are located in a semi-urban area with the Diyala River to your east that joins the Tigris River to your south. There is one main bridge to move from the south and east into the Baghdad city limits. You have been tasked by your higher to establish a hasty checkpoint operation to search for weapons or explosives being transported into your area of operations along this route. You are the leader of the patrol. If you run out of room completing your answer, please use the back of this sheet.

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**Actions (or key decisions) required by you or your unit**

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**Coordination, communications, & reports:** within your unit, to higher or adjacent units, or to host nation civilian, military, or government personnel

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**Prior preparations/battle drills/SOPs:** that your unit would need to employ

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**Use of provided or developed tools:** (e.g. "stay back 50 meters" signs for vehicles, improved litters for HMMWV mounting)

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**Other critical items:** other items that you feel are critical to resolving the event but do not "fit" into any of the previous categories

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## Tactical Vignettes Survey #6

### Indirect Fire on Platoon/Company/Battalion JSS/COP/FOB

Your unit is located on a JSS/COP/FOB. You established an internal aid station with a small contingent of medics and one PA. Your area has been relatively calm, resulting in a reduction in force protection posture to carrying weapons and wearing soft caps inside the compound. While walking to the mess hall, you hear the distinct whistle of an incoming round and hear an explosion on the other side of your compound. You are the senior leader on the JSS/COP/FOB. If you run out of room completing your answer, please use the back of this sheet.

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#### Actions (or key decisions) required by you or your unit

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#### Coordination, communications, & reports: within your unit, to higher or adjacent units, or to host nation civilian, military, or government personnel

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#### Prior preparations/battle drills/SOPs: that your unit would need to employ

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#### Use of provided or developed tools: (e.g. "stay back 50 meters" signs for vehicles, improved litters for HMMWV mounting)

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#### Other critical items: other items that you feel are critical to resolving the event but do not "fit" into any of the previous categories

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## Tactical Vignettes Survey #7

**Conduct Cordon and Search**

You are a leader of a unit in a Stryker Battalion in a semi-urban area. You receive the mission from your commander to conduct a cordon and search of a one block area within your habitual patrol area. This is an area that you are very familiar with because you attend the local NAC meetings there on a weekly basis. You are also told that informants have stated that there are weapons, ammunition, and EFP materials in one of the houses. Please list the items from receipt of mission to completion of mission that describe how you would address this scenario including how you would protect the identity of the informant(s). If you run out of room completing your answer, please use the back of this sheet.

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**Actions (or key decisions) required by you or your unit**

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**Coordination, communications, & reports:** within your unit, to higher or adjacent units, or to host nation civilian, military, or government personnel

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**Prior preparations/battle drills/SOPs:** that your unit would need to employ

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**Use of provided or developed tools:** (e.g. "stay back 50 meters" signs for vehicles, improved litters for HMMWV mounting)

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**Other critical items:** other items that you feel are critical to resolving the event but do not "fit" into any of the previous categories

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Tactical Vignettes Survey #8

Conduct a Raid in coordination with the Iraqi Army

You are a leader of a unit in a Stryker Battalion in a semi-urban area. You receive the mission from your commander to conduct a joint raid of two suspected IED/VBIED manufacturing and storage facilities located within a one half mile radius of each other. The raid is to be conducted at night to maximize the likelihood that the persons of interest will be present. You are very comfortable with the area (as you have patrolled it many times), but you have never worked a mission with this particular IA unit before. You are told that the informant will travel with you to identify the house but will not leave your vehicle for fear of being identified. If you run out of room completing your answer, please use the back of this sheet.

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<b>Actions (or key decisions) required by you or your unit</b> 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8.
<b>Coordination, communications, &amp; reports:</b> within your unit, to higher or adjacent units, or to host nation civilian, military, or government personnel 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8.
<b>Prior preparations/battle drills/SOPs:</b> that your unit would need to employ 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8.
<b>Use of provided or developed tools:</b> (e.g. "stay back 50 meters" signs for vehicles, improved litters for HMMWV mounting) 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8.
<b>Other critical items:</b> other items that you feel are critical to resolving the event but do not "fit" into any of the previous categories 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8.

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## Tactical Vignettes Survey #9

**Secure a meeting site for a habitual Iraqi DAC (District Advisory Council) meeting**

You are the leader of a four Stryker combat vehicle personal security detachment in a semi-urban area. Your team receives an order to secure a meeting site for a habitual District Advisory Council Meeting to be held in three days. The meeting attendees will include the Iraqi neighborhood council leaders, district council leaders, and a representative from the Provincial Council. The battalion commander and Corps of Engineers representative will also likely attend. Please describe items from meeting notification through meeting completion. If you run out of room completing your answer, please use the back of this sheet.

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**Actions (or key decisions) required by you or your unit**

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**Coordination, communications, & reports:** within your unit, to higher or adjacent units, or to host nation civilian, military, or government personnel

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**Prior preparations/battle drills/SOPs:** that your unit would need to employ

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**Use of provided or developed tools:** (e.g. "stay back 50 meters" signs for vehicles, improved litters for HMMWV mounting)

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**Other critical items:** other items that you feel are critical to resolving the event but do not "fit" into any of the previous categories

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## Tactical Vignettes Survey #10

### Conduct Consequence Management Operations

You are the leader of a four Stryker combat vehicle personal security detachment who has been tasked to serve as a consequence management response team for the brigade. You are located on the brigade headquarters' FOB, co-located with all typical brigade attachments. Your team receives an order to respond to the site of a VBIED attack that took place 4 hours earlier in the parking lot of a restaurant that was a local IP hangout. There were 10 killed, 25 injured, and extensive damage to the restaurant and surrounding homes, vehicles, and businesses. If you run out of room completing your answer, please use the back of this sheet.

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#### Actions (or key decisions) required by you or your unit

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#### Coordination, communications, & reports: within your unit, to higher or adjacent units, or to host nation civilian, military, or government personnel

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#### Prior preparations/battle drills/SOPs: that your unit would need to employ

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#### Use of provided or developed tools: (e.g. "stay back 50 meters" signs for vehicles, improved litters for HMMWV mounting)

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#### Other critical items: other items that you feel are critical to resolving the event but do not "fit" into any of the previous categories

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## Combat Returnees Survey Codebook Development and Coding Procedures

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This appendix describes the procedures we used for coding returnee survey responses as a foundation for developing the Iraq Common Events Approaches (ICEA) handbook.

### Codebook Development

Categories of soldiers' responses were established prior to the conduct of the survey to provide a framework to guide subjects as they completed the survey. Fifty surveys were reviewed by the RAND Arroyo Center team to develop the codebook for evaluating the remaining 280 surveys. For purposes of the survey, a phrase was defined as a complete thought and was coded based upon the content of that thought. For example, a phrase or bullet that was written in the following way, "secure site and report situation to higher" was coded as two complete thoughts, (1) "secure site" and (2) "report situation higher," and received two separate codes. Codes were numbered starting with number one.

Coded phrases that were used to accomplish the same general task were lumped together into bins and provided a descriptive name. For example, one bin under the actions category was "secure the surrounding area." Coded phrases under this bin included common items such as "set perimeter," "cordon area," and "secure site," among many others. Bins were created as phrases were coded that did not fit<sup>1</sup> into an existing bin. Table E.1 contains examples of two bins: bin 24, "secure the surrounding area," and bin 25, "search the surrounding area for ambush, trigger, other IED weapons, ammo." The shaded row provides a bin title for each bin as well as the category and bin code combination A24 and A25. Phrases with associated codes are listed below each bin. We continued this process of developing codes for unique phrases, aggregating common phrases within bins under categories for the remaining four categories. Ultimately, our precoding resulted in the "actions" category having 35 bins, "coordination" 17 bins, "prior preparations" 10 bins, "use of tools" 7 bins, and "other items" 6 bins. At the completion of the coding process, we had a codebook consisting of 695 unique codes. Table E.1 illustrates two of these bins.

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<sup>1</sup> "Fit" in this context connotes whether the phrases were or were not considered common elements of an existing bin. A phrase that did not "fit" therefore warranted creation of a new bin.

**Table E.1**  
**Sample Coding Bins in the Actions Category**

Bin 24		Bin 25	
Secure the surrounding area	A24	Search area for ambush, trigger, other IED weapons, ammunition	A25
Establish QRF	9	Search for trigger point(s)/houses	201
Block the road/routes	186	Look for (initiation) wire	201
Stop traffic	186	Watch for ambush	202
Block foot and vehicular traffic	186	Expect ambush	202
Set up perimeter	187	Don't commit – probably baited ambush	202
Set perimeter	187	Expect baited ambush	202
Take up positions	187	Check for IEDs	203
Use vehicles to establish perimeter	187	Look for secondary IEDs	203
Isolate with vehicles	187	Scan for secondary munitions	203
Set teams all around	187	Conduct 5/25	204
Cordon area	188	Feet 5/25	204
Cordon off area with wire	188	Do 30/60 meters	204
Cordon with cones and wire	188	Conduct 5 around your vectors (vehicles)	204
Check surrounding	189	Search or clear houses carefully (for weapons/ammunitions)	205
Establish/provide 360 security	190	Search houses including informants	205
Keep local populace away	191	Confiscate contraband	206
Alert/clear locals	191	IA will be main effort in joint search/raid	207
Maneuver to secure all routes	192	Use IA to search/clear	208
Secure mosque	193		
Secure market	193		
Secure/check on school	193		
Establish high ground	194		
Secure site through dominant terrain	194		
Secure site	195		
Secure scene	195		
Secure/clear immediate area	195		
Secure intersections	195		
Secure area	195		
Secure (damaged) vehicle	196		
Provide overwatch with personnel	197		
Weapons (wpns) squad provide overwatch	197		
Collapse cordon	198		
Clear surrounding buildings	199		
Provide sniper coverage on rooftops	200		

## Survey Coding Procedures

Once the codes and bins were finalized, we hired four coders through a temporary employment agency. None of the coders had previous military experience, but all were Excel trained. Each coder was employed on an hourly basis for the duration of the coding process and released when all surveys were coded.

Coders were briefed on the purpose of the substudy, provided a digital codebook, directed to code each phrase according to the codebook, and given a hands-on demonstration of how to use the codebooks. The digital codebook had two worksheets for each category; one worksheet was sorted alphabetically and one was sorted by bins to provide coders the flexibility to search and find codes in the way that was most comfortable for them. Additionally, because it was a spreadsheet, the worksheets were searchable by keyword to allow quick review of all possible words in the phrase to allow coders to select the most appropriate response code. Coders used the same procedures and rules for coding phrases as were described in the last section.

Coders were instructed to code each complete thought within the subject's responses, providing a code on the designated response sheet. Coders were directed to code subjects' responses within one of the five categories.<sup>2</sup> For phrases that were not in the established codebook, they were directed to identify them with a new temporary code. The researchers reviewed responses with temporary or unassigned codes during the coding process and assigned all of these types of responses into current bins and codes or, in some cases, established new codes (although no new bins were required during coding). A member of the research team was available to answer coders' questions and provide them guidance at all times. In total, 14,500 subjects' responses were coded in approximately 250 hours.

## Inter-Coder Agreement

We conducted inter-coder agreement analyses of the coders' work by assigning multiple coders a subset of the same subjects' responses. We analyzed these responses by counting the number of phrases for which coders agreed on the coded value and the number for which they disagreed on the coded value. We found that coders assigned the same coded value to responses approximately 75 percent of the time. The agreement percentage was lower than we desired; however, the phrases for which coders were most often in disagreement were the less common (low-density) phrases. These phrases were so uncommon that they were rarely included in ICEA, and therefore the lack of coder agreement on such phrases was not relevant.

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<sup>2</sup> The actions category, because of its size, was apportioned between two coders.



# **Iraq Common Event Approaches**

**Derived From the Experiences of Over 330 SBCT  
Combat Returnees**

**Fall 2007**

**Published  
August 2008**

## Notes

## **Background**

**In support of the Stryker Warfighting Forum (SWfF), the RAND Arroyo Center surveyed over 330 Stryker Brigade Combat Team Soldiers in early 2008 within three months after they returned from a 15-month combat tour in Iraq. These combat returnees were provided ten scenarios depicting common events faced in Iraq (identified on the following page) and asked to detail, based upon their Iraq experiences, the equipment and techniques that they felt allowed them to best respond to these situations.**

**Soldiers learn skills at home-station and at mission rehearsal exercises while training to deploy to Iraq, but once in theater they frequently adapt and refine these skills. This booklet captures what these combat returnees found worked during their 15 months in Iraq and summarizes their experiences in this booklet for use by Soldiers and units as they prepare to deploy.**

**The goal of this booklet is not to present the best, the only, or the doctrinal solution for handling these events, but rather this booklet represents the input and experience of over 330 SBCT combat veterans. The SWfF and RAND Arroyo Center hope these lessons from these combat veterans help you as you prepare for your Iraq deployment.**

**Good Luck!**



## **Index of Common Event Approaches**

- 1. [IED] Patrol comes upon a PIED (possible/suspected IED)**
- 2. [QRF] Respond as a QRF to a “hot” area**
- 3. [DP] Dismounted patrol takes small arms fire (SAF)**
- 4. [ROE] ROE engagement (escalation of force - patrol fires on POVs that get too close to convoy)**
- 5. [HD] Conduct hasty/deliberate checkpoint operations**
- 6. [IF] Indirect fire on FOB/COP/JSS**
- 7. [CS] Conduct cordon and search**
- 8. [RD] Conduct raid with Iraqi Security Forces**
- 9. [MS] Secure a habitual meeting site (District or Neighborhood Advisory council)**
- 10. [CM] Conduct consequence management operations (immediate response following IED/VBIED or combat operations damage/injuries in a neighborhood)**

## Iraq Common Event Approaches

### Derived from Recent SBCT Combat Returnees

#### PIED – Possible identified by patrol

##### Common actions/reminders

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|--|---|
| <input type="checkbox"/> Report the following to higher & adjacent:<br>____ sitrep, status, and/or contact<br>____ 9-line IED as needed<br>____ 9-line medevac as needed | <input type="checkbox"/> Brief Rules of Engagement (ROE)                            |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Track frequencies and call signs for enabling units (e.g., EOD)   | <input type="checkbox"/> Disseminate photos/description of BOLO*/high value targets |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Conduct/verify PCCs/PCIs  | <input type="checkbox"/> Request air support (AWT*/UAV)                             |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Conduct rock drills (internally & with local friendly forces)   | <input type="checkbox"/> Call and update squads/platoons/convoy                     |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Conduct movement/convoy and withdrawal brief  | <input type="checkbox"/> Update/mark friendly/enemy and incident locations on FBCB2 |
|  | <input type="checkbox"/> Prepare PAO/IO release                                     |

##### Equipment/kits/tools to support operations

- ☐ Signs – deadly force, warning, EOF (for vehicles & cordon)
- ☐ Bullhorns
- ☐ Blinking lights
- ☐ Chem lights
- ☐ Visible lasers (for C2 at night)
- ☐ Cones
- ☐ Concertina wire (pickets, pounder, & wire gloves)
- ☐ First aid kits/extra supplies/medball
- ☐ Litter/skidcos
- ☐ Non-lethal intervention weapons
- ☐ Detainee kits\*
- ☐ Hand cuff straps/zip ties
- ☐ Sensitive Site Exploitation kits (SSE)\*
- ☐ Interpreter

\*AWT – Air Weapons Team

\*BOLO – Be on lookout for (photo/description of individual or vehicle to watch for)

\*Detainee kits – Kits with unit designated items (e.g., blindfolds, detainee forms, Xsray, digital cameras, zip ties) used in capturing questioning, processing, transporting, and incarcerating individuals

\*SSE kits – Kits with various unit designated items (e.g., rubber gloves, evidence bags, finger print capabilities, video cameras/recording devices) used to facilitate evidence collection and forensic analysis

## **Iraq Common Event Approaches**

### **Derived from Recent SBCT Combat Returnees**

#### **PIED – Possible identified by patrol**

##### **Event execution checklist**

- ☐ Stop/pull off route/MSR
- ☐ Create standoff (from suspected IED)
- ☐ Conduct PIED drills (5 & 25s)
- ☐ Secure area
- ☐ Cordon area
- ☐ Alert/clear locals
- ☐ Put vehicles in overwatch & roadblock (foot and vehicular traffic)
- ☐ Use Binos, RWS, vehicle optics to identify IED
- ☐ Mark IED or cordon as possible
- ☐ Update higher: send full IED/UXO report
- ☐ Mark on FBCB2
- ☐ Call/coordinate with explosive ordnance disposal (EOD)
- ☐ Call/coordinate UAV support
- ☐ Engage locals for intelligence about IED
- ☐ Check surroundings/look for initiation wires & other IEDs
- ☐ Await further orders (await EOD or mark/bypass)
- ☐ Lead EOD to IED (secure & protect EOD)
- ☐ Contingency plan/unit battle drill for IED disposal if EOD unavailable
- ☐ EOD reduces IED
- ☐ Coordinate with higher for Law Enforcement Program (LEP) team to conduct SSE (forensics/evidence gathering)
- ☐ Continue mission
- ☐ Provide detailed/complete IED/event report to S2 staff upon return to FOB
- ☐ Execute Information Operation (IO) actions to support/exploit

## Iraq Common Event Approaches

### Derived from Recent SBCT Combat Returnees

#### QRF – Respond as QRF to “hot” area

##### Common actions/reminders

- |   |   |
|---|---|
| <input type="checkbox"/> Report the following to higher and adjacent:<br>____ sitrep, status, and/or contact<br>____ 9-line medevac as needed | <input type="checkbox"/> Post all reports (9-line & others) in vehicles |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Conduct/verify PCCs/PCIs   | <input type="checkbox"/> Call and update squads/platoons/convoy         |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Request air support (AWT*/UAV)   | <input type="checkbox"/> Prepare PAO/IO release                         |

##### Equipment/kits/tools to support operations

- |  |  |
|--|--|
| <input type="checkbox"/> Signs – deadly force, warning, EOF (for vehicles & cordon as necessary) | <input type="checkbox"/> Litter/skidcos  |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Bullhorns   | <input type="checkbox"/> Countermeasure smoke for concealment                        |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Visible lasers (for C2 at night)  | <input type="checkbox"/> Non-lethal intervention weapons                             |
| <input type="checkbox"/> VS17 panels for marking   | <input type="checkbox"/> Detainee kits*  |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Cones   | <input type="checkbox"/> Hand cuff straps/zip ties                                   |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Concertina wire (pickets, pounder, & wire gloves)                       | <input type="checkbox"/> Sensitive site exploitation kits (SSE)*                     |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Spike strips  | <input type="checkbox"/> Interpreter   |
| <input type="checkbox"/> “Hoolie tools*” for breaking/entering/repairing doors, locks, windows   | <input type="checkbox"/> Vehicle tow bars/chains/ropes prepared for recovery mission |
| <input type="checkbox"/> “Jaws of life”  |  |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Speedball (extra ammo, magazines, grenades, etc.)                       |  |
| <input type="checkbox"/> First aid kits/extra supplies/medball                                   |  |
| <input type="checkbox"/> CLS bags stocked  |  |

\*AWT – Air Weapons Team

\*Hoolie tools – Kit with various unit designated tools (e.g., crowbars, wrenches, pliers, hammers) used to force open windows, doors, fences, walls, or floors during searches

\*Detainee kits – Kits with unit designated items (e.g., blindfolds, detainee forms, Xsray, digital cameras, zip ties) used in capturing questioning, processing, transporting, and incarcerating individuals

\*SSE kits – Kits with various unit designated items (e.g., rubber gloves, evidence bags, finger print capabilities, video cameras/recording devices) used to facilitate evidence collection and forensic analysis

## **Iraq Common Event Approaches**

### **Derived from Recent SBCT Combat Returnees**

#### **QRF – Respond as QRF to “hot” area**

##### **Event execution checklist**

- ☐ Secure site/area (360 degree cordon when possible)
- ☐ Establish overwatch (snipers/marksmen)
- ☐ Alert/clear locals
- ☐ Assess casualties for urgency & assist/treat casualties (including Local Nationals [LNs])
- ☐ Send complete BDA of site (equipment & personnel)
- ☐ Maneuver Strykers to facilitate support to casevac, exfiltration, or assault
- ☐ Begin casevac/medevac procedures (ground/air as situation dictates)
- ☐ Coordinate civilian ambulance for Local National (LN) casualties
- ☐ Alert higher medical (aid station/CSH) of incoming casualty situation
- ☐ Call & coordinate Iraqi Army & Iraqi Police involvement
- ☐ React to contact/ambush
- ☐ Identify 3D's (distance, direction, description) of gun fire
- ☐ Determine source of gunfire (shooter & location)
- ☐ Mark on FBCB2
- ☐ Coordinate UAV/air support
- ☐ Suppress enemy gunfire
- ☐ Conduct squad movements/attack
- ☐ Engage enemy as necessary
- ☐ Cordon area as situation allows
- ☐ Conduct building/structure/room search & clear operations as necessary
- ☐ Call for backup/QRF as necessary
- ☐ Conduct recovery operations
- ☐ Await further orders
- ☐ Engage locals for intelligence
- ☐ Coordinate with higher for Law Enforcement Program (LEP) team to conduct SSE\* (forensics/evidence gathering)
- ☐ Continue mission
- ☐ Provide detailed/complete event report to S2 staff upon return to FOB
- ☐ Execute Information Operation (IO) actions to support/exploit

## Iraq Common Event Approaches

### Derived from Recent SBCT Combat Returnees

#### DP – Dismounted patrol takes sniper/small arms fire

##### Common actions/reminders

- |   |   |
|---|---|
| <input type="checkbox"/> Report the following to higher & adjacent:<br>____sitrep, status, and/or contact<br>____9-line medevac as needed | <input type="checkbox"/> Request air support (AWT*/UAV)                 |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Assign jobs/teams to each soldier (e.g., security, breach, litter)   | <input type="checkbox"/> Call & update squads/platoons/convoy           |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Brief Rules of Engagement (ROE)  | <input type="checkbox"/> Post all reports (9-line & others) in vehicles |
|   | <input type="checkbox"/> Prepare PAO/IO release                         |

##### Equipment/kits/tools to support operations

- ☐ Signs – deadly force, warning, EOF (for vehicles & cordon as necessary)
- ☐ Bullhorns
- ☐ Blinking lights
- ☐ Visible lasers (for C2 at night)
- ☐ Concertina wire (pickets, pounder, & wire gloves)
- ☐ “Hoolie tools\*” for breaking/entering/repairing doors, locks, windows
- ☐ Extra locks to replace cut ones
- ☐ First aid kits/extra supplies/medball
- ☐ CLS bags stocked
- ☐ Litter/skidcos
- ☐ Countermeasure smoke for concealment
- ☐ Non-lethal intervention weapons
- ☐ Detainee kits\*
- ☐ Hand cuff straps/zip ties
- ☐ Sensitive Site Exploitation kits (SSE)\*
- ☐ Interpreter

\*AWT – Air Weapons Team

\*Hoolie tools – Kit with various unit designated tools (e.g., crowbars, wrenches, pliers, hammers) used to force open windows, doors, fences, walls, or floors during searches

\*Detainee kits – Kits with unit designated items (e.g., blindfolds, detainee forms, Xsray, digital cameras, zip ties) used in capturing questioning, processing, transporting, and incarcerating individuals

\*SSE kits – Kits with various unit designated items (e.g., rubber gloves, evidence bags, finger print capabilities, video cameras/recording devices) used to facilitate evidence collection and forensic analysis

## **Iraq Common Event Approaches**

### **Derived from Recent SBCT Combat Returnees**

#### **DP – Dismounted patrol takes sniper/small arms fire**

##### **Event execution checklist**

- ☐ React to sniper/contact
- ☐ Seek cover
- ☐ Assess casualties for urgency & assist/treat as necessary
- ☐ Engage/suppress enemy fire
- ☐ Secure area
- ☐ Cordon area
- ☐ Begin casevac/medevac procedures (ground/air as situation dictates)
- ☐ Alert/clear locals
- ☐ Isolate with vehicles
- ☐ Maneuver Strykers to facilitate support to casevac, exfiltration, or assault
- ☐ Identify 3D's (distance, direction, description) of gun fire
- ☐ Determine source of gunfire (shooter & location)
- ☐ Mark on FBCB2
- ☐ Request/coordinate air weapons team/UAV
- ☐ Request QRF/backup
- ☐ Search teams designated
- ☐ Building/structure/room search and/or clear as necessary
- ☐ Engage locals for intelligence
- ☐ Squad/platoon movement and/or attack
- ☐ Continue mission/break contact
- ☐ Coordinate with higher for Law Enforcement Program (LEP) team to conduct SSE (forensics/evidence gathering)
- ☐ Provide detailed/complete event report to S2 staff upon return to FOB
- ☐ Execute Information Operation (IO) actions to support/exploit

## Iraq Common Event Drills

### Derived from Recent SBCT Combat Returnees

#### ROE – ROE engagement (escalation of force) of POV with SAF

##### Common actions/reminders

- |   |  |
|---|--|
| <input type="checkbox"/> Report the following to higher & adjacent:<br>____sitrep, status, and/or contact<br>____9-line medevac as needed | <input type="checkbox"/> Disseminate photos/<br>description of BOLO*/high<br>value targets |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Conduct/verify PCCs/PCIs   | <input type="checkbox"/> Update/mark friendly/enemy<br>and incident locations on<br>FBCB2  |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Assign jobs/teams to each soldier (e.g.,<br>security, breach, litter)  | <input type="checkbox"/> Call & update squads/<br>platoons/convoy                          |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Conduct movement/convoy and withdrawal<br>brief  | <input type="checkbox"/> Prepare PAO/IO release  |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Brief Rules of Engagement (ROE)  |  |

##### Equipment/kits/tools to support operations

- |   |  |
|---|--|
| <input type="checkbox"/> Signs – deadly force, warning, EOF (for<br>vehicles & cordon as necessary) | <input type="checkbox"/> Litter/skidcos  |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Bullhorns  | <input type="checkbox"/> Countermeasure smoke for<br>concealment                     |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Blinking lights  | <input type="checkbox"/> Non-lethal intervention<br>weapons                          |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Flares   | <input type="checkbox"/> Detainee kits*  |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Visible lasers (for C2 at night)   | <input type="checkbox"/> Hand cuff straps/zip ties                                   |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Taclite on weapons/M4  | <input type="checkbox"/> Digital camera  |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Tracers for gunner weapons   | <input type="checkbox"/> Xsray   |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Cones  | <input type="checkbox"/> Sensitive Site Exploitation kits<br>(SSE)*                  |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Concertina wire (pickets, pounder, & wire<br>gloves)                       | <input type="checkbox"/> Interpreter   |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Speedball (extra ammo, magazines,<br>grenades, etc.)                       | <input type="checkbox"/> Reference card local<br>government names & phone<br>numbers |
| <input type="checkbox"/> First aid kits/extra supplies/medball                                      |  |

\*BOLO – Be on lookout for (photo/description of individual or vehicle to watch for)

\*Detainee kits – Kits with unit designated items (e.g., blindfolds, detainee forms, Xsray, digital cameras, zip ties) used in capturing questioning, processing, transporting, and incarcerating individuals

\*SSE kits – Kits with various unit designated items (e.g., rubber gloves, evidence bags, finger print capabilities, video cameras/recording devices) used to facilitate evidence collection and forensic analysis



## **Iraq Common Event Drills**

### **Derived from Recent SBCT Combat Returnees**

#### **ROE – ROE engagement (escalation of force) of POV with SAF**

##### **Event execution checklist**

- ☐ Employ Escalation of Force (EOF) measures (shout, show, shove, shoot to disable, shoot to kill/destroy)
- ☐ Employ firing EOF discipline (tires, engine block, windshield, driver)
- ☐ Engage as necessary
- ☐ Get vehicle description & license plate numbers
- ☐ Trail gunner signals to stop by radio (laser at night)
- ☐ Stop or pull off route/MSR
- ☐ Secure area/site
- ☐ Search car(s) as necessary
- ☐ Search passengers as necessary
- ☐ Assess & assist casualties
- ☐ Begin casevac (ground/air) as necessary
- ☐ Detain individuals as necessary
- ☐ Assess damage; issue "claim" card as necessary
- ☐ Take digital photos to document
- ☐ Continue the mission
- ☐ Complete (EOF) report following mission completion
- ☐ Provide detailed/complete event report to S2 staff upon return to FOB
- ☐ Execute Information Operations (IO) actions to support/exploit

## Iraq Common Event Approaches

### Derived from Recent SBCT Combat Returnees

#### HD – Conduct Hasty/Deliberate Check Point

##### Common actions/reminders

- |   |   |
|---|---|
| <input type="checkbox"/> Report the following to higher & adjacent:<br>_____ sitrep, status, and/or contact | <input type="checkbox"/> Brief Rules of Engagement (ROE)                            |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Conduct/verify PCCs/PCIs   | <input type="checkbox"/> Disseminate photos/description of BOLO*/high value targets |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Assign jobs/teams to each soldier (e.g., security, breach, litter)                 | <input type="checkbox"/> Update/mark friendly/enemy and incident locations on FBCB2 |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Conduct rock drills (internally & with local friendly forces)                      | <input type="checkbox"/> Call & update squads/platoons/convoy                       |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Conduct movement/convoy and withdrawal brief                                       | <input type="checkbox"/> Prepare PAO/IO release                                     |

##### Equipment/kits/tools to support operations

- |  |  |
|--|--|
| <input type="checkbox"/> Signs – deadly force, warning, EOF (for vehicles & cordon as necessary) | <input type="checkbox"/> Spike strips  |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Sirens  | <input type="checkbox"/> Sandbags  |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Bullhorns   | <input type="checkbox"/> Speedball (extra ammo, magazines, grenades, etc.)   |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Blinking lights   | <input type="checkbox"/> First aid kits/extra supplies/medball               |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Chem lights   | <input type="checkbox"/> Litter/skidcos                                      |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Flares  | <input type="checkbox"/> Helmet cameras                                      |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Signal devices  | <input type="checkbox"/> Wands (mirrored handles for looking under vehicles) |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Visible lasers (for C2 at night)  | <input type="checkbox"/> Non-lethal intervention weapons                     |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Taclite on weapon/M4  | <input type="checkbox"/> Females available to search females                 |
| <input type="checkbox"/> VS17 panels   | <input type="checkbox"/> Metal detector                                      |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Engineer tape   | <input type="checkbox"/> Detainee kits*                                      |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Cones   | <input type="checkbox"/> Hand cuff straps/zip ties                           |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Concertina wire (pickets, pounder, & wire gloves)                       | <input type="checkbox"/> Xsray   |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Concrete barriers   | <input type="checkbox"/> Interpreter   |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Folding barricades  |  |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Blocking barricades   |  |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Speed bumps   |  |

\*BOLO – Be on lookout for (photo/description of individual or vehicle to watch for)

\*Detainee kits – Kits with unit designated items (e.g., blindfolds, detainee forms, Xsray, digital cameras, zip ties) used in capturing questioning, processing, transporting, and incarcerating individuals

\* Sensitive Site Exploitation

## Iraq Common Event Approaches Derived from Recent SBCT Combat Returnees

### HD – Conduct Hasty/Deliberate Check Point

#### Event execution checklist

- ☐ Call & coordinate Iraqi Army & Iraqi Police involvement (brief late to avoid compromise)
- ☐ Secure both ends of bridge (150 meters)
- ☐ Secure area
- ☐ Set up serpentine: avoid suicide bombers
- ☐ Put vehicles in overwatch & roadblock positions (foot and vehicular traffic)
- ☐ Establish “trigger” lines for non-compliance
- ☐ Create fighting positions for personnel
- ☐ Establish detainee area
- ☐ Provide overwatch with personnel
- ☐ Establish search area
- ☐ Search teams identified
- ☐ Establish search plan (all or random numbers)
- ☐ Employ Escalation of Force (EOF) measures (shout, show, shove, shoot to disable, shoot to kill/destroy)
- ☐ Conduct “vehicle search” drill
- ☐ Conduct personnel search drill
- ☐ Coordinate UAV overwatch
- ☐ Engage locals for intelligence
- ☐ Detain/arrest as necessary
- ☐ Move suspects to safe/secure area for tactical questioning
- ☐ Have Tactical HUMINT Team (THT)/interrogators available
- ☐ Coordinate with higher for law enforcement program (LEP) team to conduct SSE\* (forensics/evidence gathering) as necessary
- ☐ Continue mission
- ☐ Provide detailed/complete event report to S2 staff upon return to FOB
- ☐ Execute Information Operation (IO) actions to support/exploit

## **Iraq Common Event Approaches**

### **Derived from Recent SBCT Combat Returnees**

#### **IF – Indirect Fire on Platoon/Company/Battalion JSS/COP/FOB**

##### **Common actions/reminders**

- ☐ Report the following to higher & adjacent:
  - \_\_\_ sitrep, status, and/or contact
  - \_\_\_ 9-line medevac as needed
- ☐ Request air support (AWT\*/UAV)
- ☐ Call & update squads/platoons/convoy
- ☐ Prepare PAO/IO release

##### **Equipment/kits/tools to support operations**

- ☐ Alarms for JSS/COP/FOB notification
- ☐ Sirens
- ☐ Bullhorns
- ☐ Concrete barriers
- ☐ Sandbags
- ☐ First aid kits/extra supplies/medball
- ☐ Litter/skidcos

\* AWT – Air Weapons Team

\* SSE kits – Kits with various unit designated items (e.g. rubber gloves, evidence bags, finger print capabilities, video cameras/recording devices) used to facilitate evidence collection and forensic analysis

## **Iraq Common Event Approaches**

### **Derived from Recent SBCT Combat Returnees**

#### **IF – Indirect Fire on Platoon/Company/Battalion JSS/COP/FOB**

##### **Event execution checklist**

- ☐ Seek/take cover
- ☐ Clear markings that identify bunkers/mortar barriers
- ☐ Get in mortar barrier
- ☐ Do not move until incoming rounds cease
- ☐ Move to established rally point
- ☐ Assess casualties for urgency & assist/treat casualties (including local nationals [LNs])
- ☐ Construct Casualty Collection Point (CCP)/execute Mass Casualty (MASCAL) drill
- ☐ Begin casevac (ground/air)
- ☐ Alert higher medical (aid station/CSH) of incoming casualty situation
- ☐ Establish accountability of personnel
- ☐ Employ JSS/COP/FOB lockdown procedures
- ☐ Change/upgrade uniform policy to full kit (higher force protection level)
- ☐ Increase JSS/COP/FOB security
- ☐ Conduct crater analysis
- ☐ Confirm if counterfire radar acquired incoming round Point of Origin (POO)
- ☐ Conduct counterfire mission as necessary
- ☐ Reinforce vigilance of all guards/towers
- ☐ Coordinate with higher for Law Enforcement Program (LEP) team to conduct SSE\* (forensics/evidence gathering)
- ☐ Provide detailed/complete event report to S2 staff upon return to FOB
- ☐ Execute Information Operation (IO) actions to support/exploit

## Iraq Common Event Approaches

### Derived from Recent SBCT Combat Returnees

#### CS – Conduct Cordon & Search

##### Common actions/reminders

- |   |   |
|---|---|
| <input type="checkbox"/> Report the following to higher & adjacent:<br>_____ sitrep, status, and/or contact<br>_____ 9-line medevac as needed | <input type="checkbox"/> Conduct movement/convoy and withdrawal brief               |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Conduct rock drills (internally & with local friendly forces)  | <input type="checkbox"/> Brief Rules of Engagement (ROE)                            |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Conduct rehearsals (internally & with local friendly forces)   | <input type="checkbox"/> Disseminate photos/description of BOLO*/high value targets |

##### Equipment/kits/tools to support operations

- |  |  |
|--|--|
| <input type="checkbox"/> Signs – deadly force, warning, EOF (for vehicles & cordon as necessary) | <input type="checkbox"/> First aid kits/extra supplies/medball   |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Sirens  | <input type="checkbox"/> Litter/skidcos                          |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Bullhorns   | <input type="checkbox"/> Non-lethal intervention weapons         |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Blinking lights   | <input type="checkbox"/> Police dogs                             |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Visible lasers (for C2 at night)  | <input type="checkbox"/> Metal detector                          |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Cones   | <input type="checkbox"/> Detainee kits*                          |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Concertina wire (pickets, pounder, & wire gloves)                       | <input type="checkbox"/> Hand cuff straps/zip ties               |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Folding barricades  | <input type="checkbox"/> Xsray                                   |
| <input type="checkbox"/> “Hoolie tools*” for breaking/entering/repairing doors, locks, windows   | <input type="checkbox"/> Sensitive site exploitation (SSE) kits* |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Demolitions   | <input type="checkbox"/> Informant disguises/uniform/mask        |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Gate stickers to mark cleared houses                                    | <input type="checkbox"/> Interpreter                             |

\*BOLO – Be on lookout for (photo/description of individual or vehicle to watch for)

\*Hoolie tools – Kit with various unit designated tools (e.g., crowbars, wrenches, pliers, hammers) used to force open windows, doors, fences, walls, or floors during searches

\*Detainee kits – Kits with unit designated items (e.g., blindfolds, detainee forms, Xsray, digital cameras, zip ties) used in capturing questioning, processing, transporting, and incarcerating individuals

\*SSE kits – Kits with various unit designated items (e.g., rubber gloves, evidence bags, finger print capabilities, video cameras/recording devices) used to facilitate evidence collection and forensic analysis

## **Iraq Common Event Approaches**

### **Derived from Recent SBCT Combat Returnees**

#### **CS – Conduct Cordon & Search**

##### **Event execution checklist**

- ☐ Call & coordinate Iraqi Army & Iraqi Police involvement (brief specifics late to avoid compromise)
- ☐ Conduct recon (map/driving) with informant as available
- ☐ Establish (by recon) cordon/search area & withdrawal plan
- ☐ Search teams identified/designated
- ☐ Secure area/site
- ☐ Cordon area
- ☐ Put vehicles in overwatch & roadblock (foot and vehicular traffic)
- ☐ Maneuver Strykers to facilitate support to casevac, exfiltration, or assault
- ☐ Establish dismounted security
- ☐ Establish overwatch (snipers/marksmen)
- ☐ Coordinate UAV overwatch
- ☐ Search houses within cordon including informant's
- ☐ Conduct building/structure/room search & clear operations as necessary
- ☐ Employ helmet cameras
- ☐ Confiscate contraband
- ☐ Engage locals for intelligence
- ☐ Detain/arrest as necessary
- ☐ Move suspects to safe/secure area for tactical questioning
- ☐ Have Tactical HUMINT Team (THT)/interrogators available
- ☐ Coordinate with higher for law enforcement program (LEP) team to conduct SSE (forensics/evidence gathering) as necessary
- ☐ Continue mission
- ☐ Provide detailed/complete event report to S2 staff upon return to FOB
- ☐ Execute Information Operation (IO) actions to support/exploit

## Iraq Common Event Approaches

### Derived from Recent SBCT Combat Returnees

#### RD – Conduct a raid in coordination with the Iraqi Army

##### Common actions/reminders

- |   |   |
|---|---|
| <input type="checkbox"/> Report the following to higher and adjacent:<br>____sitrep, status, and/or contact<br>____9-line medevac as needed | <input type="checkbox"/> Brief Rules of Engagement (ROE)                            |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Conduct/verify PCCs/PCIs   | <input type="checkbox"/> Disseminate photos/description of BOLO*/high value targets |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Conduct rock drills (internally & with local friendly forces)  | <input type="checkbox"/> Request air support (AWT*/UAV)                             |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Conduct rehearsals (internally & with local friendly forces)   | <input type="checkbox"/> Call & update squads/platoons/convoy                       |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Conduct movement/convoy and withdrawal brief   | <input type="checkbox"/> Prepare PAO/IO release                                     |

##### Equipment/kits/tools to support operations

- |  |  |
|--|--|
| <input type="checkbox"/> Signs – deadly force, warning, EOF (for vehicles & cordon as necessary) | <input type="checkbox"/> Collapsible ladders                     |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Bullhorns   | <input type="checkbox"/> First aid kits/extra supplies/ medball  |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Blinking lights   | <input type="checkbox"/> Combat Lifesaver bags stocked           |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Chem lights   | <input type="checkbox"/> Litter/skidcos                          |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Visible lasers (for C2 at night)  | <input type="checkbox"/> Non-lethal intervention weapons         |
| <input type="checkbox"/> TacLite for weapons/M4  | <input type="checkbox"/> NVGs                                    |
| <input type="checkbox"/> VS17 panels for marking   | <input type="checkbox"/> Detainee kits*                          |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Cones   | <input type="checkbox"/> Hand cuff straps/zip ties               |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Concertina wire (pickets, pounder, & wire gloves)                       | <input type="checkbox"/> Blindfolds                              |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Spike strips  | <input type="checkbox"/> Digital camera                          |
| <input type="checkbox"/> "Hoolie tools*" for breaking/entering/ repairing doors, locks, windows  | <input type="checkbox"/> Xsray                                   |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Demolitions   | <input type="checkbox"/> Informant disguises/uniform/mask        |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Speedball (extra ammo, magazines, grenades, etc.)                       | <input type="checkbox"/> Sensitive Site Exploitation kits (SSE)* |
|  | <input type="checkbox"/> Interpreter                             |

\*AWT – Air Weapons Team

\*BOLO – Be on lookout for (photo/description of individual or vehicle to watch for)

\*Detainee kits – Kits with unit designated items (e.g., blindfolds, detainee forms, Xsray, digital cameras, zip ties) used in capturing questioning, processing, transporting, and incarcerating individuals

\*SSE kits – Kits with various unit designated items (e.g., rubber gloves, evidence bags, finger print capabilities, video cameras/recording devices) used to facilitate evidence collection and forensic analysis



## **Iraq Common Event Approaches**

### **Derived from Recent SBCT Combat Returnees**

#### **RD – Conduct a raid in coordination with the Iraqi Army**

##### **Event execution checklist**

- ☐ Call & coordinate Iraqi Army & Iraqi Police support/involvement
- ☐ Assess Iraqi asset availability & compatibility
- ☐ Split US sections with Iraqi Army units
- ☐ Determine Iraqi Army role in search/clear (main/subordinate)
- ☐ Provide scheme of operation but NOT location & time (hold back)
- ☐ Conduct recon (map/driving) with informant as available
- ☐ Establish movement & withdrawal plan
- ☐ Assign jobs/teams to each Soldier (e.g., security, breach, litter)
- ☐ Secure site/area
- ☐ Establish overwatch (snipers/marksmen)
- ☐ Cordon area
- ☐ Coordinate use of adjacent building/house(s) for security
- ☐ Conduct raid
- ☐ Engage enemy as necessary
- ☐ Conduct building/structure/room search & clear operations
- ☐ Search for weapons/explosives
- ☐ Establish marking/reporting plan for cleared house/room
- ☐ Take detainees
- ☐ Conduct personnel search drills
- ☐ Assess casualties for urgency & assist/treat casualties
- ☐ Begin casevac/medevac procedures (ground/air as situation dictates)
- ☐ Call for backup/QRF as necessary
- ☐ Provide detailed/complete event report to S2 staff upon return to FOB
- ☐ Execute Information Operations (IO) actions to support/exploit

## Iraq Common Event Approaches

### Derived from Recent SBCT Combat Returnees

#### MS – Secure site for a habitual meeting of Iraqi District Advisory Council (DAC)

##### Common actions/reminders

- |  |   |
|--|---|
| <input type="checkbox"/> Report the following to higher & adjacent:<br>_____sitrep, status, and/or contact | <input type="checkbox"/> Disseminate photos/description of BOLO*/high value targets |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Assign jobs/teams to each soldier (e.g., security, breach, litter)                | <input type="checkbox"/> Request air support (AWT*/UAV)                             |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Conduct rock drills (internally & with local friendly forces)                     | <input type="checkbox"/> Call & update squads/platoons/convoy                       |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Brief Rules of Engagement (ROE)   | <input type="checkbox"/> Prepare PAO/IO release                                     |

##### Equipment/kits/tools to support operations

- |  |  |
|--|--|
| <input type="checkbox"/> Signs – deadly force, warning, EOF (for vehicles & cordon as necessary) | <input type="checkbox"/> Sandbags  |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Sirens  | <input type="checkbox"/> Speedball (extra ammo, magazines, grenades, etc.)   |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Bullhorns   | <input type="checkbox"/> First aid kits/extra supplies/medball               |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Blinking lights   | <input type="checkbox"/> Litter/skidcos                                      |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Chem lights   | <input type="checkbox"/> Wands (mirrored handles for looking under vehicles) |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Visible lasers (for C2 at night)  | <input type="checkbox"/> Non-lethal intervention weapons                     |
| <input type="checkbox"/> TacLite on weapon/M4  | <input type="checkbox"/> Females available to search females                 |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Cones   | <input type="checkbox"/> Metal detector                                      |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Concertina wire (pickets, pounder, & wire gloves)                       | <input type="checkbox"/> Detainee kits*                                      |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Concrete barriers   | <input type="checkbox"/> Hand cuff straps/zip ties                           |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Folding barricades  | <input type="checkbox"/> Xspray  |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Blocking barricades   | <input type="checkbox"/> Interpreters/coordinate for additional interpreters |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Speed bumps   |  |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Spike strips  |  |

\*AWT – Air Weapons Team

\*BOLO – Be on lookout for (photo/description of individual or vehicle to watch for)

\*Detainee kits – Kits with unit designated items (e.g., blindfolds, detainee forms, Xspray, digital cameras, zip ties) used in capturing questioning, processing, transporting, and incarcerating individuals

## **Iraq Common Event Approaches**

### **Derived from Recent SBCT Combat Returnees**

#### **MS – Secure site for a habitual meeting of Iraqi District Advisory Council (DAC)**

##### **Event execution checklist**

- ☐ Notify meeting participants
- ☐ Call/coordinate IA/IP/MiTT support
- ☐ Secure area
- ☐ Cordon area
- ☐ Coordinate use of adjacent building/house(s) for security
- ☐ Coordinate/emplace snipers
- ☐ Create blocking barricades
- ☐ Set up serpentine: avoid suicide bombers
- ☐ Put vehicles in overwatch & roadblock positions (foot and vehicular traffic)
- ☐ Building/structure/room search/clear
- ☐ Take building and establish “strong point”
- ☐ Establish movement & withdrawal plan
- ☐ Identify/search entrants
- ☐ Establish personnel/vehicle search area
- ☐ Employ Escalation of Force (EOF) measures (shout, show, shove, shoot to disable, shoot to kill/destroy)
- ☐ Be respectful
- ☐ Conduct meeting
- ☐ Provide detailed/complete event report to S2 staff upon return to FOB
- ☐ Execute Information Operation (IO) actions to support/exploit

## Iraq Common Event Approaches

### Derived from Recent SBCT Combat Returnees

#### CM – Conduct Consequence Management Operations

##### Common actions/reminders

- |   |   |
|---|---|
| <input type="checkbox"/> Report the following to higher & adjacent:<br>____sitrep, status, and/or contact<br>____9-line medevac as needed | <input type="checkbox"/> Brief Rules of Engagement (ROE)      |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Conduct/verify PCCs/PCIs   | <input type="checkbox"/> Call & update squads/platoons/convoy |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Assign jobs/teams to each soldier (e.g., security, breach, litter)   | <input type="checkbox"/> Prepare PAO/IO release               |

##### Equipment/kits/tools to support operations

- ☐ Signs – deadly force, warning, Escalation of Force (EOF) (for vehicles & cordon as necessary)
- ☐ Bullhorns
- ☐ Cones
- ☐ Concertina wire (pickets, pounder, & wire gloves)
- ☐ Spike strips
- ☐ Body bags
- ☐ First aid kits/extra supplies/medball (medical resupply materials)
- ☐ Litter/skidcos
- ☐ Wands (mirrored handles for looking under vehicles)
- ☐ Detainee kits\*
- ☐ Hand cuff straps/zip ties
- ☐ Digital camera
- ☐ Xspray
- ☐ Sensitive site exploitation kits (SSE)\*
- ☐ Interpreter
- ☐ Reference card local government names & phone numbers

\*Detainee kits – Kits with unit designated items (e.g., blindfolds, detainee forms, Xspray, digital cameras, zip ties) used in capturing questioning, processing, transporting, and incarcerating individuals

\*SSE kits – Kits with various unit designated items (e.g., rubber gloves, evidence bags, finger print capabilities, video camera/recording devices) used to facilitate evidence collection and forensic analysis

## **Iraq Common Event Approaches**

### **Derived from Recent SBCT Combat Returnees**

#### **CM – Conduct Consequence Management Operations**

##### **Event execution checklist**

- ☐ Call/coordinate Civil Affairs & Tactical Psyops Team (TPT) support
- ☐ Call & coordinate Iraqi Army & Iraqi Police involvement
- ☐ Secure area/site
- ☐ Cordon area
- ☐ Isolate with vehicles
- ☐ Put vehicles in overwatch & roadblock (foot and vehicular traffic)
- ☐ Maneuver Strykers to facilitate support to casevac, exfiltration, or assault
- ☐ Assess & assist casualties
- ☐ Treat Local National (LN) casualties
- ☐ Begin casevac
- ☐ Engage locals for intelligence
- ☐ Detain/arrest as necessary
- ☐ Move suspects to safe/secure area for tactical questioning
- ☐ Have Tactical HUMINT Team (THT)/interrogators available
- ☐ Be respectful of local people and customs
- ☐ Never pay for terrorist damage
- ☐ Coordinate with higher for Law Enforcement Program (LEP) team to conduct SSE (forensics/evidence gathering) as necessary
- ☐ Provide detailed/complete event report to S2 staff upon return to FOB
- ☐ Use TPT to highlight damage
- ☐ Execute Information Operations (IO) actions to support/exploit

## Iraq Common Event Approaches

### Derived from Recent SBCT Combat Returnees

#### Consolidated List Covering all 10 common events

#### Common actions/reminders for all operations

- ☐ Report the following to higher and adjacent:
  - \_\_\_\_\_sitrep, status, and/or contact
  - \_\_\_\_\_9-line IED as needed
  - \_\_\_\_\_9-line medevac as needed
- ☐ Track frequencies & call signs for enabling units (e.g., EOD)
- ☐ Conduct/verify PCCs/PCIs
- ☐ Assign jobs/teams to each soldier (e.g., security, breach, litter)
- ☐ Conduct rock drills (internally & with local friendly forces)
- ☐ Conduct rehearsals (internally & with local friendly forces)
- ☐ Conduct movement/convoy and withdrawal brief
- ☐ Brief Rules of Engagement (ROE)
- ☐ Disseminate photos/description of BOLO\*/high value targets
- ☐ Request air support (AWT\*/UAV)
- ☐ Post all reports (9-line & others) in vehicles
- ☐ Update/mark friendly/enemy and incident locations on FBCB2
- ☐ Call and update squads/platoons/convoy
- ☐ Prepare PAO/IO release

\* AWT - Air Weapons Team

\* BOLO – Be on lookout for (photo/description of individual or vehicle to watch for)

\* Detainee kits – Kits with unit designated items (e.g. blindfolds, detainee forms, Xsray, digital cameras, zip ties) used in capturing, questioning, processing, transporting, and incarcerating individuals

\* Hoolie tools – kit with various unit designated tools (e.g. crow bars, wrenches, pliers, hammers) used to force open windows, doors, fences, walls, or floors during searches

\* SSE kits – Kits with various unit designated items (e.g. rubber gloves, evidence bags, finger print capabilities, video cameras/recording devices) used to facilitate evidence collection and forensic analysis.

## Iraq Common Event Approaches Derived from Recent SBCT Combat Returnees

### Consolidated List Covering all 10 common events

#### Equipment/kits/tools to support all operations

- |  |  |
|--|--|
| <input type="checkbox"/> Signs – deadly force, warning, EOF (for vehicles & cordon as necessary) | <input type="checkbox"/> Speedball (extra ammo, magazines, grenades, etc.)           |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Alarms for JSS/COP/FOB notification                                     | <input type="checkbox"/> Collapsible ladders   |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Sirens  | <input type="checkbox"/> Gate stickers to mark cleared houses                        |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Bullhorns   | <input type="checkbox"/> First aid kits/extra supplies/medball                       |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Blinking lights   | <input type="checkbox"/> CLS bags stocked  |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Chem lights   | <input type="checkbox"/> Litter/skidcos  |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Flares  | <input type="checkbox"/> Countermeasure smoke for concealment                        |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Signal devices  | <input type="checkbox"/> Helmet cameras  |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Visible lasers (for C2 at night)  | <input type="checkbox"/> Wands (mirrored handles for looking under vehicles)         |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Taclite on weapons/M4   | <input type="checkbox"/> Non-lethal intervention weapons                             |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Tracers for gunner weapons  | <input type="checkbox"/> Police dogs   |
| <input type="checkbox"/> VS17 panels for marking   | <input type="checkbox"/> Females to search females                                   |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Engineer tape   | <input type="checkbox"/> Metal detector  |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Cones   | <input type="checkbox"/> NVGs  |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Concertina wire (pickets, pounder, & wire gloves)                       | <input type="checkbox"/> Detainee kits*  |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Concrete barriers   | <input type="checkbox"/> Hand cuff straps/zip ties                                   |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Folding barricades  | <input type="checkbox"/> Blindfolds  |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Blocking barricades   | <input type="checkbox"/> Digital camera  |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Speed bumps   | <input type="checkbox"/> Xsray   |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Spike strips  | <input type="checkbox"/> Sensitive Site Exploitation kits (SSE)*                     |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Sandbags  | <input type="checkbox"/> Informant disguises/uniform/mask                            |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Ensure body bags available  | <input type="checkbox"/> Interpreter   |
| <input type="checkbox"/> "Hoolie tools" for breaking/entering/repairing doors, locks, windows    | <input type="checkbox"/> Vehicle tow bars/chains/ropes prepared for recovery mission |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Extra locks to replace cut ones   | <input type="checkbox"/> Reference card local government names & phone numbers       |
| <input type="checkbox"/> "Jaws of life"  |  |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Demolitions   |  |

\*Hoolie tools – Kit with various unit designated tools (e.g., crowbars, wrenches, pliers, hammers) used to force open windows, doors, fences, walls, or floors during searches

\*Detainee kits – Kits with unit designated items (e.g., blindfolds, detainee forms, Xsray, digital cameras, zip ties) used in capturing questioning, processing, transporting, and incarcerating individuals

\*SSE kits – Kits with various unit designated items (e.g., rubber gloves, evidence bags, finger print capabilities, video cameras/recording devices) used to facilitate evidence collection and forensic analysis

## Notes





# Ten Event Scenario CTC Observer Questionnaires



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## *Iraq Common Event Approaches – Master Common Actions & Equipment Questionnaire*

☐ Check if STX/Lanes

O/C call sign \_\_\_\_\_ # of rotations with this call sign \_\_\_\_\_ Training day \_\_\_\_\_

Unit \_\_\_\_\_ Rotation \_\_\_\_\_ Battalion Mission \_\_\_\_\_

Score each activity below by how sufficiently it was done. 0 = NOT DONE – BUT should have been 1 = NOT SUFFICIENT 2 = SOMEWHAT SUFFICIENT 3 = MODERATELY SUFFICIENT 4 = <b>COMPLETELY SUFFICIENT - the action or activity was complete, AND timely enough so that assigned tasks and/or mission could be accomplished</b> 5 = SUPERIOR NA = NOT APPLICABLE (not required, no reason to execute) UO = UNOBSERVED BY OC	N O T  S U F F I C I E N T  D O N E	N O T  S U F F I C I E N T  D O N E	S O M E W H A T  M O D E R A T E L Y  D O N E	M O D E R A T E L Y  D O N E	C O M P L E T E  D O N E	S U P E R I O R  D O N E	A P P L I C A B L E  D O N E	U N O B S E R V E D  D O N E
<b>Common actions/reminders</b>								
1. During preparation for execution and reporting, how well did the unit ...								
a. Report the following to higher and adjacent ...								
1) sitrep, status, and/or contact?	0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
2) 9-line medevac as needed?	0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
3) 9-line medevac as needed?	0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
b. Track frequencies & call signs for enabling units (e.g., EOD)?	0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
c. Conduct/verify PCC/PCI?	0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
d. Assign jobs/teams to each Soldier (e.g., security, breach, litter)?	0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
e. Conduct rock drills (internally & with Local friendly forces)?	0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
f. Conduct rehearsals (internally & with Local friendly forces)?	0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
g. Conduct movement/convoy withdrawal briefs?	0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
h. Brief Rules of Engagement (ROE)?	0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
i. Disseminate photos/description of BOLO*/high value targets?	0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
j. Request air support (AWT*/UAV)?	0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
k. Post all reports (9-line & others) in vehicles?	0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
l. Update/mark friendly/enemy and incident locations on FBCB2?	0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
m. Call and update squads/platoons/convoy?	0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
n. Prepare PAO/IO release?	0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO

\* Hoolie tools – kit with various unit designated tools (e.g., crow bars, wrenches, pliers, hammers) used to force open windows, doors, fences, walls, or floors during searches

\* Detainee kits – Kits with unit designated items (e.g., blindfolds, detainee forms, Xspray, digital cameras, zip ties) used in capturing, questioning, processing, transporting, and incarcerating individuals

\* SSE kits – Kits with various unit designated items (e.g., rubber gloves, evidence bags, finger print capabilities, video cameras/recording devices) used to facilitate evidence collection and forensic analysis.

\* AWT – Air Weapons Team

\* BOLO – Be on lookout for (photo/description of individual or vehicle to watch for)

Key Equipment, Kits, and Tools (EKT) to Facilitate Operations. Place an X in each appropriate box to show whether EKT items were (1) on the SOP, (2) available for use, (3) necessary for use based upon tactical situation, (4) used. (5) Then identify, according to the scale above, how well the unit used this item to influence the tactical situation.	(1) Equipment, Kit, Tools were listed on SOP or equipment lists	(2) Equipment, Kit, Tools were available for use	(3) Item should have been used to support tactical situation	(4) Item <u>was</u> used to support tactical situation	(5) How well did the unit use this item to influence the tactical situation?							
					0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
Speed ball (extra ammo, magazines, grenades, etc.).					0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
Collapsible ladders					0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
Gate stickers to mark cleared houses					0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
First aid kits/extra supplies/medball					0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
CLS bags stocked					0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
Litter/skidcos					0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
Countermeasure smoke for concealment					0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
Helmet cameras					0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
Wands (mirrored handles for looking under vehicles)					0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
Non-lethal intervention weapons					0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
Police dogs					0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
Females to search females					0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
Metal detector					0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
NVGs					0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
Detainee kits*					0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
Hand cuff straps/zip ties					0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
Blindfolds					0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
Digital camera					0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
Xsray					0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
Sensitive site exploitation kits (SSE)*					0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
Informant disguises/uniform/mask					0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
Interpreter					0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
Vehicle tow bars/chains/ropes prepared for recovery mission					0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
Reference card local government names & phone numbers					0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO



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***Iraq Common Event Approaches  
ROE Engagement (Escalation of Force)  
POV with SAF Questionnaire***



Check if STX/Lanes

O/C call sign \_\_\_\_\_ # of rotations with this call sign \_\_\_\_\_ Training day \_\_\_\_\_

Unit \_\_\_\_\_ Rotation \_\_\_\_\_ Battalion Mission \_\_\_\_\_

Score each activity below by how sufficiently it was done. 0 = NOT DONE – BUT should have been 1 = NOT SUFFICIENT 2 = SOMEWHAT SUFFICIENT 3 = MODERATELY SUFFICIENT 4 = COMPLETELY SUFFICIENT - the action or activity was complete, AND timely enough so that assigned tasks and/or mission <u>could be accomplished</u> 5 = SUPERIOR NA = NOT APPLICABLE (not required, no reason to execute) UO = UNOBSERVED BY OC	N O T  S U F F I C I E N T  D O N E	1	2	3	4	5	N A  U O	U O
<b>Common actions/reminders</b>								
1. During preparation for execution and reporting, how well did the unit ...								
a. Report the following to higher and adjacent ...								
1) sitrep, status, and/or contact?	0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
2) 9-line medevac as needed?	0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
b. Conduct/verify PCC/PCI?	0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
c. Assign jobs/teams to each soldier (e.g., security, breach, litter)?	0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
d. Conduct movement/convoy withdrawal brief?	0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
e. Brief Rules of Engagement (ROE)?	0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
f. Disseminate photos/description of BOLO*/high value targets?	0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
g. Update/mark friendly/enemy and incident locations on FBCB2?	0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
h. Call and update squads/platoons/convoy?	0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
i. Prepare PAO/IO release?	0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
<b>Event execution checklist</b>								
2. During event execution, how well did the unit ...								
a. Employ Escalation of Force (EOF) measures (shout, show, shove, shoot to disable, shoot to kill/destroy)?	0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
b. Employ firing EOF discipline (tires, engine block, windshield, driver)?	0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
c. Engage as necessary?	0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
d. Get vehicle description and license plate numbers?	0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
e. Use trail gunner to signal to stop (radio by day laser at night)?	0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
f. Stop/pull off route/MSR?	0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
g. Secure area/site?	0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
h. Search car(s) as necessary?	0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
i. Search passengers as necessary?	0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
j. Assess and assist casualties?	0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
k. Begin casevac (ground/air) as necessary?	0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
l. Detain and/or arrest individuals as necessary?	0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
m. Assess damage; issue "claim" card as necessary?	0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
n. Take digital photos to document?	0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
o. Continue the mission?	0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
p. Complete EOF report following mission completion?	0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
q. Provide detailed/complete event report to S2 staff upon return to FOB?	0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
r. Execute information operations (IO) actions to support/exploit?	0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO

Key Equipment, Kits, and Tools (EKT) to Facilitate Operations. Place an X in each appropriate box to show whether EKT items were (1) on the SOP, (2) available for use, (3) necessary for use based upon tactical situation, (4) used. (5) Then identify, according to the scale above, how well the unit used this item to influence the tactical situation.	(1) Equipment, Kit, Tools were listed on SOP or equipment lists	(2) Equipment, Kit, Tools were available for use	(3) Item should have been used to support tactical situation	(4) Item <u>was</u> used to support tactical situation	(5) How well did the unit use this item to influence the tactical situation?							
					0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
Signs – deadly force, warning, EOF (for vehicles & cordon)					0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
Bullhorns					0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
Blinking lights					0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
Flares					0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
Visible lasers (for C2 at night)					0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
TacLite on weapons/M4					0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
Tracers for gunner weapons					0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
Cones					0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
Concertina wire (pickets, pounder, wire gloves)					0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
Speedball (extra ammo, magazines, grenades, etc.)					0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
First aid kits/extra supplies/medball					0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
Litter/skidcos					0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
Countermeasure smoke for concealment					0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
Non-lethal intervention weapons					0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
Detainee Kits*					0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
Hand cuff straps/zip ties					0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
Digital camera					0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
Xsray					0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
Sensitive site exploitation kits (SSE)*					0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
Interpreter					0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
Reference card local government names & phone numbers					0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO

\* BOLO – be on the lookout for (photo/description of individual or vehicle to watch for)

\* Detainee kits – Kits with unit designated items (e.g., blindfolds, detainee forms, Xsray, digital cameras, zip ties) used in capturing, questioning, processing, transporting, and incarcerating individuals

\* SSE kits – Kits with various unit designated items (e.g., rubber gloves, evidence bags, finger print capabilities, video cameras/recording devices) used to facilitate evidence collection and forensic analysis



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### Iraq Common Event Approaches Raid (RD) in Coordination with Local Army Questionnaire

Check if STX/Lanes

O/C call sign \_\_\_\_\_ # of rotations with this call sign \_\_\_\_\_ Training day \_\_\_\_\_

Unit \_\_\_\_\_ Rotation \_\_\_\_\_ Battalion Mission \_\_\_\_\_

Score each activity below by how sufficiently it was done. 0 = NOT DONE – BUT should have been 1 = NOT SUFFICIENT 2 = SOMEWHAT SUFFICIENT 3 = MODERATELY SUFFICIENT 4 = COMPLETELY SUFFICIENT - the action or activity was complete, AND timely enough so that assigned tasks and/or mission <u>could be</u> <u>accomplished</u> 5 = SUPERIOR NA = NOT APPLICABLE (not required, no reason to execute) UO = UNOBSERVED BY OC	N O T  S U F F I C I E N T  D O N E	1	2	3	4	5	N A  P P L I C A B L E	U O  B S E R V E D
<b>Common actions/reminders</b>								
1. During preparation for execution and reporting, how well did the unit ...								
a. Report the following to higher and adjacent ...								
1) sitrep, status, and/or contact?	0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
2) 9-line medevac as needed?	0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
b. Conduct/verify PCC/PCI?	0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
c. Conduct rock drills (internally & with Iraqi forces)?	0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
d. Conduct rehearsals (internally & with Iraqi forces)?	0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
e. Conduct movement/convoy withdrawal brief?	0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
f. Brief Rules of Engagement (ROE)?	0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
g. Disseminate photos/description of BOLO*/high value targets?	0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
h. Request air support (AWT*/UAV)?	0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
i. Call & update squads/platoons/convoy?	0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
j. Prepare PAO/IO release?	0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
<b>Event execution checklist</b>								
2. During event execution, how well did the unit ...								
a. Call & coordinate Local Army & Local Police support/involvement?	0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
b. Assess Iraqi asset availability and compatibility?	0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
c. Split US sections with Local Army units?	0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
d. Determine Local Army role in search/clear (main/subordinate)?	0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
e. Provide scheme of operation but NOT location and time (hold back)?	0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
f. Conduct recon (map/driving) with informant as available?	0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
g. Establish movement and withdrawal plan?	0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
h. Assign jobs/teams to each Soldier (e.g., security, breach, litter)?	0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
i. Secure site/area?	0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
j. Establish overwatch (snipers/marksmen)?	0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
k. Cordon area?	0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
l. Coordinate use of adjacent building/house(s) for security?	0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
m. Conduct raid?	0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
n. Engage enemy as necessary?	0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
o. Conduct building/structure/room search and clear operations?	0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
p. Search for weapons/explosives?	0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
q. Establish marking/reporting plan for cleared house/room?	0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
r. Detain and/or arrest individuals as necessary?	0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
s. Conduct personnel search drills?	0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
t. Assess casualties for urgency & assist/treat casualties?	0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
u. Begin casevac/medevac procedures (ground/air as situation dictates)?	0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
v. Call for backup/QRF as necessary?	0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
w. Provide detailed/complete event report to S2 staff upon return to FOB?	0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
x. Execute Information Operations (IO) actions to support/exploit?	0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO

Key Equipment, Kits, and Tools (EKT) to Facilitate Operations. Place an X in each appropriate box to show whether EKT items were (1) on the SOP, (2) available for use, (3) necessary for use based upon tactical situation, (4) used, (5) Then identify, according to the scale above, how well the unit used this item to influence the tactical situation.	(1) Equipment, Kit, Tools were listed on SOP or equipment lists	(2) Equipment, Kit, Tools were available for use	(3) Item should have been used to support tactical situation	(4) Item <u>was</u> used to support tactical situation	(5) How well did the unit use this item to influence the tactical situation?							
					0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
Signs – deadly force, warning, EOF (for vehicles & cordon as necessary)					0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
Bullhorns					0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
Blinking lights					0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
Chem lights					0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
Visible lasers (for C2 at night)					0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
Taclite for weapons/M4					0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
VS17 Panels for marking					0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
Cones					0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
Concertina wire (pickets, pounder, wire gloves)					0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
Spike strips					0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
“Hoolie tools” for breaking/entering/repairing doors, locks, windows					0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
Demolitions					0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
Speed ball (extra ammo, magazines, grenades, etc.)					0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
Collapsible ladders					0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
First aid kits/extra supplies/medball					0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
Combat lifesaver bags (stocked)					0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
Litter/Skidcos					0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
Non-lethal intervention weapons					0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
NVGs					0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
Detainee kits*					0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
Hand cuff straps/zip ties					0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
Blindfolds					0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
Digital camera					0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
Xsray					0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
Informant disguises/uniform/mask					0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
Sensitive site exploitation kits (SSE)*					0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
Interpreter					0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO

\* AWT – Air Weapons Team

\* BOLO – be on the lookout for (photo/description of individual or vehicle to watch for)

\* Detainee kits – Kits with unit designated items (e.g., blindfolds, detainee forms, Xsray, digital cameras, zip ties) used in capturing, questioning, processing, transporting, and incarcerating individuals

\* SSE kits – Kits with various unit designated items (e.g., rubber gloves, evidence bags, finger print capabilities, video cameras/recording devices) used to facilitate evidence collection and forensic analysis.



ARROYO CENTER

### Iraq Common Event Approaches - Respond as QRF to "Hot" Area (QRF) Questionnaire



Check if STX/Lanes

O/C call sign \_\_\_\_\_ # of rotations with this call sign \_\_\_\_\_ Training day \_\_\_\_\_

Unit \_\_\_\_\_ Rotation \_\_\_\_\_ Battalion Mission \_\_\_\_\_

Score each activity below by how sufficiently it was done. 0 = NOT DONE – BUT should have been 1 = NOT SUFFICIENT 2 = SOMEWHAT SUFFICIENT 3 = MODERATELY SUFFICIENT 4 = COMPLETELY SUFFICIENT - the action or activity was complete, AND timely enough so that assigned tasks and/or mission <u>could be accomplished</u> 5 = SUPERIOR NA = NOT APPLICABLE (not required, no reason to execute) UO = UNOBSERVED BY OC		N O T  N O T  D O N E	S U F F I C I E N T	S O M E W H A T	M O D E R A T E L Y	C O M P L E T E	S U P E R I O R	N A P P L I C A B L E	U N O B S E R V E D
<b>Common actions/reminders</b>									
1. During preparation for execution and reporting, how well did the unit ...									
a. Report the following to higher and adjacent ...									
1) sitrep, status, and/or contact?	0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO	
2) 9-line medevac as needed?	0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO	
b. Conduct/verify PCC/PCI?	0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO	
c. Request air support (AWT*/UAV)?	0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO	
d. Post all reports (9-line and others) in vehicles?	0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO	
e. Call and update squads/platoons/convoy?	0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO	
f. Prepare PAO/IO release?	0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO	
<b>Event execution checklist</b>									
2. During event execution, how well did the unit ...									
a. Secure site/area (360 degree cordon when possible)?	0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO	
b. Establish overwatch (snipers/marksman)?	0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO	
c. Alert/clear locals?	0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO	
d. Assess casualties for urgency & assist/treat casualties (including local nationals [LNs])?	0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO	
e. Send complete BDA of site (equipment & personnel)?	0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO	
f. Maneuver vehicles to support to casevac, exfiltration, or assault?	0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO	
g. Begin casevac/medevac procedures (ground/air as situation dictates)?	0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO	
h. Coordinate civilian ambulance for Local National (LN) casualties?	0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO	
i. Alert higher medical (aid station/CSH) of incoming casualty situation?	0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO	
j. Call & coordinate Local Army and Local Police involvement?	0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO	
k. React to contact/ambush?	0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO	
l. Identify 3Ds (distance, direction, description) of gun fire?	0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO	
m. Determine source of gun fire (shooter & location)?	0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO	
n. Mark on FBCB2?	0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO	
o. Coordinate UAV/air support?	0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO	
p. Suppress enemy gun fire?	0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO	
q. Conduct squad movements/attack?	0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO	
r. Engage enemy as necessary?	0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO	
s. Cordon area as situation allows?	0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO	
t. Conduct building/structure/room search & clear operations as necessary?	0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO	
u. Call for backup/QRF as necessary?	0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO	
v. Conduct recovery operations?	0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO	
w. Await further orders?	0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO	
x. Engage locals for intelligence?	0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO	
y. Coordinate with higher for Law Enforcement Program (LEP) team to conduct SSE* (forensics/evidence gathering)?	0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO	
z. Continue mission?	0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO	
aa. Provide detailed/complete event report to S2 staff upon return to FOB?	0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO	
bb. Execute Information Operations (IO) actions to support/exploit?	0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO	



Key Equipment, Kits, and Tools (EKT) to Facilitate Operations. Place an X in each appropriate box to show whether EKT items were (1) on the SOP, (2) available for use, (3) necessary for use based upon tactical situation, (4) used. (5) Then identify, according to the scale above, how well the unit used this item to influence the tactical situation.	(1) Equipment, Kit, Tools were listed on SOP or equipment lists	(2) Equipment, Kit, Tools were available for use	(3) Item should have been used to support tactical situation	(4) Item <u>was</u> used to support tactical situation	(5) How well did the unit use this item to influence the tactical situation?							
					0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
Signs – deadly force, warning, EOF (for vehicles & cordon as necessary)					0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
Bullhorns					0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
Visible lasers (for C2 at night)					0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
VS 17 panels for marking					0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
Cones					0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
Concertina wire (pickets, pounder, wire gloves)					0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
Spike strips					0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
“Hoolie tools**” for breaking/entering/repairing doors, locks, windows					0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
“Jaws of life”					0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
Speed ball (extra ammo, magazines, grenades, etc.)					0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
First aid kits/extra supplies/medball					0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
CLS bags stocked					0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
Litter/skidcos					0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
Countermeasure smoke for concealment					0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
Non-lethal intervention weapons					0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
Detainee kits*					0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
Hand cuff straps/zip ties					0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
Sensitive site exploitation kits (SSE)*					0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
Interpreter					0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
Vehicles' tow bars/chains/ropes prepared for recovery mission					0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO

\* AWT – Air Weapons Team

\* Hoolie tools – kit with various unit designated tools (e.g., crow bars, wrenches, pliers, hammers) used to force open windows, doors, fences, walls, or floors during searches

\* Detainee kits – Kits with unit designated items (e.g., blindfolds, detainee forms, Xsray, digital cameras, zip ties) used in capturing, questioning, processing, transporting, and incarcerating individuals

\* SSE kits – Kits with various unit designated items (e.g., rubber gloves, evidence bags, finger print capabilities, video cameras/recording devices) used to facilitate evidence collection and forensic analysis



ARROYO CENTER

### ***Iraq Common Event Approaches – Possible IED (PIED) Identified by Patrol Questionnaire***

☐ Check if STX/Lanes

O/C call sign \_\_\_\_\_ # of rotations with this call sign \_\_\_\_\_ Training day \_\_\_\_\_

Unit \_\_\_\_\_ Rotation \_\_\_\_\_ Battalion Mission \_\_\_\_\_

Score each activity below by how sufficiently it was done. 0 = NOT DONE – BUT should have been 1 = NOT SUFFICIENT 2 = SOMEWHAT SUFFICIENT 3 = MODERATELY SUFFICIENT 4 = COMPLETELY SUFFICIENT - the action or activity was complete, AND timely enough so that assigned tasks and/or mission could be accomplished 5 = SUPERIOR NA = NOT APPLICABLE (not required, no reason to execute) UO = UNOBSERVED BY OC	N O T  S U F F I C I E N T  D O N E	S O M E W H A T  D O N E	M O D E R A T E L Y  D O N E	C O M P L E T E  D O N E	S U P E R I O R  D O N E	A P P L I C A B L E  D O N E	U N O B S E R V E D  D O N E
<b>Common actions/reminders</b>							
2. During preparation for execution and reporting, how well did the unit ...							
a. Report the following to higher and adjacent ...							
1) sitrep, status, and/or contact?	0	1	2	3	4	5	NA UO
2) 9-line IED?	0	1	2	3	4	5	NA UO
3) 9-line medevac as needed?	0	1	2	3	4	5	NA UO
b. Track frequencies and call signs for enabling units (e.g., EOD)?	0	1	2	3	4	5	NA UO
c. Conduct/verify PCC/PCI?	0	1	2	3	4	5	NA UO
d. Conduct rock drills (internally & with Iraqi forces)?	0	1	2	3	4	5	NA UO
e. Conduct movement/convoy withdrawal brief?	0	1	2	3	4	5	NA UO
f. Brief Rules of Engagement (ROE)?	0	1	2	3	4	5	NA UO
g. Disseminate photos/description of BOLO* /high value targets?	0	1	2	3	4	5	NA UO
h. Request air support (AWT*/UAV)?	0	1	2	3	4	5	NA UO
i. Call and update squads/platoons/convoy?	0	1	2	3	4	5	NA UO
j. Update/mark friendly/enemy and incident locations on FBCB2?	0	1	2	3	4	5	NA UO
k. Prepare PAO/IO release?	0	1	2	3	4	5	NA UO
<b>Event execution checklist</b>							
2. During event execution, how well did the unit ...							
a. Stop/pull off route/MSR?	0	1	2	3	4	5	NA UO
b. Create standoff (from suspected IED)?	0	1	2	3	4	5	NA UO
c. Conduct IED drills?	0	1	2	3	4	5	NA UO
d. Secure area?	0	1	2	3	4	5	NA UO
e. Cordon area?	0	1	2	3	4	5	NA UO
f. Alert/clear locals?	0	1	2	3	4	5	NA UO
g. Put vehicles in overwatch and roadblock (foot and vehicular traffic)?	0	1	2	3	4	5	NA UO
h. Use Binocs, RWS, vehicle optics to identify IED?	0	1	2	3	4	5	NA UO
i. Mark IED or cordon as soon as possible?	0	1	2	3	4	5	NA UO
j. Update higher by sending full IED/UXO report?	0	1	2	3	4	5	NA UO
k. Mark on FBCB2?	0	1	2	3	4	5	NA UO
l. Call/coordinate with explosive ordnance disposal (EOD)?	0	1	2	3	4	5	NA UO
m. Call/coordinate UAV support?	0	1	2	3	4	5	NA UO
n. Engage locals for intelligence about IED?	0	1	2	3	4	5	NA UO
o. Check surroundings/look for initiation wires and other IEDs?	0	1	2	3	4	5	NA UO
p. Await further orders (await EOD or mark/bypass)?	0	1	2	3	4	5	NA UO
q. Lead EOD to IED (secure and protect EOD)?	0	1	2	3	4	5	NA UO
r. Execute contingency plan/unit battle drill for IED disposal if EOD was unavailable?	0	1	2	3	4	5	NA UO
s. Use EOD to reduce the IED?	0	1	2	3	4	5	NA UO
t. Coordinate with higher for Law Enforcement Program (LEP) team to conduct SSE* (forensics/evidence gathering)?	0	1	2	3	4	5	NA UO
u. Continue mission?	0	1	2	3	4	5	NA UO
v. Provide detailed/complete IED/event report to S2 staff upon return to FOB?	0	1	2	3	4	5	NA UO
w. Execute information operations (IO) actions to support/exploit?	0	1	2	3	4	5	NA UO

Key Equipment, Kits, and Tools (EKT) to Facilitate Operations. Place an X in each appropriate box to show whether EKT items were (1) on the SOP, (2) available for use, (3) necessary for use based upon tactical situation, (4) used. (5) Then identify, according to the scale above, how well the unit used this item to influence the tactical situation.	(1) Equipment, Kit, Tools were listed on SOP or equipment lists	(2) Equipment, Kit, Tools were available for use	(3) Item should have been used to support tactical situation	(4) Item <u>was</u> used to support tactical situation	(5) How well did the unit use this item to influence the tactical situation?							
					0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
Signs – deadly force, warning, EOF (for vehicles & cordon)					0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
Bullhorns					0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
Blinking lights					0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
Chem lights					0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
Visible lasers (for C2 at night)					0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
Cones					0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
Concertina wire (pickets, pounder, wire gloves)					0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
First aid kits/extra supplies/medball					0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
Litter/skidcos					0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
Non-lethal intervention weapons					0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
Detainee kits*					0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
Hand cuff straps/zip ties					0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
Sensitive site exploitation kits (SSE)*					0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
Interpreter					0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO

\* AWT – Air Weapons Team

\* BOLO – be on the lookout for (photo/description of individual or vehicle to watch for)

\* Detainee kits – Kits with unit designated items (e.g., blindfolds, detainee forms, Xsray, digital cameras, zip ties) used in capturing, questioning, processing, transporting, and incarcerating individuals

\* SSE kits – Kits with various unit designated items (e.g., rubber gloves, evidence bags, finger print capabilities, video cameras/recording devices) used to facilitate evidence collection and forensic analysis



ARROYO CENTER

### Iraq Common Event Approaches Secure Meeting Site (MS) Questionnaire



Check if STX/Lanes

O/C call sign \_\_\_\_\_ # of rotations with this call sign \_\_\_\_\_ Training day \_\_\_\_\_

Unit \_\_\_\_\_ Rotation \_\_\_\_\_ Battalion Mission \_\_\_\_\_

Score each activity below by how sufficiently it was done. 0 = NOT DONE – BUT should have been 1 = NOT SUFFICIENT 2 = SOMEWHAT SUFFICIENT 3 = MODERATELY SUFFICIENT 4 = <b>COMPLETELY SUFFICIENT</b> - the action or activity was complete, AND timely enough so that assigned tasks and/or mission <u>could be accomplished</u> 5 = SUPERIOR NA = NOT APPLICABLE (not required, no reason to execute) UO = UNOBSERVED BY OC	NOT DONE	NOT SUFFICIENT	SOMEWHAT SUFFICIENT	MODERATELY SUFFICIENT	COMPLETELY SUFFICIENT	SUPERIOR	NOT APPLICABLE	UNOBSERVED
<b>Common actions/reminders</b>								
1. During preparation for execution and reporting, how well did the unit ...								
a. Report the following to higher and adjacent ...								
1) sitrep, status, and/or contact?	0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
b. Assign jobs/teams to each Soldier (e.g., security, breach, litter)?	0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
c. Conduct rock drills (internally & with local friendly forces)?	0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
d. Brief Rules of Engagement (ROE)?	0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
e. Disseminate photos/description of BOLO*/high value targets?	0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
f. Request air support (AWT*/UAV)?	0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
g. Call & update squads/platoons/convoy?	0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
h. Prepare PAO/IO release?	0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
<b>Event execution checklist</b>								
2. During event execution, how well did the unit ...								
a. Notify meeting participants?	0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
b. Call/coordinate IA/IP/MIIT support?	0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
c. Secure area?	0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
d. Cordon area?	0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
e. Coordinate use of adjacent building/house(s) for security?	0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
f. Coordinate/emplace snipers?	0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
g. Create blocking barricades?	0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
h. Set up serpentine to guard against suicide bombers?	0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
i. Put vehicles in overwatch & roadblock positions (foot & vehicular traffic)?	0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
j. Execute building/structure/room searches/clearing?	0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
k. Take building and establish "strong point?"	0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
l. Establish movement and withdrawal plan?	0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
m. Identify/search entrants?	0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
n. Establish personnel/vehicle search area?	0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
o. Employ Escalation of Force (EOF) measures (shout, show, shove, shoot to disable, shoot to kill/destroy)?	0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
p. Maintain appropriate respect of local people and customs?	0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
q. Conduct meeting(s)?	0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
r. Provide detailed/complete event report to S2 staff upon return to FOB?	0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
s. Execute Information Operations (IO) actions to support/exploit?	0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO

Key Equipment, Kits, and Tools (EKT) to Facilitate Operations. Place an X in each appropriate box to show whether EKT items were (1) on the SOP, (2) available for use, (3) necessary for use based upon tactical situation, (4) used. (5) Then identify, according to the scale above, how well the unit used this item to influence the tactical situation.	(1) Equipment, Kit, Tools were listed on SOP or equipment lists	(2) Equipment, Kit, Tools were available for use	(3) Item should have been used to support tactical situation	(4) Item <u>was</u> used to support tactical situation	(5) How well did the unit use this item to influence the tactical situation?							
					0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
Signs – deadly force, warning, EOF (for vehicles & cordon as necessary)					0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
Sirens					0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
Bullhorns					0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
Blinking lights					0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
Chem lights					0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
Visible lasers (for C2 at night)					0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
Taclite for weapons/M4					0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
Cones					0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
Concertina wire (pickets, pounder, wire gloves)					0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
Concrete barriers					0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
Folding barricades					0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
Blocking barricades					0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
Speed bumps					0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
Spike strips					0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
Sandbags					0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
Speed ball (extra ammo, magazines, grenades, etc.)					0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
First aid kits/extra supplies/medball					0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
Litter/skidcos					0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
Wands (mirrored handles for looking under vehicles)					0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
Non-lethal intervention weapons					0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
Females to search females					0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
Metal detector					0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
Detainee kits*					0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
Hand cuff straps/zip ties					0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
Xsray					0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
Interpreters/coordinate for additional interpreters					0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO

\* AWT – Air Weapons Team

\* BOLO – be on the lookout for (photo/description of individual or vehicle to watch for)

\* Detainee kits – Kits with unit designated items (e.g., blindfolds, detainee forms, Xsray, digital cameras, zip ties) used in capturing, questioning, processing, transporting, and incarcerating individuals



ARROYO CENTER

### Iraq Common Event Approaches Indirect Fire (IF) on unit Questionnaire

Check if STX/Lanes

O/C call sign \_\_\_\_\_ # of rotations with this call sign \_\_\_\_\_ Training day \_\_\_\_\_

Unit \_\_\_\_\_ Rotation \_\_\_\_\_ Battalion Mission \_\_\_\_\_

Score each activity below by how sufficiently it was done. 0 = NOT DONE – BUT should have been 1 = NOT SUFFICIENT 2 = SOMEWHAT SUFFICIENT 3 = MODERATELY SUFFICIENT 4 = <b>COMPLETELY SUFFICIENT</b> - the action or activity was complete, AND timely enough so that assigned tasks and/or mission <u>could</u> <u>be accomplished</u> 5 = <b>SUPERIOR</b> NA = <b>NOT APPLICABLE</b> (not required, no reason to execute) UO = <b>UNOBSERVED BY OC</b>	N O T S U F F I C I E N T	S O M E W H A T L Y	M O D E R A T E L Y	C O M P L E T E	S U P E R I O R	N A P P L I C A B L E	U N O B S E R V E D
<b>Common actions/reminders</b>							
1. During preparation for execution and reporting, how well did the unit ...							
a. Report the following to higher and adjacent ...							
1) sitrep, status, and/or contact?	0	1	2	3	4	5	NA UO
2) 9-line medevac as needed?	0	1	2	3	4	5	NA UO
b. Request air support (AWT*/UAV)?	0	1	2	3	4	5	NA UO
c. Call and update squads/platoons/convoy?	0	1	2	3	4	5	NA UO
d. Prepare PAO/IO release?	0	1	2	3	4	5	NA UO
<b>Event execution checklist</b>							
2. During event execution, how well did the unit ...							
a. Seek/take cover?	0	1	2	3	4	5	NA UO
b. Clear markings that identify bunkers/mortar barriers?	0	1	2	3	4	5	NA UO
c. Get in mortar barriers?	0	1	2	3	4	5	NA UO
d. Remain in safe positions until incoming rounds ceased landing?	0	1	2	3	4	5	NA UO
e. Move to established rally point?	0	1	2	3	4	5	NA UO
f. Assess casualties for urgency & assist/treat casualties (including local nationals [LNs])?	0	1	2	3	4	5	NA UO
g. Construct Casualty Collection Point (CCP)/execute Mass Casualty (MASCAL) drill?	0	1	2	3	4	5	NA UO
h. Begin casevac (ground/air as necessary)?	0	1	2	3	4	5	NA UO
i. Alert higher medical (aid station/CSH) of incoming casualty situation?	0	1	2	3	4	5	NA UO
j. Establish accountability of personnel?	0	1	2	3	4	5	NA UO
k. Employ JSS/COP/FOB lockdown procedures?	0	1	2	3	4	5	NA UO
l. Change/upgrade uniform policy to full kit (higher force protection level)?	0	1	2	3	4	5	NA UO
m. Increase JSS/COP/FOB security?	0	1	2	3	4	5	NA UO
n. Conduct crater analysis?	0	1	2	3	4	5	NA UO
o. Confirm if counterfire radar acquired incoming round point of origin (POO)?	0	1	2	3	4	5	NA UO
p. Conduct counterfire mission as necessary?	0	1	2	3	4	5	NA UO
q. Reinforce vigilance of all guards/towers?	0	1	2	3	4	5	NA UO
r. Coordinate with higher for Law Enforcement Program (LEP) team to conduct SSE* (forensics/evidence gathering)?	0	1	2	3	4	5	NA UO
s. Provide detailed/complete event report to S2 staff upon return to FOB?	0	1	2	3	4	5	NA UO
t. Execute Information Operations (IO) actions to support/exploit?	0	1	2	3	4	5	NA UO

\* AWT – Air Weapons Team

\* SSE kits – Kits with various unit designated items (e.g. rubber gloves, evidence bags, finger print capabilities, video cameras/recording devices) used to facilitate evidence collection and forensic analysis.

<b>Key Equipment, Kits, and Tools (EKT) to Facilitate Operations.</b> Place an X in each appropriate box to show whether EKT items were (1) on the SOP, (2) available for use, (3) necessary for use based upon tactical situation, (4) used. (5) Then identify, according to the scale above, how well the unit used this item to influence the tactical situation.	(1) Equipment, Kit, Tools were listed on SOP or equipment lists	(2) Equipment, Kit, Tools were available for use	(3) Item should have been used to support tactical situation	(4) Item <u>was</u> used to support tactical situation	(5) How well did the unit use this item to influence the tactical situation?									
					0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO		
Alarms for JSS/COP/FOB notification					0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO		
Sirens					0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO		
Bullhorns					0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO		
Concrete barriers					0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO		
Sandbags					0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO		
First aid kits/extra supplies/medball					0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO		
Litter/skidcos					0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO		



ARROYO CENTER

### ***Iraq Common Event Approaches - Hasty/ Deliberate (HD) Checkpoint Questionnaire***

Check if STX/Lanes

O/C call sign \_\_\_\_\_ # of rotations with this call sign \_\_\_\_\_ Training day \_\_\_\_\_

Unit \_\_\_\_\_ Rotation \_\_\_\_\_ Battalion Mission \_\_\_\_\_

Score each activity below by how sufficiently it was done. 0 = NOT DONE – BUT should have been 1 = NOT SUFFICIENT 2 = SOMEWHAT SUFFICIENT 3 = MODERATELY SUFFICIENT 4 = <b>COMPLETELY SUFFICIENT - the action or activity was complete, AND timely enough so that assigned tasks and/or mission <u>could be</u> accomplished</b> 5 = SUPERIOR NA = NOT APPLICABLE (not required, no reason to execute) UO = UNOBSERVED BY OC	N O T  S U F F I C I E N T  D O N E	S U F F I C I E N T	M O D E R A T E L Y	C O M P L E T E	S U P E R I O R	N O T  A P P L I C A B L E	U N O B S E R V E D
<b>Common actions/reminders</b>							
1. During preparation for execution and reporting, how well did the unit ...							
a. Report the following to higher and adjacent ...							
1) sitrep, status, and/or contact?	0	1	2	3	4	5	NA UO
b. Conduct/verify PCC/PCI?	0	1	2	3	4	5	NA UO
c. Assign jobs/teams to each soldier (e.g., security, breach, litter)?	0	1	2	3	4	5	NA UO
d. Conduct rock drills (internally & with local friendly forces)?	0	1	2	3	4	5	NA UO
e. Conduct movement/convoy and withdrawal brief?	0	1	2	3	4	5	NA UO
f. Brief Rules of Engagement (ROE)?	0	1	2	3	4	5	NA UO
g. Disseminate photos/description of BOLO*/high value targets?	0	1	2	3	4	5	NA UO
h. Update/mark friendly/enemy and incident locations on FBCB2?	0	1	2	3	4	5	NA UO
i. Call and update squads/platoons/convoy?	0	1	2	3	4	5	NA UO
j. Prepare PAO/IO release?	0	1	2	3	4	5	NA UO
<b>Event execution checklist</b>							
2. During event execution, how well did the unit ... or did the unit ...							
a. Call & coordinate Local Army and Local Police involvement (brief late to avoid compromise)?	0	1	2	3	4	5	NA UO
b. Secure both ends of checkpoint or bridge?	0	1	2	3	4	5	NA UO
c. Secure area?	0	1	2	3	4	5	NA UO
d. Set up serpentine to guard against suicide bombers?	0	1	2	3	4	5	NA UO
e. Put vehicles in overwatch & roadblock positions (foot and vehicular traffic)?	0	1	2	3	4	5	NA UO
f. Establish "trigger" lines for non-compliance?	0	1	2	3	4	5	NA UO
g. Provide overwatch with personnel?	0	1	2	3	4	5	NA UO
h. Establish search area?	0	1	2	3	4	5	NA UO
i. Identify search teams?	0	1	2	3	4	5	NA UO
j. Establish search plan (all or random numbers)?	0	1	2	3	4	5	NA UO
k. Employ Escalation of Force (EOF) measures (shout, show, shove, shoot to disable, shoot to kill/destroy)?	0	1	2	3	4	5	NA UO
l. Conduct "vehicle" search drill?	0	1	2	3	4	5	NA UO
m. Conduct personnel search drill?	0	1	2	3	4	5	NA UO
n. Coordinate UAV overwatch?	0	1	2	3	4	5	NA UO
o. Engage locals for intelligence?	0	1	2	3	4	5	NA UO
p. Detain and/or arrest individuals as necessary?	0	1	2	3	4	5	NA UO
q. Move suspects to safe/secure area for tactical questioning?	0	1	2	3	4	5	NA UO
r. Request Tactical HUMINT Team (THT) or interrogators?	Yes					No	
s. Have Tactical HUMINT Team (THT) or interrogators available?	Yes					No	
t. Employ Tactical HUMINT Team (THT) or interrogators?	0	1	2	3	4	5	NA UO
u. Coordinate with higher for Law Enforcement Program (LEP) team to conduct SSE* (forensics/evidence gathering)?	0	1	2	3	4	5	NA UO
v. Continue the mission?	0	1	2	3	4	5	NA UO
w. Provide detailed/complete event report to S2 staff upon return to FOB?	0	1	2	3	4	5	NA UO
x. Execute information operations (IO) actions to support/exploit?	0	1	2	3	4	5	NA UO



Key Equipment, Kits, and Tools (EKT) to Facilitate Operations. Place an X in each appropriate box to show whether EKT items were (1) on the SOP, (2) available for use, (3) necessary for use based upon tactical situation, (4) used. (5) Then identify, according to the scale above, how well the unit used this item to influence the tactical situation.	(1) Equipment, Kit, Tools were listed on SOP or equipment lists	(2) Equipment, Kit, Tools were available for use	(3) Item should have been used to support tactical situation	(4) Item <u>was</u> used to support tactical situation	(5) How well did the unit use this item to influence the tactical situation?							
					0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
Signs – deadly force, warning, EOF (for vehicles & cordon)					0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
Sirens					0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
Bullhorns					0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
Blinking lights					0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
Chem lights					0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
Flares					0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
Signal devices					0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
Visible lasers (for C2 at night)					0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
TacLite on weapons/M4					0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
VS17 panels					0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
Engineer tape					0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
Cones					0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
Concertina wire (pickets, pounder, wire gloves)					0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
Concrete barriers					0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
Folding barricades					0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
Blocking barricades					0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
Speed bumps					0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
Spike strips					0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
Sandbags					0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
Speedball (extra ammo, magazines, grenades, etc.)					0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
First aid kits/extra supplies/medball					0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
Litter/skidcos					0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
Helmet cameras					0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
Wands (mirrored handles for looking under vehicles)					0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
Non-lethal intervention weapons					0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
Females available to search females					0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
Metal detector					0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
Detainee kits*					0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
Hand cuff straps/zip ties					0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
Xsray					0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
Interpreter					0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO

\* BOLO – be on the lookout for (photo/description of individual or vehicle to watch for)

\* Detainee kits – Kits with unit designated items (e.g., blindfolds, detainee forms, Xsray, digital cameras, zip ties) used in capturing, questioning, processing, transporting, and incarcerating individuals

\* SSE kits – Kits with various unit designated items (e.g., rubber gloves, evidence bags, finger print capabilities, video cameras/recording devices) used to facilitate evidence collection and forensic analysis



ARROYO CENTER

***Iraq Common Event Approaches  
Dismounted Patrol (DP)  
takes sniper/SAF Questionnaire***

Check if STX/Lanes

O/C call sign \_\_\_\_\_ # of rotations with this call sign \_\_\_\_\_ Training day \_\_\_\_\_

Unit \_\_\_\_\_ Rotation \_\_\_\_\_ Battalion Mission \_\_\_\_\_

Score each activity below by how sufficiently it was done. 0 = NOT DONE – BUT should have been 1 = NOT SUFFICIENT 2 = SOMEWHAT SUFFICIENT 3 = MODERATELY SUFFICIENT 4 = COMPLETELY SUFFICIENT - the action or activity was complete, AND timely enough so that assigned tasks and/or mission <u>could</u> <u>be accomplished</u> 5 = SUPERIOR NA = NOT APPLICABLE (not required, no reason to execute) UO = UNOBSERVED BY OC	N O T  S U F F I C I E N T  D O N E	S O M E W H A T  E N O U G H	M O D E R A T E  L Y	C O M P L E T E	S U P E R I O R	N A P P L I C A B L E	U N O B S E R V E D
<b>Common actions/reminders</b>							
1. During preparation for execution and reporting, how well did the unit ...							
a. Report the following to higher and adjacent ...							
1) sitrep, status, and/or contact?	0	1	2	3	4	5	NA UO
2) 9-line medevac as needed?	0	1	2	3	4	5	NA UO
b. Assign jobs/teams to each soldier (e.g., security, breach, litter)?	0	1	2	3	4	5	NA UO
c. Brief Rules of Engagement (ROE)?	0	1	2	3	4	5	NA UO
d. Request air support (AWT*/UAV)?	0	1	2	3	4	5	NA UO
e. Call and update squads/platoons/convoy?	0	1	2	3	4	5	NA UO
f. Post all reports (9-line & others) in vehicles?	0	1	2	3	4	5	NA UO
g. Prepare PAO/IO release?	0	1	2	3	4	5	NA UO
<b>Event execution checklist</b>							
2. During event execution, how well did the unit ...							
a. React to sniper contact?	0	1	2	3	4	5	NA UO
b. Seek cover?	0	1	2	3	4	5	NA UO
c. Assess casualties for urgency & assist/treat as necessary?	0	1	2	3	4	5	NA UO
d. Engage/suppress enemy fire?	0	1	2	3	4	5	NA UO
e. Secure area?	0	1	2	3	4	5	NA UO
f. Cordon area?	0	1	2	3	4	5	NA UO
g. Begin casevac/medevac procedures (ground/air as situation dictates)?	0	1	2	3	4	5	NA UO
h. Alert/clear locals?	0	1	2	3	4	5	NA UO
i. Shield dismounts/casualty with vehicles?	0	1	2	3	4	5	NA UO
j. Maneuver vehicles to facilitate casevac, exfiltration, or assault?	0	1	2	3	4	5	NA UO
k. Identify 3D's (distance, direction, description) of gun fire?	0	1	2	3	4	5	NA UO
l. Determine source of gun fire (shooter & location)?	0	1	2	3	4	5	NA UO
m. Mark on FBCB2?	0	1	2	3	4	5	NA UO
n. Request/coordinate air weapons team/UAV?	0	1	2	3	4	5	NA UO
o. Request QRF/backup?	0	1	2	3	4	5	NA UO
p. Search teams designated?	0	1	2	3	4	5	NA UO
q. Building/structure/room search and/or clear as necessary?	0	1	2	3	4	5	NA UO
r. Engage locals for intelligence?	0	1	2	3	4	5	NA UO
s. Execute squad/platoon movement and/or attack?	0	1	2	3	4	5	NA UO
t. Continue mission/break contact?	0	1	2	3	4	5	NA UO
u. Coordinate with higher for Law Enforcement Program (LEP) team to conduct SSE* (forensics/evidence gathering)?	0	1	2	3	4	5	NA UO
v. Provide detailed/complete IED/event report to S2 staff upon return to FOB?	0	1	2	3	4	5	NA UO
w. Execute information operations (IO) actions to support/exploit?	0	1	2	3	4	5	NA UO

<b>Key Equipment, Kits, and Tools (EKT) to Facilitate Operations.</b> Place an X in each appropriate box to show whether EKT items were (1) on the SOP, (2) available for use, (3) necessary for use based upon tactical situation, (4) used. (5) Then identify, according to the scale above, how well the unit used this item to influence the tactical situation.	(1) Equipment, Kit, Tools were listed on SOP or equipment lists	(2) Equipment, Kit, Tools were available for use	(3) Item should have been used to support tactical situation	(4) Item <u>was</u> used to support tactical situation	(5) How well did the unit use this item to influence the tactical situation?							
					0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
Signs – deadly force, warning, EOF (for vehicles & cordon)					0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
Bullhorns					0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
Blinking lights					0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
Visible lasers (for C2 at night)					0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
Concertina wire (pickets, pounder, wire gloves)					0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
"Hoolie tools*" for breaking/entering/repairing doors, locks, windows					0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
Extra locks to replace cut ones					0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
First aid kits/extra supplies/medball					0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
CLS bags (stocked)					0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
Litter/skidcos					0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
Countermeasure smoke for concealment					0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
Non-lethal intervention weapons					0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
Detainee kits*					0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
Hand cuff straps/zip ties					0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
Sensitive site exploitation kits (SSE)*					0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
Interpreter					0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO

\* AWT – Air Weapons Team

\* Hoolie tools – kit with various unit designated tools (e.g., crow bars, wrenches, pliers, hammers) used to force open windows, doors, fences, walls, or floors during searches

\* Detainee kits – Kits with unit designated items (e.g., blindfolds, detainee forms, Xsray, digital cameras, zip ties) used in capturing, questioning, processing, transporting, and incarcerating individuals

\* SSE kits – Kits with various unit designated items (e.g., rubber gloves, evidence bags, finger print capabilities, video cameras/recording devices) used to facilitate evidence collection and forensic analysis



ARROYO CENTER

### Iraq Common Event Approaches Cordon & Search (CS) Questionnaire

☐ Check if STX/Lanes

O/C call sign \_\_\_\_\_ # of rotations with this call sign \_\_\_\_\_ Training day \_\_\_\_\_

Unit \_\_\_\_\_ Rotation \_\_\_\_\_ Battalion Mission \_\_\_\_\_

Score each activity below by how sufficiently it was done. 0 = NOT DONE – BUT should have been 1 = NOT SUFFICIENT 2 = SOMEWHAT SUFFICIENT 3 = MODERATELY SUFFICIENT 4 = <b>COMPLETELY SUFFICIENT</b> - the action or activity was complete, AND timely enough so that assigned tasks and/or mission <u>could be accomplished</u> 5 = <b>SUPERIOR</b> NA = <b>NOT APPLICABLE</b> (not required, no reason to execute) UO = <b>UNOBSERVED BY OC</b>	NOT DONE	SUFFICIENT	SOMEWHAT	MODERATELY	COMPLETE	SUPERIOR	NOT APPLICABLE	UNOBSERVED
<b>Common actions/reminders</b>								
1. During preparation for execution and reporting, how well did the unit								
a. Report the following to higher and adjacent ...								
1) sitrep, status, and/or contact?	0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
2) 9-line medevac as needed?	0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
b. Conduct rock drills (internally & with Local friendly forces)?	0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
c. Conduct rehearsals (internally & with Local friendly forces)?	0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
d. Brief movement, convoy, and withdrawal?	0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
e. Brief Rules of Engagement (ROE)?	0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
f. Disseminate photos/description of BOLO*/high value targets?	0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
g. Request air support (AWT*/UAV)?	0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
h. Call & update squads/platoons/convoy?	0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
i. Assign jobs/teams to each soldier (e.g., security, breach, litter)?	0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
j. Prepare PAO/IO release?	0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
<b>Event execution checklist</b>								
2. During event execution, how well did the unit ...								
a. Call & coordinate Local Army & Local Police involvement (brief specifics late to avoid compromise)?	0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
b. Conduct recon (map/driving) with informant as available?	0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
c. Establish (by recon) cordon/search area and withdrawal plan?	0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
d. Search teams identified/designated?	0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
e. Secure area/site?	0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
f. Cordon area?	0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
g. Put vehicles in overwatch & roadblock (foot and vehicular traffic)?	0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
h. Maneuver vehicles to facilitate support to casevac, exfiltration, or assault?	0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
i. Establish dismounted security?	0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
j. Establish overwatch (snipers/marksmen)?	0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
k. Coordinate UAV overwatch?	0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
l. Search houses within cordon including informant's house?	0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
m. Conduct building/structure/room search & clear operations as necessary?	0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
n. Employ helmet cameras?	0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
o. Confiscate contraband?	0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
p. Engage locals for intelligence?	0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
q. Detain and/or arrest as necessary?	0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
r. Move suspects to safe/secure area for tactical questioning?	0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
s. Request Tactical HUMINT Team (THT) or interrogators?							Yes	No
t. Have Tactical HUMINT Team (THT) or interrogators available?							Yes	No
u. Employ Tactical HUMINT Team (THT) or interrogators?	0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
v. Coordinate with higher for Law Enforcement Program (LEP) team to conduct SSE* (forensics/evidence gathering)?	0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
w. Continue mission?	0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
x. Provide detailed/complete event report to S2 staff upon return to FOB?	0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
y. Execute Information Operations (IO) actions to support/exploit?	0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO

Key Equipment, Kits, and Tools (EKT) to Facilitate Operations. Place an X in each appropriate box to show whether EKT items were (1) on the SOP, (2) available for use, (3) necessary for use based upon tactical situation, (4) used. (5) Then identify, according to the scale above, how well the unit used this item to influence the tactical situation.	(1) Equipment, Kit, Tools were listed on SOP or equipment lists	(2) Equipment, Kit, Tools were available for use	(3) Item should have been used to support tactical situation	(4) Item <u>was</u> used to support tactical situation	(5) How well did the unit use this item to influence the tactical situation?							
					0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
Signs – deadly force, warning, EOF (for vehicles & cordon as necessary)					0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
Sirens					0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
Bullhorns					0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
Blinking lights					0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
Visible lasers (for C2 at night)					0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
Cones					0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
Concertina wire (pickets, pounder, wire gloves)					0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
Folding barricades					0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
“Hoolie tools**” for breaking/entering/repairing doors, locks, windows					0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
Demolitions					0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
Gate stickers to mark cleared houses					0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
First aid kits/extra supplies/medball					0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
Litter/skidcos					0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
Non-lethal intervention weapons					0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
Police dogs					0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
Metal detector					0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
Detainee kits*					0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
Hand cuff straps/zip ties					0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
Xsray					0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
Sensitive site exploitation kits (SSE)*					0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
Informant disguises/uniform/mask					0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
Interpreter					0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO

\* AWT – Air Weapons Team

\* BOLO – be on the lookout for (photo/description of individual or vehicle to watch for)

\* Detainee kits – Kits with unit designated items (e.g. blindfolds, detainee forms, Xsray, digital cameras, zip ties) used in capturing, questioning, processing, transporting, and incarcerating individuals

\* SSE kits – Kits with various unit designated items (e.g. rubber gloves, evidence bags, finger print capabilities, video cameras/recording devices) used to facilitate evidence collection and forensic analysis

***Iraq Common Event Approaches  
Conduct Consequence Management  
Operations (CM) Questionnaire***

Unit	Rotation	Battalion Mission
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Score each activity below by how sufficiently it was done.	NOT DONE	NOT SUFFICIENT	SOMEWHAT	MODERATELY	COMPLETE	SUPERIOR	NOT APPLICABLE	UNOBSERVED
0 = NOT DONE – BUT should have been								
NA = NOT APPLICABLE (not required, no reason to execute)								
UO = UNOBSERVED BY OC								
<b>Common actions/reminders</b>								
1. During preparation for execution and reporting, how well did the unit								
a. Report the following to higher and adjacent ...								
1) sitrep, status, and/or contact?	0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
2) 9-line medevac as needed?	0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
b. Conduct PCC/PCI?	0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
c. Assign jobs/teams to each Soldier (e.g., security, breach, litter)?	0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
d. Brief Rules of Engagement (ROE)?	0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
e. Call & update squads/platoons/convoy?	0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
f. Prepare PAO/IO release?	0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
<b>Event execution checklist</b>								
2. During event execution, how well did the unit ...								
a. Call/coordinate Civil Affairs (CA) & Tactical Psyops Team (TPT) support?	0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
b. Call & coordinate Local Army & Local Police involvement?	0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
c. Secure area/site?	0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
d. Cordon area?	0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
e. Isolate with vehicles?	0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
f. Put vehicles in overwatch & roadblock positions (foot & vehicular traffic)?	0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
g. Maneuver vehicles to facilitate casevac, exfiltration, or assault?	0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
h. Assess & assist casualties?	0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
i. Treat Local National (LN) casualties?	0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
j. Begin casevac?	0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
k. Engage locals for intelligence?	0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
l. Detain and/or arrest as necessary?	0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
m. Move suspects to safe/secure area for tactical questioning?	0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
n. Request Tactical HUMINT Team (THT) or interrogators?	Yes					No		
o. Have Tactical HUMINT Team (THT) or interrogators available?	Yes					No		
p. Employ Tactical HUMINT Team (THT) or interrogators?	0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
q. Maintain appropriate respect of local people and customs?	0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
r. Pay for terrorist damage?	Yes					No		
s. Coordinate with higher for Law Enforcement Program (LEP) team to conduct SSE* (forensics/evidence gathering) as necessary?	0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
t. Use TPT to highlight damage?	0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
u. Provide detailed/complete event report to S2 staff upon return to FOB?	0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
v. Execute Information Operations (IO) actions to support/exploit?	0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO

Key Equipment, Kits, and Tools (EKT) to Facilitate Operations. Place an X in each appropriate box to show whether EKT items were (1) on the SOP, (2) available for use, (3) necessary for use based upon tactical situation, (4) used. (5) Then identify, according to the scale above, how well the unit used this item to influence the tactical situation.	(1) Equipment, Kit, Tools were listed on SOP or equipment lists	(2) Equipment, Kit, Tools were available for use	(3) Item should have been used to support tactical situation	(4) Item <u>was</u> used to support tactical situation	(5) How well did the unit use this item to influence the tactical situation?							
Signs – deadly force, warning, EOF (for vehicles & cordon as necessary)					0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
Bullhorns					0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
Cones					0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
Concertina wire (pickets, pounder, wire gloves)					0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
Spike strips					0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
Body bags					0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
First aid kits/extra supplies/medball					0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
Litter/skidcos					0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
Wands (mirrored handles for looking under vehicles)					0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
Detainee kits*					0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
Hand cuff straps/zip ties					0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
Digital camera					0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
Xsray					0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
Sensitive site exploitation kits (SSE)*					0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
Interpreter					0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO
Reference card local government names and phone numbers					0	1	2	3	4	5	NA	UO

\* Detainee kits – Kits with unit designated items (e.g., blindfolds, detainee forms, Xsray, digital cameras, zip ties) used in capturing, questioning, processing, transporting, and incarcerating individuals

\* SSE kits – Kits with various unit designated items (e.g., rubber gloves, evidence bags, finger print capabilities, video cameras/recording devices) used to facilitate evidence collection and forensic analysis

## CTC Observer Questionnaire Instructions

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### RAND Arroyo Center Platoon/Company *“Iraq Common Event Approaches” instructions*

The data you provide on the questionnaires allow RAND researchers to provide objective feedback to Senior Army Leaders in many areas and ways (including how well trained our forces are prior to coming to the CTCs and how well prepared they are to address common events faced by units in Iraq) to inform Army decisions.

The data are always kept confidential, with no unit identities ever being disclosed to anyone. The feedback is averaged over many units in order to provide accurate information to leaders without disclosing information about units.

If you have any questions, contact Bryan Hallmark, [hallmark@rand.org](mailto:hallmark@rand.org), 310.393.0411 X6312 or COL S. Jamie Gayton [jgayton@rand.org](mailto:jgayton@rand.org) 310.393.0411 X7636 at the RAND Corporation.

### Questionnaire/key card instructions

**There are 10 different questionnaires, each one associated with a specific event commonly experienced by units in a contingency theater like Iraq. They are:**

**[IED] Probable, PIED, identified by a patrol**

**[QRF] Respond as QRF to a “hot” area**

**[DP] Dismounted Patrol takes sniper/small arms fire**

**[ROE] ROE engagement (escalation of force) of POV with SAF**

**[HD] Conduct Hasty/Deliberate Check Point**

**[IF] Indirect Fire on Platoon/Company/Battalion JSS/COP/FOB**

**[CS] Conduct Cordon and Search**

**[RD] Conduct a Raid in coordination with the Iraqi Army**

**[MS] Secure site for a habitual meeting of Iraqi DAC (District Advisory Council)**

**[CM] Conduct Consequence Management Operations**

*Throughout the STX lanes or battle period, we ask that you complete one card the FIRST TIME that each specific event is faced by the unit for which you are the OC. In the event a unit receives a redo on an event, please ensure that we collect data only from the first time they face a specific event.*



*Do NOT wait until the end of the rotation to complete the questionnaires. Try to complete them as soon after each STX lane or battle period that the questionnaires' data represent.*

*The questionnaires are designed to measure how well 1) common actions/reminders are executed, 2) specific skills (from event execution checklist) are employed, and 3) equipment and tools are used. Each item (an action, skill, or equipment/tool) should be scored independent of the others. For example, if secure a site was not done well, but the unit reacted to direct contact well, then secure a site should be scored lower than react to direct contact.*

The questionnaire is divided into 4 sections: 1) Header Data; 2) Common Actions/Reminders; 3) Event Execution Checklist (skills); and 4) Equipment, Kits, and Tools. Each section is explained below.

### ***Section I: Header Data***

We ask that you provide critical information on the top of the questionnaire; an explanation of each field follows:

**OC call sign** = please provide your complete call sign. For example, if your call sign is "S12B" then please put down this call sign, and NOT just "12B."

**# of rotations with this call sign** = You may have been an OC previously, but we only want the number of rotations that you have had this call sign. Your first rotation should be a "1" not a zero.

**Training Day** = This field should be the last day of the period the data cover. For example, if the data represent observations from training days 3 & 4, this field should be a "4."

**Check if STX/Lanes** = Check this box if the data represent STX or lane training. Please do not have STX and "in the box" data on the same questionnaire.

**Unit** = We need **PLT/CO/BN/BDE**. We keep the unit identifier confidential! We need this information to correctly correlate the data from this questionnaire with data from other sources. These other sources include training data from unit QTBs.

**Rotation** = This should identify the rotation number and fiscal year such as 08-08.

**Battalion Mission** = If a STX Lane, *please identify the title of the STX lane*, if a battalion training event, please identify the title of the training event.

### ***Sections II & III: Common Actions/Reminders Assigned During Battle Period and Skills from the Event Execution Checklist***

In this section, the general "lead-in" question is "How well did the unit ..."

If the action or skill **should have been done**, please circle the appropriate number on the **0-5 scale** based on the description provided on the questionnaire.

If you **did not observe** the action or skill being completed, please **circle the UO** (unobserved). If conditions **did not require** the unit to conduct the action or skill then please **circle NA** (not applicable). Marking NA is important because it specifically tells us the item did not need to be done, as opposed to a zero that would mean it was not done, but should have been.

There are a small number of items where the lead-in question is more appropriately “Did the unit request, have, or use ...” These questions have a Yes or No scale that requires no additional explanation.

***Section IV: Equipment, Kits, and Tools (EKT)***

Because units usually conduct multiple missions/tasks during a single battle period or STX Lane, we want to be able to assess the availability and use of each piece of relevant EKT for each type of mission/task or STX Lane conducted. To achieve the above, we ask that you mark each column with an X as appropriate:

EKT were listed on unit SOP or equipment lists (X if yes, blank if No);

EKT were available for use (X if yes, blank if No);

EKT (item) should have been used to support the tactical situation—using OC experience/judgment (X if yes, blank if No);

EKT (item) was used to support tactical situation (X if yes, blank if No). Please note that for column 4 to receive an X for a specific EKT, then column 2 must also receive an X for that same EKT;

How well did the unit use EKT to influence the tactical situation (same scale as was described above in Sections II & III).

Thank you for your time and effort completing these important questionnaires. The results will help the Army’s senior leaders make important decisions and improve its warfighters’ forums.



## Unit-Level Performance Regression Description

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The following variables were created from the data: treatment, event scenario, site, training day assessed, and experience of the observer; these are shown in Table 4.3, repeated here for convenience. Treatment was a categorical variable that identified whether the unit received the handbook (1 = received, 0 = not received). The ten event scenarios were “1” and “0” categorical variables that identified what training event occurred. Site was a categorical variable that identified whether the assessment occurred at NTC or JRTC. The CTC rotation training days 1–15 were collapsed into three groups representing natural break points within the training rotation, early (training days 1–4), middle (training days 5–9), and late (training days 10–15). Interaction terms were also introduced to test the significance of treatment and the training day group interaction. Additionally, to test the significance of treatment on each individual event form, interaction terms between treatment and form were also modeled.

The initial regression model’s coefficients, t-statistics, and annotation of significance for all variables and the model fit statistic, adjusted  $R^2$ , are in Table I.1. Because so many variables in this full model were not statistically significant, we progressively deleted variables and estimated models with fewer variables. Because they were not statistically significant, site and observer experience were removed from subsequent models.

**Table I.1**  
**Initial (Full) Unit-Level Performance Regression Model**

Variable	Coefficient	t-statistic	Statistically Significant
Received handbook	0.37	1.34	no
Quick Reaction Force event scenario	0.16	1.33	no
Dismounted Patrol event scenario	-0.18	-1.73	no
Rules of Engagement event scenario	-0.01	-0.08	no
Conduct Checkpoint event scenario	0.03	0.28	no
React to Indirect Fire event scenario	-0.18	-1.37	no
Cordon and Search event scenario	0.05	0.49	no
Raid with Iraqi Army event scenario	0.16	1.54	no
Secure Meeting Site event scenario	-0.07	-0.65	no
Consequence Management event scenario	0.11	1.09	no
Assessed training days 1-4	-0.45	-3.45	>99%
Assessed training days 5-9	-0.33	-2.72	>99%
CTC site	-0.01	-0.06	no
Observer had more than three rotations	-0.01	0.34	no
Training days 1-4 * treatment	0.08	0.27	no
Training days 5-9 * treatment	-0.06	-0.19	no
Training days 10-15 * treatment	-0.42	-1.44	no
Quick Reaction Force * treatment	-0.12	-0.64	no
Dismounted Patrol * treatment	0.12	0.70	no
Rules of Engagement * treatment	0.01	0.04	no
Conduct Checkpoint * treatment	-0.08	-0.53	no
React to Indirect Fire * treatment	-0.20	-0.94	no
Cordon and Search * treatment	-0.12	-0.81	no
Raid with Iraqi Army * treatment	0.00	0.00	no
Secure Meeting Site * treatment	-0.13	-0.77	no
Consequence Management * treatment	-0.19	-1.10	no
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup> = 0.12			

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